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For The Sake Of Our Children: Selected Legislative
Needs Of Florida's Children
Ellen Irene Hoffenberg*
I. Introduction
The realization that children are a group of special peo-
ple-individual constituents deserving special recognition, protection
and attention-is a new concept for American jurisprudence and for
state legislators. This article reviews Florida child welfare law, focusing
on selected issues identified by numerous professionals and groups dur-
ing recent years. It specifically addresses concerns which require resolu-
tion through the passage of substantive legislation.1 This article ex-
amines first the need for uniformity and clarity in laws pertaining to
children. It then discusses specific reforms for child abuse and neglect
proceedings. Special protections needed for child victims and witnesses
in sexual and other abuse-related prosecutions are highlighted. The au-
thor recommends several specific methods of improving professional
and volunteer services for children and concludes with comments on the
current state of the needs of Florida's children and prospects for the
future.
II. The Need for Uniformity and Clarity in Legislation for
Children
Laws seeking to protect the maltreated child must be especially
clear and uniform because the persons principally responsible for en-
forcing and responding to them are non-lawyers. For example, social
workers investigate and, if necessary, initiate prosecution of cases, de-
velop written contracts, and prepare evidence; all usually without the
assistance of legal counsel. The parties to a juvenile court proceeding
*B.S. Russell Sage College; J.D. Stetson University College of Law; State Pro-
gram Director of Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program. The views expressed by the
author are not necessarily those of the Program. The author expresses gratitude for
information and research provided by House of Representatives Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services Committee staff members Judy Justice and Terry Simpson.
1. Issues requiring appropriations actions are not included in the scope of this
article.
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are generally not represented by counsel; parents are afforded the right
to counsel only in limited situations; and the child welfare agency often
appears unrepresented. Additionally, Florida has chosen a lay citizen
model for its guardian ad litem representation of children.
Most states have provided three separate focuses in child protec-
tive statutes since the passage of the federal Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act in 1974.2 The first is the criminal focus, defining
and prohibiting those child abuse and neglect acts which are criminally
punishable. The acts of the parent or other person are the focal point of
the proceedings and are measured by the degree of harm. The second
area of focus of child welfare legislation is the juvenile court. Certain
child abuse and neglect acts authorize the juvenile court to intervene in
the parent-child relationship by ordering specific services or by separat-
ing the child from the family. In this area the concern is for the partic-
ular harm to the child and the need to protect him. The third area of
emphasis is reporting. Child abuse or neglect is defined for the purpose
of requiring the reporting of such incidents to child protective agencies.
These statutory definitions of abuse and neglect also allow investigation
of the home and its danger to the child and authorize intervention on
minimal grounds for belief that the child has been abused.3
Florida's child protective laws follow this tripartite model to some
extent. Criminal statutes are contained in Chapter 827, Abuse of Chil-
dren or Disabled or Aged Persons,4 and in numerous other statutes not
necessarily directed toward the protection of children, 5 but containing
elements relevant to crimes of child abuse and neglect. 6 Chapter 415
2. 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (1974).
3. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUB. No. 79-30203, CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A GUIDE TO WORKERS 3 (1979).
4. See FLA. STAT. §§ 827.01-.05; 827.071 (1983) for definitions and descriptions
of the following: aggravated child abuse; child abuse; negligent treatment of children;
persistent nonsupport; sexual performance by a child; respectively.
5. Assault, Battery, Culpable Negligence; ch. 784; Kidnapping, False Imprison-
ment, Custody Offenses, ch. 787; Sexual Battery, ch. 794; Prostitution, ch. 796; Crime
Against Nature, Indecent Exposure, ch. 800; Bigamy, Incest, ch. 826, Obscene Litera-
ture, Profanity, ch. 847.
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.503(1),(3) (1983;formerly 827.07(2)(b-d) (1983). "Child
abuse or neglect" is defined as "harm or threatened harm to a child's physical or
mental health or welfare by the acts or omissions of the parent or other person respon-
sible for the child's welfare. See id. § 415.503(3). "Harm" includes physical or mental
injury, id. § 415.503(5); abuse, id. § 415.503(5)(a),(b); pornography and prostitution,
id. § 415.503(5)(c); acts of abandonment and neglect, id. § 415.503(5)(d)-(f).
[Vol. 8
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provides for child abuse reporting,7 investigations of reports,8 coordina-
tion of agencies, 9 evidentiary considerations at trial, 10 protective cus-
tody,"1 the use of expert diagnoses and evaluation, 12 education and
training,13 and representation of children.1 4 The jurisdiction and re-
sponsibilities of the juvenile court regarding dependent children are
contained primarily in Chapter 39, Proceedings Relating to Juveniles.1 5
However, court jurisdiction to protect dependent children is also
granted in the "reporting" statutes," the chapter devoted to agency
mandates for protection of children, 17 and in proceedings for dissolution
of marriage.1 8 Additionally, although guardianship is an important tool
7. Id. 415.504, .505, .51, .513 (1983); formerly § 827.07(3),(4),(9),(l5) (1981).
8. Id. 415.505 (1983); formerly 827.07 (4),(10)(1981).
9. Id. 415.504 (1983); formerly 827.07(4) (1981). Medical examiner must report
findings of child abuse to local law enforcement agency. The law enforcement agency
or Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is authorized to take the
child into protective custody, Id. § 415.506. HRS may create multi-disciplinary teams.
Id. § 415.505(2). HRS can notify the state attorney or law enforcement agency to
conduct a criminal investigation. Id. § 415.505(1)(g). Responsibilities of public agen-
cies, including the court, are given regarding education and training. Id. § 415.509.
10. Id. § 415.512 (Abrogation of privileged communications).
11. Id. § 415.506.
12. Id. § 415.505(2). "The department may develop and coordinate one or more
multidisciplinary child protection teams in each of the department's service districts.
The department may convene such teams when necessary to assist in its diagnostic
assessment, service, and coordination responsibilities. Members of the team may in-
clude representatives of appropriate health, mental health, social service,, legal service,
and law enforcement agencies." Id.
13. Id. § 415.509(2).
14. Id. § 415.508; formerly 827.07(16). "A guardian ad litem shall be appointed
by the court to represent the child in any child abuse or neglect judicial proceeding."
Id.
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001-39.516 (1981). Ch. 39 contains four separate sections:
Part I includes legislative intent and definitions; Part II includes proceedings for delin-
quency cases; Part III includes dependency cases and Part IV includes proceedings for
interstate placement of juveniles. It should be noted that interstate placement of depen-
dent children is contained in FLA. STAT. § 409.401 (1981). See also FLA. STAT. §
409.168 (1981) regarding children in foster care; department report and court review
status.
16. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.503(5)(f(3); 415.506(2) (1983).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 409.168, 409.401 (1981).
18. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1981) contains the only full definition of the best
interests of the child in the Florida Statutes, a concept which is the central theme of
agency and court intervention on behalf of dependent children. This section is cross-
referenced in FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2) (1981) requiring HRS to conduct a pre-disposi-
tion study, prior to disposition of dependency cases, which covers all factors defined in
1984]
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to assure permanency planning for children,19 guardianship proceedings
are the subject of a separate division of the circuit court."
Laypersons and practitioners alike become confused when at-
tempting to reconcile these various laws. For instance, a "child" is de-
fined by Chapter 415 as "any person under the age of 18 years". 21
Therefore, a report of abuse or neglect concerning a married child
under the age of 18 will trigger an investigation by the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). However, HRS can not
seek juvenile court protection for the same child because the court's
authority extends only to unmarried persons under eighteen.22 There-
fore, if the investigation leads to a determination that the child is in
danger and should be removed from the home, the court is powerless to
order the removal.2
Chapters 39 and 415 are irreconcilable as well on the issue of de-
fined acts of child abuse and neglect. The protection afforded to the
child under the "reporting" statute is broader because investigation is
less intrusive to family life than formal court intervention. However,
the definitions of harm and injury which constitute abuse and neglect 24
do not correlate well with the court's protective powers.25 HRS may
investigate a report of child neglect where the parents do not have suf-
ficient financial resources to care for the child and the court may order
medical services for such a child .2 However, if the parent resists inter-
§ 61.13(3).
19. See, Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Permanence for Children
in Foster Care in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 150 (M. Hardin ed. 1983). The
court is allowed to place the child with relatives and others on a temporary basis. How-
ever, only temporary legal custody is provided. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(1)(b) (1981).
20. See FLA. STAT. §§ 744.101-744.531 (1981) regarding guardianship. Hardin
distinguishes between those states which grant guardianship within juvenile proceed-
ings and those which require petitioning a different division of the court. The latter is a
more difficult and multi-staged process. Hardin, supra note 19, at 150.
21. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(2)(1983); See also FLA. STAT. 827.01(1) (1981).
22. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(7) (1981).
23. FLA. STAT. § 415.506 (1983).
24. See supra note 6.
25. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(1),(2),(26)(1983). Rather than limiting court jurisdic-
tion by strict definitions of child abuse or neglect, it is recommended that court review
of prevention and reunification services prior to authorizing removal of the child be
used as the mechanism of assuring that agency and court intervention is limited to the
most serious of cases. See infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text. Florida's law pres-
ently places an arbitrary distinction between children protected by reporting laws, and
those able to seek court protection.
26. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(5)(f) (1983). Financial inability does not eliminate the
[Vol. 8
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vention, the court does not have authority to declare the child depen-
dent, since according to the definitions in Chapter 3927 a child cannot
be considered neglected if the sole basis for neglect is his parents'
financial inability to care for him. A similar disparity between statutes
occurs in the definition of abandonment. The "reporting" statute de-
fines abandonment in simple terms as the time when a parent "aban-
dons" the child.28 This definition permits agency intervention when it
determines from the circumstances that a child's caretakers exhibit an
intent to withdraw protection or support. However, the juvenile court is
not immediately able to take the child into its care because abandon-
ment for its jurisdiction carries a requirement that the lack of support
or communication with the child continues for a period of six months or
longer.29 Similarly, although the court may not find the child legally
abandoned if the abandonment arises from a parent's lack of ability or
capacity to care for him,30 Chapter 415 makes no distinction between
voluntary or involuntary acts of abandonment. Further, the respective
laws do not share a consistent definition of the caretaker, be it parent,
guardian, or custodian, whose alleged acts of abuse or neglect warrant
scrutiny.3 1 The acts also fail to provide clear direction on those circum-
stances when caretakers should be offered an opportunity to voluntarily
accept services, rather than be forced by the court to do so.32
requirement that the case be investigated nor preclude the court from ordering medical
services.
27. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(26) (1983) states in part that " 'Neglect' occurs when
the parent or other legal custodian, though financially able, deprives a child
of.. .food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment ... " Id. (emphasis added).
28. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(5)(d) (1983).
29. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1) (1983). Abandoned means a situation in which a par-
ent, who, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no
effort to communicate with the child for a period of 6 months or longer. Id. See infra
notes 75-100 and accompanying text.
30. FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (1981). See In the Interest of P.S. v. State, 384 So. 2d
656 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
31. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(3), (5) (1983) provides for the protection of children
who are abused or neglected by a parent "or other person responsible for the child's
welfare." Id. This includes the child's legal guardian, custodian, foster parent, and em-
ployee of a day care center, residential home or institution; or other person legally
responsible for the child's welfare in a residential setting. Id. § 415.503(9).
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9) (1981) defines acts of dependency as applying to parents or
other custodians. Legal custody is defined in § 39.01(21), but the term custodian is not.
The language contained in chapter 415 is recommended as more appropriate.
32. FLA. STAT. § 415.505(1)(e) (1983) provides that if the Department deter-
mines that a child requires immediate or long-term protection through (1) medical or
1984]
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Child abuse and neglect laws must function within a scheme that
allows both intervention and the eventual withdrawal of agencies and
the court so that the child can be restored to a family which is able to
care for him without state interference. Laws contained in separate
chapters must, therefore, clearly relate to one another, and facilitate
protective intervention in a consistent manner. Inconsistencies must be
resolved in favor of the maximum protection of the child, not the adult.
The child's well-being must be deferred to in any balancing test.
III. Specific Reforms For Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings
A. Voluntary Agreements for Services
Once it is determined that a child has been abused or neglected,
and that services or placement outside the home will be necessary to
protect the child, Florida law's encourages offering such services on a
voluntary, rather than court-ordered, basis. Typically in such a case the
parents will agree in writing to pursue a course of services in exchange
for HRS not filing formal dependency proceedings. This course is con-
sistent with legislative intent to preserve family life with minimal state
intervention.3 The offer of voluntary services is, however, tempered by
HRS responsibility to protect the child, if it later proves necessary, by
initiating court proceedings. 5 The specific circumstances under which
other health care, (2) homemaker care, day care, protective supervision, or other ser-
vices to stabilize the home environment, or (3) foster care, shelter care, or other substi-
tute care to remove the child from his parents' custody, such services shall first be
offered for the voluntary acceptance of the parents or other person responsible for the
child's welfare, who shall be informed of the right to refuse services as well as the
Department's responsibility to protect the child regardless of the acceptance or refusal
of services. If the services are refused or the Department deems that the child's need
for protection so requires, the Department shall take the child into protective custody
or petition the court as provided in chapter 39. The statute does not define which cases
are serious enough to warrant court intervention. Chapter 415 fails to require consent
of the child prior to entry into voluntary agreements. FLA. STAT. § 39.403(2)(b) re-
quires consent of the child. Neither statute sets forth criteria for reviewing consent of
the child or parent.
33. See supra note 32.
34. FLA. STAT. § 415.502 (1983) sets forth the legislative intent. FLA. STAT. §
39.001(2) (1981) lists the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act.
35. FLA. STAT. § 415.505(1)(e) (1983) states in part: "If the services are refused
or the department deems that the child's need for protection so requires, the depart-
[Vol. 8
9
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Selected Legislative Needs
a child is considered to be in danger are not clear, and practitioners are
left unguided as to whether the consent of the child is necessary to an
effective voluntary service agreement.36
Agreements, in general, between agencies and parents have been
the subject of considerable criticism on the grounds that a child cannot
be made the subject of a contract with the same force and effect as if
he were a mere chattel. 37 Voluntary agreements are useful to circum-
vent the formal legal process or to avoid the bitterly contested hearings
which may hinder later treatment and increase parents' antagonism to
agency services.38 However, such agreements may be perceived by par-
ents as unwarranted pressure to admit the need for help or wrongdoing,
and are often based on the interest of the parents and agency without
full consideration of the child's interests.39 Similar concerns are raised
when the court is requested to amend a petition alleging abuse or neg-
lect in order to make the allegations more acceptable to the parties, or
to use pre-adjudicatory hearing plans which defer actions on filed peti-
tions.40 In these cases, the child is not represented, and is therefore not
afforded an effective voice in the decisionmaking.41
Voluntary agreements may be the best choice where the parents
are amenable to help and the child is believed to be free from danger.
However, they should not be used where there is prior evidence of
abuse, neglect, or resistance by the parents to offered services. The ad-
ment shall take the child into protective custody or petition the court as provided in
chapter 39." Id.
36. FLA. STAT. § 39.403 (2)(b) (1981) states: "If the intake officer determines
that the report or complaint [of child abuse] is complete, but that in his judgment the
interest of the child and the public will be best served by providing the child care or
other treatment voluntarily accepted by the child and his parents or legal custodians,
the intake officer may refer the child for such care or other treatment." Id. (emphasis
added). FLA. STAT. § 415.505(l)(e) (1983) refers only to acceptance by the parent.
37. See Cipriani, Disposition 1 (March 25, 1982) (Nat. Coll. of Juv. and Fam.
Ct. Judges; children at Risk conference manual).
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id at 1.
40. See e.g., Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.130 (West 1983). The new rule proposed by the
Juvenile Rules Committee requires the consent of the child and the guardian ad litem
where appointed. Such plans rarely contain stipulations to facts of abuse or neglect. If
violated, there is no provision for recording the child's statement, or preservation of
other important evidence.
41. The practice of appointing an advocate to represent the child in agency pro-
ceedings to pursue voluntary agreements prior to court intervention should be
encouraged.
19841
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vantages of informal disposition are outweighed by the need to estab-
lish a court record:42
Court proceedings create a record of the facts surrounding the
placement. Complete transcripts, detailed petitions, orders, and
findings of fact can create complete information for later court pro-
ceedings if efforts to work with the natural parent prove unsuccess-
ful. The attorney should be aware that the facts surrounding the
original placement will be an important part of a termination pro-
ceeding, should that later become necessary.48
The problems involved with voluntary agreements made outside of
court proceedings cannot be cured by court review, since the judge will
probably do little more than ask the parent whether the consent to the
agreement is voluntary, and whether the allegations of abuse or neglect
are true."
In recent years, there have been efforts to categorically define the
types of cases serious enough to receive judicial review on a non-discre-
tionary basis. Alternative legislative drafts have proposed that indepen-
dent multidisciplinary child protection teams review agency recommen-
dations to divert cases from judicial review where the child has been
sexually abused, there is evidence of failure to thrive, or there is visible
injury to a child under the age of five. These types of cases have been
identified as the least likely to be resolved by voluntary rehabilitation,
and include children at the highest risk for additional injury or death.
It is believed that this type of legislation has been repeatedly rejected
because of antipathy to greater court intervention in family life and the
expense involved. Ensuing child protection team review of all cases in
the most serious category would require significant funding increases.
Court review of such cases would also involve greater financial costs
since at present less than five percent of the reported cases of child
abuse and neglect in Florida receive judicial attention.45
Florida Statutes section 409.168, popularly known as the Skinner
Bill, attempts to provide timely court review of voluntary placements in
foster care if the child remains in placement longer than thirty days or
42. Hardin, Setting Limits on Voluntary Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN
THE COURTS 72 (M. Hardin ed. 1983).
43. Id. at 73.
44. Id. at 78.
45. FLA. HRS, 1982 REPORT.
[Wdl. 8
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is placed in foster care twice within one year.46 HRS is requiied to
draft a written performance agreement, with the participation of the
parents, outlining the actions that the parents will take to resume cus-
tody of the child.4' The performance agreement must then be submit-
ted to the court to assure court review within six months of the date
that the court is notified of the placement in foster care. However,
courts have consistently not reviewed such voluntary placements be-
cause they lack dependency jurisdiction. The court has not conducted a
hearing on allegations of abuse and neglect properly brought upon a
petition or found the child to be dependent and in need of out-of-home
placement, and, therefore, the court has no jurisdictional basis for exer-
cising its power over the child. 48 Proposed legislation 49 would amelio-
rate this problem by: 1) amending the definition of dependency to in-
clude a child who has been voluntarily placed in care as set forth in
section 409.168, Florida Statutes, where the parents have failed to sub-
stantially comply with the terms of a written performance agreement,50
and 2) amending section 409.168, Florida Statutes, to clearly state that
upon submission to the court of a performance agreement, the court
shall review the agreement to determine if it complies with law. This
provision is necessary since submission to the court for approval of the
agreement under section 409.168 does not assure timely review by the
court, nor specify that the court has the power to accept or reject the
46. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(3)(a)(4) (1981).
47. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(3)(a), (3)(a)(6)(a-g) (1981).
48. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(3)(f(2) (1981). Section 409.168(3)(8) mandates court
review of children placed voluntarily in foster care after six months from court notifica-
tion of voluntary placement. Although the agency is required to draft and submit a
performance agreement for these children, the agreement would not constitute a peti-
tion for initiation under chapter 39. Section 39.404(l) requires the filing of a petition
alleging the child to be dependent pursuant to § 39.01(9). Therefore, the court must
first find the child to be dependent and thereafter review placement of the child.
49. HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES COMMITTEE, FLA. HousE BILL 399
(1984). See also Senate Bill 273. The proposed legislation has been the subject of
committee review since 1981, and represents important and major changes to chapter
39 and chapter 409. The proposed changes will hereinafter be referenced to present
law.
50. Proposed amendments to § 39.01(9)(8) (through an additional category of
dependency: "Child found to be dependent includes a child who has been voluntarily
placed with a licensed child caring agency or the Department, whereupon, pursuant to
409.108 a performance agreement has expired and the parent has failed to substan-
tially comply with the requirements. .. ").
1984]
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proposed agreement.51
B. Tightening Guidelines for Removing Abused or Neglected
Children from Their Homes
When a report of abuse or neglect is investigated and it appears
that the child is in imminent danger, 2 he may be taken into protective
custody.53 If the child is held in protective custody for longer than
twenty-four hours, a petition must be filed requesting the court to au-
thorize his continued detention." Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, pro-
vides broad guidelines for taking a child into custody. There must be:
reasonable grounds to believe that the child has been abandoned,
abused, or neglected, is suffering from illness or injury, or is in
immediate danger from his surroundings and that his removal is
necessary to protect the child or if the custodian of a child under
protective supervision has violated in a material way a condition of
the placement imposed by the court.5
The lack of more specific guidelines has been the subject of contin-
uing debate.5 It is. argued that the broad terms used in most statutes
51. Id. Proposed amendments to § 409.168(3) add a section, entitled "Review by
the court" to present section regarding performance agreements, which reads in part:
"[u]pon submission of a performance agreement to the court, the court shall review the
agreement to determine if the agreement is consistent with previous orders of the court
placing the child in care and with the requirements for the content of a performance
agreement as provided in paragraph (3)(c). The court may set a hearing with notice to
all parties on the agreement and any provisions thereof." Id.
52. FLA. STAT. § 415.506 (1983) states in part that if the condition of the child
is such, that continuing the child in the child's place of residence or in the care or
custody of the parents... presents an imminent danger to the child's life or physical or
mental health." Id. (emphasis added.). See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text
which notes the lack of guidelines for the types of cases considered dangerous.
53. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(6) (1981) allows law enforcement, HRS, hospital per-
sonnel, or a doctor to take the child into protective custody.
54. Id. Thereafter the child must meet detention criteria specified in FLA. STAT.
§ 39.402 (1981).
55. FLA. STAT. § 39.401(1) (1981).
56. See A. FREUD, T. GOLDSTEIN & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter cited as A. FREUD], wherein the authors argue that
agencies and courts are unable to adequately deal with the most serious cases of abuse
and neglect, and should not attempt to broaden the net of protection to include all
suspected cases of abuse and neglect.
[Vol. 8
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allow unnecessary removal of children from their parents by not care-
fully defining the specific types of harm which warrant removal.5 The
Institute for Judicial Administration-American Bar Association (IJA-
ABA) Joint Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect 58 propose that
state legislatures limit court intervention to those cases where the child
is endangered and likely to suffer additional harm. 9 This would require
a showing of serious physical injury such as disfigurement or impair-
ment of a bodily function, broken bones or severe bruising. 0 Those op-
posing stricter guidelines argue that in attempting to accommodate the
conflict between parental autonomy and state intervention, the propo-
nents of such standards fail to appreciate and distinguish the ranges of
intervention. They assume, often erroneously, that court-ordered ser-
vices have a negative impact on the child and family. Moreover, a child
who does not display specific physical injury can still suffer the physical
pain and emotional trauma occasioned by parental abuse. Under the
IJA-ABA guidelines that child is denied access to court-imposed ser-
vices. 61 Initial agency intervention on a minimal basis must be justified
by the same showing of serious danger that is required to remove a
child from his home. It is likely under these proposed standards that
the child without visible injuries will "fall through the cracks," only to
come to the court's attention later with much more serious or fatal
injuries.
In addition to stricter definitions of the types of trauma that war-
rant intervention, attempts have been made to ensure that an agency
provides sufficient services to the family to avoid long-term removal.
The court is required to review the agency's documented efforts before
it can authorize the continued detention of the child. 2 Overreaction to
57. See Lowry, The Judge v. The Social Worker: Can Arbitrary Decision Mak-
ing Be Tempered by the Courts, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033 (1977); Note, Synopsis:
Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1977).
58. These standards are committee proposals and have not been approved by the
IJA-ABA as an organization. See generally M. HARDIN & P. TAZZARA, TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: A SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF GROUNDS FROM NINE
MODEL ACTS 34 (1981) (for a discussion of ABA standards for court intervention).
59. Id., Standard 8.2 at 34. See also id., Standard 6.4 at 35.
60. Id., Standard 2.1A at 35. See also McCathren, Accountability in the Child
Protection System, 57 B.U. L. REv. 707 (1977).
61. Bourne & Newberger, "Family Autonomy" or "Coercive Intervention"?
Ambiguity and Conflict in the Proposed Standards For Child Abuse & Neglect, 57
B.U. L. REV. 670 (1977).
62. A.B.A. NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY &
PROTECTION, TIGHTENING POLICIES GOVERNING THE INITIAL REMOVAL OF CHILDREN
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alleged abuse or neglect and the immediate removal of the child from
the parents' custody has often resulted in unnecessary placement of mi-
nors outside of the home and sometimes into extended foster care.63
Federal law requires that prior to the placement of a child, efforts must
be made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal by the social
service agency.64 The court must find that continuation in the home
would be contrary to the child's best interests and that the agency's
efforts to re-unite the family have been reasonable.6 5 Since states vary
in terminology, it is often difficult to determine at what point the court
is required to make this determination. It is important that judicial re-
view occur as closely in time as possible to the actual removal. How-
ever, review should not occur prior to the parties having had an oppor-
tunity to fully explore efforts to prevent removal.66
Proposed Florida legislation clarifies existing uncertainties by re-
quiring court review throughout the various stages-at detention or
shelter hearings, arraignment hearings, subsequent detention review
hearings, adjudicatory hearings, and disposition hearings.67 Thus, at
the initial hearing the court would be required to determine that there
is probable cause to believe that the child is dependent 8 and that the
"department has made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the
need or removal of the child from his home. ' 69 In order to allow HRS,
guardians ad litem, prosecutors, and child protection teams sufficient
time to make and document reasonable preventive efforts, the proposed
legislation extends the time for which shelter care can be authorized
from fourteen to twenty-one days.7 0 Additionally, the proposed legisla-
tion encourages the use of an arraignment hearing to assure that par-
ents are represented by counsel and to help determine whether a con-
(monograph no. 12) (1980).
63. Wienerman, Improving Practice to Avoid Unnecessary Placements, in Fos-
TER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 12 (M. Hardin ed. 1983).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1980).
65. Id.
66. Hardin, Memorandum to State Administrators Responsible for Compliance
with Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, at 6, (May 20, 1983).
67. See supra note 49. A proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 39.402 (1981)
states that "[n]o child shall be removed from home or continued out of home pending
disposition where, with the provision of appropriate and available services, including
services provided in the family home, the child could safely remain at home." Id.
68. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(6)(a) (1983).
69. See supra note 49.
70. Id.
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tested hearing is necessary.7 1
C. Definitions of Abuse, Abandonment and Neglect for Depen-
dency and Termination of Parental Rights
The present definitions of an abused, abandoned or neglected child
have given rise to considerable debate in Florida. The incident giving
rise to initial removal or adjudication of a child as dependent, may
later become the basis for proceedings to terminate the parents'
rights.7 2 Definitions of abuse, abandonment and neglect for short-term
court intervention should be distinct from definitions applying to the
drastic step of terminating parental rights. The criteria used in termi-
nation proceedings should place more emphasis on the particular as-
pects of parental conduct, for example, their willingness to seek coun-
seling and follow through with offered services, or their failure to
accept treatment for mental or emotional illness, or drug or alcohol
addiction. The parent-child relationship should be closely examined,
with emphasis on the nature of the bond between parent and child, the
child's wishes, and the ability or willingness of foster caretakers to
adopt the child. The initial abusive or neglectful conduct of the parent
which precipitated agency intervention should be considered only as
one of several factors in terminating parental rights and should receive
particular emphasis only when the conduct is so serious as to have
caused significant injury to the child or a sibling, or is followed by re-
current incidents of abuse despite intevention efforts.
Grounds for termination of parental rights differ dramatically
throughout the United States, and many states have chosen to separate
the definitions for termination from those involving initial interven-
tion.73 Termination statutes should focus on the condition of the parent
which causes him or her to be unable to consistently care for the child
for extended periods of time. Some model acts 4 provide for termina-
tion if "emotional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency render the
71. Id. The proposed amendment to § 39.402 adds the provision for an arraign-
ment hearing to be conducted after the filing of a petition and prior to the adjudicatory
hearing.
72. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9) (1981). See § 39.01, the definitional section of the
statute, for definitions of the following: abandonment § 39.01(1); abuse § 39.01(2);
neglect § 39.01(26). The aforementioned are used for proof of grounds for permanent
commitment under FLA. STAT. § 39.41(1)(f)(1)(a).
73. See M. HARDIN & P. TAZZARA, supra note 58, at 34.
74. Id.
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parent consistently unable to care for the . . child for extended peri-
ods.17 5 In Colorado, for example, the parent-child relationship can be
terminated upon a showing that the conduct or condition of the parent
is unlikely to change within a reasonable period of time.78 Emotional or
mental illness or deficiency, excessive use of drugs or alcohol, long-term
confinement and unsuccessful efforts by child caring agencies are fac-
tors to be taken into consideration in determining parental unfitness. 77
Recommended model acts also discuss termination of parental
rights when the child has been previously removed from the home be-
cause of abuse or neglect.78 However, they also urge that termination
of parental rights should occur only after examination of the ties that
the child has retained with the parent and the relationships that the
child has developed with foster parents or other caretakers.7 9 Several
experts8" encourage the use of the term "psychological parent" to assist
the court in determining whether the child has established a significant
relationship with the person who fulfills the child's psychological and
75. Id. at 33 (discussing Katz Model Act for Permanent Committment). See
also Health and Human Services Model State Adoption Act cited therein at 9, 33.
76. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-11-105 (1981). See also OR. REv. STAT. § 419.523
(1981) where termination can occur if the parent is found unfit by reason of conduct or
condition seriously detrimental to the child and integration of the child into the home is
improbable in the foreseeable future due to the unlikehood of the conduct or condition
changing. Regional Research Institute Guidelines developed by Hardin, as cited in his
work, supra note 58, at 33, require that the parent's condition be diagnosable and
cause the parent to be unlikely to assume minimally acceptable care of the child.
77. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-11-105 (1981).
78. See M. HARDIN & P. TAZZARA, supra note 58, at 34 (discussing Standards
Relating to Abuse and Neglect); at 33 (discussing Katz Model Act for Permanent
Commitment requiring showing of a previous adjudication and continuing or serious
acts and the Regional Research Institute Guidelines which require a showing that the
parental conduct caused serious harm or danger to the child or siblings which makes
return of the child an unacceptable risk when considering the frequency and duration
of the conduct, severity of harm, and continuation of conduct despite diligent agency
efforts to assist parents).
79. See M. HARDIN & P. TAZZARA, supra note 58, at 29 (citing the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges Termination of Parental Rights Statute,
which urges that where the child is in foster care, the court shall consider whether the
child has become integrated into the foster family, and whether the family is willing to
permanently integrate the child. The factors to be taken into consideration are identical
in all important respects to Florida's present definition of the best interest of the child.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1981). Florida's permanent commitment statute presently re-
quires a showing of manifest best interest of the child to permit termination. FLA.
STAT. § 39.41(1)(f)(1) (1981)).
80. See generally A. FREUD, supra note 56.
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physical needs on a day-to-day basis"1 Termination is not encouraged
where it would be detrimental to the child's bond with the parent8 2 or
where the present placement of the child makes adoption impractical.83
Passage by the Florida legislature of proposed legislation to revise
the definition of abandonment by removing the requirement that a
child be abandoned six months or longer would distinguish initial inter-
vention from the definition of dependency used as the statutory criteria
for authorizing permanent commitment. However, this legislation does
little to reconcile the need to protect children whose parents have aban-
doned them or lack capacity to care for the child through mental ill-
ness, severe physical incapacity or drug addiction. 4 Proposed amend-
ments to the neglect definitions, removing the need to show financial
ability, are appropriate but fail to protect the child whose parents can-
not be provided services because of lack of funding. This is so because
amendments to section 39.01(26) would not allow a finding of neglect
to be entered if the neglect was "caused primarily by financial inability
unless services for relief have been offered and rejected." A proposal to
allow a finding of neglect where services were unavailable was rejected
during subcommittee hearings. Therefore, before a child could be con-
sidered neglected, the agency must show 1) that grounds for neglect
are not primarily because of financial inability; 2) if primarily caused
by financial inability, that services are available; and 3) that services
have been rejected by the parent. This would prevent the court from
adjudicating a child dependent upon the consent of a parent or relative
in order to gain funding for social service programs that would not be
81. See M. HARDIN & P. TAZZARA, supra note 58, at 29.
82. Id. at 28.
83. Id. (Where child is placed with relatives that do not wish to adopt, or child is
placed in a residential treatment facility or other placement which could not be consid-
ered a "family" environment, or where the foster family is unwilling or unable to adopt
the child). See also Hardin, Legal Placement Options Achieve Permanence for Chil-
dren in Foster Care, supra note 19, at 128.
84. The six-month abandonment requirement presently contained in Chapter
39.001(1) would be removed by H.B. 399 and S.B. 273 to FLA. STAT. §
39.41(1)(O(1)(a) and replaced with ". . .sufficient to evince a wilful rejection of pa-
rental obligations." See supra note 49 and 72. Regarding parental incapacity,compare
M.T.S. v. State, 408 So. 2d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) with In the Interest of
J.L.P., 416 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). This amendment would do little to
reconcile what has been termed in M.T.S. as a tragic oversight in failing to protect the
child whose parent is suffering from mental illness. This statutory problem has been the
subject of numberous resolutions of the conference of Circuit Judges of the State of
Florida, Juvenile Section.
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available without court order.
D. Permanency Planning for Children
With the passage of the Skinner Bill in 1980, Florida introduced a
requirement that the juvenile court consider parental efforts to secure
return of their child by improving the home conditions which caused
his removal.85 However, Florida must presently comply with the intent
of federal legislation which requires 1) examination of the removal of a
child to determine whether preventive and reunification efforts have
been made to keep the child in the home,86 2) the drafting of a case
plan for each child placed voluntarily or involuntarily, designed to
achieve placement in the least restrictive (most family like) setting
available and in close proximity to the parent's home,87 3) judicial or
court approved administrative hearings within eighteen months of
placement of the child to determine the future permanent placement of
the child.88Failure to comply with federal legislation can technically re-
sult in the loss of millions of dollars to Florida's foster care program.
Proposed legislation seeks to bring Florida law into further compli-
ance with federal law by closely examining initial removal as a mecha-
nism to force an agency to use preventive services. Proposed legislation
would accomplish the following: 1) assure court review of voluntary
placements in foster care by specifically providing court jurisdiction for
dependent children placed in such care; 2) clarify that permanent
placement plans can be substituted for performance agreements when
the parent is unwilling or unable to enter into a written agreement with
the agency; 3) define the court's role in assuring that the performance
agreement complies with law and previous court orders; and 4) define
substantial compliance so that a child cannot be returned home unless
85. FLA. STAT. § 409.168 (1981). See also FLA. STAT. § 39.41(l)(O(d) (1981)
which provides that the child may be permanently commited if the parent has failed to
substantially comply with the performance agreement. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(1)
(1981), the Skinner Bill, was enacted because of the legislative finding that 7 out of 10
children placed in foster care did not return to their biological parents after the first
year, and tht the children placed in foster care should either be returned to their natu-
ral parents or placed in adoptive homes after one year. To assure permanency planning,
the legislature required the drafting of performance agreements for each child placed
in care, and mandated a series of court reviews. Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1980).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 475(5)(A) (1980).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 475(5)(B) (1980).
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the child's well being and safety are assured.89
The Florida statute known as the Skinner Bill presently recognizes
either return of the child to the parent or adoption as Florida's perma-
nency planning goals. Proposed legislation would sanction other op-
tions. In many cases, for example, it may be more appropriate for the
sixteen or seventeen year old adolescent in agency care to prepare for
independent living9" rather than be adopted or left in foster care indefi-
nitely. For other children, long-term foster care would be recognized as
a permanency planning option. A substantial number of children re-
main in foster care after it is apparent that return to the natural par-
ents is impossible. This may be the result of poor planning for the child
or the result of a conscious choice by the agency or the biological or
foster parents.91 If long-term foster care is selected, it should be accom-
panied by clarification of whether the agency or the foster parent will
make important decisions regarding the child9 2 and whether the foster
parent has standing to protest a subsequent agency decision to remove
the child.9 Although adoption may be desired by some foster parents,
they may be unable to do so because they would lose the financial assis-
tance provided to them as foster parents.94 Federal law includes a legal
guardian within the definition of a parent95 and the foster parent who
pursues guardianship may be prevented from receiving financial assis-
tance. Florida's guardianship proceedings96 are not presently viewed as
a mechanism for establishing permanency. Florida foster parents would
lose state payments by becoming guardians and guardianship proceed-
ings themselves are costly and difficult for foster parents, relatives or
others to pursue since they take place in a separate court division.9 7
Legislation proposed for the 1984 Florida legislative session fur-
89. See supra text accompanying notes 33-51. H.B. 399 and S.B. 273 would sub-
stantially amend FLA. STAT. 409.168 with appropriate cross-amendments to chapter
39.
90. See supra note 49. The proposed amendments to FLA. STAT. § 409.168
(1981) would add independent living as an option throughout the statute.
91. See Hardin, supra note 19, at 139.
92. Id. at 160.
93. Id. at 151. FLA. STAT. § 409.168 (1981) encourages the involvement of the
foster parent in review proceedings. It is hoped that standing would be granted to the
foster parent seeking to contest removal.
94. Id. at 153.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 475(2) (1980).
96. See FLA. STAT. § 744 (1981).
97. See Hardin, supra note 19, at 150.
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thers permanency planning in two other ways. First, it formally recog-
nizes the important role of the child's representative by mandating the
appointment of a guardian ad litem.98 Second, it specifies the role of
the court at judicial review hearings.9" An area which remains unad-
dressed -by Florida law is permanency planning for children placed with
relatives. Presently, the court may place a child with a relative follow-
ing an adjudication of dependency. 100 The child does not receive the
benefits of legally mandated written agreements and judicial reviews as
is the case with children placed with HRS or other licensed child-car-
ing agencies. Agency supervision may be terminated after the child is
no longer in danger. Placement with relatives can be as disruptive to
the relationship between parent and child as placement with strangers
since the relative's authority and control over the child is just as likely
to conflict with that of the parent. Permanency planning proceedings
should apply to these children as well.
IV. Special Protections for Child Victims and Witnesses in
Child Abuse Cases
A. Florida Law and Proposed Recommendations
Florida law presently allows for the prosecution of abuse-related
offenses under numerous criminal statutes. 01 The punishment for these
offenses ranges from capital punishment, for the sexual battery of a
child eleven years old or younger, to various degrees of felony and mis-
demeanor offenses. Age, consent requirements and penalties bear little
98. See supra note 49. Amendments to FLA. STAT. § 409.168 (1981) would in-
clude recognition of the role of the guardian ad litem by reviewing the guardian ad
litem report at judicial reviews, and by assuring that the child is represented by a
guardian ad litem throughout § 409.168 proceedings.
99. See supra note 49. The proposed legislation would amend § 409.168 to re-
quire the court to inquire whether the child is represented by counsel; whether the
parties have complied with the services, visitation, financial obligations of the agree-
ment; review whether the reasons for entry into a plan are still relevant; whether the
child's placement is appropriate; and the projected date for the child's return to the
home.
100. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(1)(a)(b) (1981) permits the court to place the child
with a relative or other adult person, with or without agency supervision, recognizing
that family or community placement is preferred to more institutionalized shelter
placements.
101. See supra note 5.
240 [Vol. 8
21
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
19841 Selected Legislative Needs
relation to the behavioral and psychological information available
about child and sexual abuse victims. The American Bar Association
National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection
has recommended a scheme of sexual abuse definitions and acts which
encompasses any form of intentional and explicit sexual behavior with
a child or committed in a child's presence. 102 The recommendations en-
courage defining "sexual abuse" in criminal statutes by the same terms
used in reporting laws.10 3 The recommendations further encourage
criminal statutes to include a provision specifically prohibiting in-
trafamily sexual abuse'04 in order to give legislative recognition to the
serious problem -of sexual abuse of children by parents or parental
102. J. Buckley, Recommendations for Improving Legal Intervention in In-
trafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases (Oct. 1982) (pamphlet issued by National Legal
Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection).
103. Id. at 14. The recommendations are: Specific Statutory Definitions. Crimi-
nal statutes should specifically define sexual abuse of a child. Juvenile court statutes
and child abuse and neglect reporting statutes should include and specifically define
sexual abuse of a child, or define such abuse by reference to the definition in the crimi-
nal statute. The following acts should constitute sexual abuse of a child: (1)any pene-
tration, however, slight, of the vagina or anal opening of one person by the penis of
another person, whether or not there is an emission of semen; (2)any sexual contact
between the genitals or anal opening of one person and the mouthor tongue of another
person; (3)any intrusion by one person into the genitals or anal opening of another
person, including the use of any object for this purpose (except acts intended for valid
medical purposes); (4)the intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts (includ-
ing the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks) or the clothing covering
them, of either the child or the perpetrator (except acts reasonably construed as normal
caretaker responsibilities or affection and those for valid medical purposes); (5)The
intentional masturbation of the perpetrator's genitals in the presence of the child;
(6)the intentional exposure of the perpetrator's genitals in the presence of the child, or
any other sexual act, intentionally perpetrated in the presence of a child, if such expo-
sure or sexual act is for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, aggression, deg-
radation, or other similar purpose; (7)sexual exploitation, which includes allowing, en-
couraging or forcing a child to solicit for or engage in prostitution or engage in the
filming, photographing, videotaping, posing, modeling, or performing before a live audi-
ence, where such acts involve exhibition of the child's genitals or any sexual act with
the child as defined in (1)-(6) of these recommendations. Id. at 13. See also proposed
House of Representatives Bill 873 (1984), where sexual abuse is defined, similar to the
aforementioned requirement, as an amendment to § 415.503 (1983). This bill, intro-
duced by the Speaker of the House, received impetus from finding of the House of
Representatives Ad Hoc Committee on Children and Youth.
104. Id. at 22, Recommendation 3.1 defines intrafamily sexual abuse as that
committed by a parent, caretaker, or adult household member in a position of authority
or control over the child.
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figures. 10 5 Criminal statutes should establish degrees in the sexual
abuse of a child, and attendant punishment, based upon whether the
acts constitute intrafamily sexual abuse. 106 Factors such as the nature
and duration of the abuse, the age of the child and perpetrator, the use
of force, threats or other forms of coercion, and the existence of prior
sexual offense convictions or juvenile court adjudications for sexual
abuse should be considered.107 Higher penalties should be reserved for
those cases considered more aggravated. 10 8 Colorado has amended sev-
eral of its criminal law provisions to include sexual assault by a person
in a position of trust to the child'09 and has adopted penalties that re-
flect more closely the relationship of the child to the perpetrator.110
The model recommendations also encourage legislative guidelines
for prosecution and sentencing in intrafamily child sexual abuse
cases."' Innovations like these in other states have proven successful in
protecting the child, punishing the offender, protecting the rights of the
child and offender, and encouraging a greater number of prosecutions
of sexual abuse cases with minimal disruption to the child and the fam-
ily's life.1"2 Where the court has guidelines which permit it to order
treatment as a coridition of probation or a suspended sentence, an of-
fender may be helped while avoiding a criminal trial."13 Colorado, for
example, has recently passed legislation allowing suspension of
sentences for perpetrators who are not habitual offenders, and permit-
ting the imposition of a treatment program as part of a probationary
105. Id.
106. Id. at 23, Recommendation 3.2, Statutory Degrees of Offenses Based Upon
Certain Factors (the relationship of the perpetrator to the child should be a factor).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. A person in a position of trust is defined in COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401
(1983) as a person who is a parent or acting in the place of a parent and charged with
any of a parent's rights, duties, or responsibilities concerning a child, or a person who is
charged with any duty or responsibility for the health, education, welfare or supervision
of a child, including foster care, child care or family care, either independently or
through another, no matter how brief, at the time of an unlawful act.
110. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405 (1983).
111. See supra note 102, at 24, Recommendation 3.3.
112. Id. at 25. See also INNOVATIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES (J. Buckley ed. 1981).
113. J. Buckley, supra note 102, at 26. Pre-trial diversion programs in criminal
prosecutions suffer from the same dangers as described in part III of this article if
there is no judicial finding that the abuse has occurred.
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sentence. 114
The recommendations encourage states to mandate use of protec-
tive orders in sexual abuse cases. Orders of this nature may require the
perpetrator to do or refrain from doing certain specified acts such as
vacate the home where the child resides; 115 limit contact with the vic-
tim, other children in the home or any child; refrain from further
abuse; participate in counseling or treatment; stay away from the
neighborhood or school of the child; cooperate with limited or super-
vised visitation; and pay support for the child or family., 6 The nonpar-
ticipating parent may even be included in such orders.1 17 Protective or-
ders entered in both criminal and civil proceedings will ensure
maximum protection and sensitivity to the child's needs, while expedit-
ing the prosecution process. Typically the responsibility for seeking and
enforcing such protective orders is legislatively placed with law enforce-
ment agencies.11 8
B. Videotaping and Other Protective Measures for Child Vic-
tims and Witnesses
Prosecution of child abuse cases is difficult because often the
child's testimony is supported by little physical corroboration to over-
come the factfinders' natural skepticism that the crime occurred.119
Those experienced in dealing with the child sexual abuse victim know
that bolstering the credibility of the child and educating the criminal
justice system to exercise sensitivity during proceedings are almost in-
surmountable problems. An abused child is often threatened by parents
regarding the child's intent to testify. The child finds it difficult, in an
open courtroom, to accuse the parent whom he still loves.
114. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-303 (1983).
115. In Florida, as well as other states, the child is normally removed from the
home rather than the abuser being ordered to reside elsewhere. The child is thus fur-
ther traumatized by being isolated from family members who may be supportive of the
child. Prolonged resolution of the case often results in the child not receiving needed
treatment and the child's recanting of sexual abuse accusations.
116. Buckley, supra note 102, at 20, Recommendation 2.2. See also House Bill
873, supra note 103, which adds § 39.4055, entitled Injunction Pending Disposition of
Petition for Detention or Dependency, but is not confined to sexual abuse.
117. Id. at 21.
118. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-116 (1981).
119. See Lloyd, The Corroboration of Sexual Victimization of Children, in
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 103 (J. Buckley ed. 1983).
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A courtroom physically accommodates adults, but is quite threat-
ening to the younger child. Child advocates have attempted to reduce
the trauma of courtroom testifying in a variety of ways. Prosecutors,
guardians ad litem and victim advocates may explain court proceedings
to the child prior to the actual trial, and provide emotional support
throughout the case. In some Florida courts, a guardian ad litem will
be appointed to represent the child in the criminal prosecutions of his
abuser.120 However, the legislatively mandated appointment of a vic-
tim-witness advocate to assist the child would best ensure that the
child is protected.1 21 Experts encourage such appointments, acknowl-
edging that criminal cases differ from juvenile cases because the child
is a witness, rather than a party, to the proceedings and the purpose of
criminal prosecutions is primarily to punish the offender rather than
protect the best interests of the child. A victim-witness advocate in
criminal court, however, can help to minimize the trauma of the legal
process by "for example, accompanying the child during interviews and
court proceedings, arranging transportation, explaining the process,
preventing, where possible, harassment or other intimidating investiga-
tive or court room procedures, and in essence, being a "friend of the
court" or support person who shepherds the child through the pro-
cess."1 22 The commentary to the recommendation urges the guardian
ad litem appointed in the juvenile court proceeding as the person most
appropriate to provide assistance during the criminal trial phase. This
practice, when used in Florida, has helped to achieve better communi-
cation between the juvenile, the criminal court, and professionals, while
providing the child with a continuous support figure throughout the va-
rious proceedings.
Florida law currently recognizes the need to reduce trauma to the
child victim by allowing a parent to be present during any questioning,
and requiring interviews to be conducted in the least harmful environ-
ment.12 3 In 1982, a bill was proposed to further protect children during
120. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1983) representation of the child is by a
guardian ad litem in all child abuse and neglect proceedings. The definition of child
abuse and neglect contained in § 415.503(5) would include not only those acts con-
tained in §§ 827.03-.06 but other criminal offenses. H.B. 873 clarifies that a guardian
ad Litem must be appointed in civil and criminal cases. See supra note 5. Special
thanks to P. Miles, Circuit Coordinator of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Guardian Ad
Litem Program for her research contributions to this section of the article.
121. J. Buckley, supra note 102, at 9, Recommendation 1.4.1.
122. Id. at 10.
123. See State v. Sievert, 312 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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depositions, discovery and other actions involved in child abuse prose-
cutions. In its amended form the bill, which was not passed by the
Florida legislature, required the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
represent victims under the age of eighteen who are compelled to tes-
tify in a criminal child abuse case."'
A separate problem was addressed in State v. Dolen where a Flor-
ida court acknowledged the need to exclude the defendant from a depo-
sition because of emotional trauma to his child victim.1 2 5 In several
foreign countries, questioning of children is conducted outside the pres-
ence of the defendant by specially trained professionals. 12 Although
requests to exclude an abuser from dependency proceedings in juvenile
court are usually granted, questioning a child outside the presence of
the defendant during a criminal trial conflicts with the defendant's con-
stitutional right to confront his accuser.127 As a result, special videotap-
124. The guardian ad litem would have been authorized to request protective
orders on behalf of the child, attend depositions and request court protection. One form
of the bill would have required the presence of a judicial officer. H.R. 5 Fla. Leg. Sess.
(1983), creating FLA. STAT. § 914.16 (1983) (depositions of juvenile victims in crimi-
nal proceedings). The bill would have created FLA. STAT. § 914.10 (1983) and repealed
FLA. STAT. § 827.07(16) (1981) in favor of broader appointment authorities including
any victim of child abuse or neglect. The bills did not pass during the session. Argua-
bly, there was insufficient information about the Guardian Ad Litem Program, then in
a pilot stage, to assure sufficient resources for representing the victims that needed
protection under the bill. Additionally, confusion existed regarding the role of the
guardian ad litem in criminal prosecutions since the state attorney is charged with
protection of the child. See J. Buckley, supra note 102, at 9 (the idea that the state's
function to assure punishment of the offender may cause treatment of the child in a
manner inconsistent with the child's best interests.)
125. 390 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Dolen recites that the court
has descretion to exclude the defendant from depositions pursuant to FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.220 without intrfering with the defendant's right to confrontation, and where the
witness will be available for trial.
126. See Lloyd, supra note 119, at 185, which recited the practice in Israel and
Scandinavian countries of using professional workers with extensive backgrounds in
human behavior to interview children.
127. See U.S. v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1978). This would include
blocking the defendant's view of the child, Herbert v. Superior Court, 712 Cal. Rptr.
850 (1981); See also In the Matter of S. Children, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Kings County
Fam. Ct. 1980). A creative approach is recommended by Libai, as outlined in Lloyd,
supra note 134. The use of an informal child-proof courtroom is recommended, which
has a one way mirror behind which the defendant and the public would sit. Counsel for
the defendant would be in the courtroom and communicate electronically with the de-
fendant. However, the practice is noted as not only raising constitutional issues, but
containing prohibitive construction costs.
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ing statutes have been introduced in Florida and other states to provide
protection to the child while safeguarding the rights of the defendant.
In order to be effective several additional provisions should be incorpo-
rated into Florida's present videotaping law. 128
First, Florida presently allows videotaping if the child victim is
eleven years of age or younger.129 Other states extend protection to
young adolescents who face many of the same traumas as children
under eleven. In addition, many victims who qualify under Florida's
statute at the time of the abuse are older than eleven when they are
required to testify. Arizona law presently allows videotaping of a minor
under the age of fifteen,130 while New Mexico's statute includes chil-
dren who are sixteen years or younger. 3 1 The Florida proposed amend-
ments would raise the protection to children under age sixteen. Second,
Florida presently permits only the state to apply for videotaping. This
procedure fails to recognize that a parent or the child's representative
may also wish to invoke this protection based on facts and circum-
stances of which the state is unaware, or is unwilling to support based
upon the relative need for conviction in the case. Florida law does not
permit the child, parent, child representative or defendant to have
standing to request that the court allow the child to be videotaped.
Other states, however, allow such requests. 3 2 It may be argued that
the state has the right to conduct the case as it sees fit. But recognition
that counsel or the representative of the child, as well as the defendant,
may apply for an order to videotape would simply permit the victim or
witness to be heard regarding the "severe mental or emotional trauma"
that might occur if the child were required to give live testimony. The
present Florida statute provides for a hearing where the court may con-
sider the state's arguments in opposition to videotaping, as well as those
of other parties, and the relative merits on behalf of the child.1 33 This
practice is continued in proposed amendments. Third, Florida presently
\
128. FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1983). Bills passing both House and Senate commit-
tees during 1984 have been refiled this year and are identical in all substantive aspects.
See Committee Substitute for House Bill 56 and Senate Bills 140 and 237.
129. FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1981).
130. ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 12-2311, 2312 (Supp. 1979-80). See also CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-412(1) (1983).
131. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978).
132. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2311, 2312 (1978) recognizes that "either"
party may make the request. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978) recognizes the vic-
tim's right to be heard on this issue.
133. FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1983).
[Vol. 8
27
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Selected Legislative Needs
allows the videotaping of a victim's testimony only in prosecutions for
sexual battery and child abuse, even though the victim of another of-
fense might suffer equal or more serious trauma.13' New Mexico pro-
vides for taping in prosecutions involving sexual penetration or sexual
contact.1 35 Arizona permits it in all civil or criminal offenses involving
an alleged sexual offense.136 Fourth, Florida presently requires that the
court find "a substantial likelihood that the child will suffer severe
emotional strain if required to testify in open court" as a prerequisite to
granting a request for taping.1 7 This requirement must be met by evi-
dence from parents, caretakers, psychologists or other mental health
professionals. Colorado law requires a preliminary finding which can be
based upon "recommendations from the child's therapist, or any other
person having direct contact with the child, whose recommendations
are based on specific behavioral indicators exhibited by the child."1 38
Fifth, Florida presently allows for taping only after the trial has actu-
ally commenced.13 9 One of the major obstacles toward successful prose-
cution of child sexual abuse cases is assuring that the trial occurs as
soon as possible after the incident has been reported or has occured.
Child victims are vulnerable to the pressures of prolonged prosecutions
because they do not have the coping mechanisms of adults to deal with
such stress. The child is likely to recant prior statements in order to
end prolonged proceedings and the harsh effects of being removed from
family and friends. In addition, a child is especially susceptible to for-
getting important facts.
It is essential for children to receive treatment for the trauma of
sexual abuse, and begin the healing process, as soon as possible. Pro-
longed prosecution detrimentally affects this process. Colorado has for-
mally recognized that cases involving the commission of unlawful sex-
134. Id. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412(1) (183) which allows for taping in
various sexual offense cases.
135. See supra note 131.
136. See supra note 130. The proposed Florida legislation would relate to sexual
or child abuse cases, whether civil or criminal. Both victims and witnesses would be
permitted to invoke the protection of the law.
137. FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1983). The proposed legislation retains this require-
ment, substituting the word "trauma" for strain.
138. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412(3) (1983).
139. FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1983). The proposed amendment would permit taping
at any time. At the hearing on the videotaping motion the court could ascertain if the
defendant has completed discovery. The prosecutor must assure expeditious handling of
these cases to assure maximum benefits of early videotaping.
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ual acts against minors must take precedence before the court.140
Neither Colorado, Arizona, Montana, or New Mexico require that the
trial be commenced before the videotaping can take place. Proposed
legislation would eliminate this requirement by allowing an application
for videotaping to be made at any time prior to the trial of the case. 141
Finally, Florida presently requires that the court preside at the vide-
otaping.142 Either the court or a person who is specifically interested in
the well-being of the child should be present during taping to assure
that questioning is conducted in a sensitive manner, and to counter the
effect of confrontation with the defendant. 43
C. Innovations in Evidentiary Principles
The prosecution of child and sexual abuse cases can be greatly
aided by expert testimony on the dynamics of intrafamily child sexual
abuse and principles of child development.1 44 Using an expert to pre-
sent evidence of the sexually abused child syndrome, which includes
dynamics of sexual abuse, similar to expert evidence on the battered
child syndrome,1 45 is recommended when pertinent. The sexual abuse
syndrome involves such elements as progressive sexual behavior over a
prolonged period of time, the lack of force or physical injury, the late
disclosure of the incident, the passive role of the nonparticipating par-
ent, retraction or inconsistency in statements by the victim, and certain
special behavioral characteristics of the victim and the offender.1 46
140. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(4) (1983).
141. See supra note 39.
142. FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1981).
143. The proposed legislation would delete the requirement that the court be pre-
sent if the court finds that the child will be protected and that a guardian ad litem
represents the child. Montana provides for the court and "such persons as deemed nec-
essary by the court" to be present, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46.15-401 (1981). See supra
notes 130-32 and accompanying text. The proposed legislation would also permit the
appointment of a special master. The parties, including the child's representative must
stipulate that the presence of the court is not necessary.
144. See Buckley, supra note 102, at 37.
145. Id. at 40.
146. Id. See also, Berliner, Canfield, Blick & Buckley, Expert Testimony on the
Dynamics of Intra-Family Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Development,
in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 166, 171-173 (J. Buckley ed. 1983), (the
behavior includes physical symptoms with no physiological basis, clinical depression,
isolation from peers, runaway, truancy, involvement with drugs or alcohol, drop in aca-
demic performance, pseudo-mature seductive behavior, fear of men, heavy family re-
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Such testimony is crucial where a jury might find it difficult to believe
that the child is the victim of a violent crime. Additionally, evidence in
a sexual abuse prosecution may include statements which are inadmis-
sible hearsay according to evidence law. Where there is corroborating
evidence of the abuse, however, Florida courts should be willing to ac-
cept the testimony under the general exception to the hearsay rule.147
The court should be permitted to consider "the age and maturity of the
child, the nature and duration of the abuse, the relationship of the child
to the offender, the reliability of the assertion, and the reliability of the
child witness, in deciding whether to admit the statement. 48 Such an
exception would comport with the belief that children are not adept at
the reasoned reflection necessary to support false allegations. 49 A spe-
cial hearsay rule exception added to Florida's code of evidence would
eliminate the need for courts to allow the statements of a child through
"tortured interpretation" of the existing hearsay exceptions. Colorado
has legislated exactly such an exception, with the requirement that the
adverse party be given ample notice.15 0
V. Proposals For the Improvement of Professional and
Volunteer Services For Children
A. Establishment of Minimum Standards
In any given community, there are certain persons who are most
likely to come into contact with abused children, such as teachers, doc-
tors and social workers. By law these professionals are mandated to
report abuse or neglect; they may also be responsible for diagnosing 51
sponsibilities, prostitution and promiscuity. Development characteristics include shy-
ness, embarassment, difficulty in understanding abstract concepts, and short attention
span).
147. SeeBUCKLEY, supra note 102, at 34. Proposed H.B. 873 recommends that
Florida adopt this postion by adding § (23) to § 90.803.
148. Id. at 34, Recommendation 4.3.
149. Id. at 35. See also Buckley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's
Out-of Court Statement of Sexual Abuse at Trial, supra note 119, at 153.
150. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1983).
151. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(3) (1981) requires reports by day care center workers,
teachers, public health practitioners, social service and mental health workers, and doc-
tors. Those likely to contribute to diagnosis are nurses, social workers, teachers police
officers. Florida law also mandates responsibilities for law enforcement, state attorney,
judges, H.R.S. guardians ad litem and child protection teams in the handling of abuse
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or providing intervention or treatment services to the abused child. The
state's child abuse prevention plan mandated under Florida Statutes
section 415.501, popularly known as the Mills Bill, 152 recommends that
the legislature statutorily require the development of minimum stan-
dards for education and training of professionals charged with responsi-
bilities in child abuse cases.1 53 The Mills Bill provided the major impe-
tus in the training of school and law enforcement personnel.154
Legislation can provide direction and impetus to persons and agencies
by requiring minimum training 55 and formulation of standards for pro-
fessionals and volunteers who are responsible for the detection, diagno-
sis, treatment, and representation of abused children. These standards
can be implemented by: requiring certification of those professionals
licensed or regulated by the state in the relevant responsibilities of
dealing with children; providing funding incentives for training activi-
ties; and requiring that any contract entered into by HRS with private
agencies for services targeted for abused and neglected children specify
that agency staffs have minimal qualifications and training in the rele-
vant area of practice.
cases under FLA. STAT. § 827.07(1) (1981). See also notes 2-35 and accompanying
text.
152. FLA. STAT. § 415.501 (1983); formerly 827.075 (1982), (also known as the
Child Abuse Prevention Act. The Law called for the appointment of state and district
task forces to identify the child abuse prevention needs of the state.
153. Fla. Dept. of HRS, State Plan: A Comprehensive Approach for the Preven-
tion of Child Abuse and Neglect 23 (Dec. 1982) which recommended funding for and
statutory mandates requiring minimum education and training standard for professions
in child abuse cases, e.g. law enforcement, state attorneys, public defenders and judges.
District II and VII identified these items specifically. See id. at 76. Each institution of
higher learning should mandate courses if future professional practice involves working
with children. Id.
154. Id. at 30 (target dates for training elementary, middle and high school per-
sonnel). Id. at 28. (law enforcement agencies have included mastery of information on
child abuse as part of basic recruit curriculum in forty-one certified training centers.
Id. at 30. FLA. STAT. § 402.305(1) (1981) requires minimal standards of training for
day child care personnel.
155. See J. Buckley, supra note 102, at 13, which recommends special training
for professionals who deal with intrafamily child sexual abuse in psychological, social
and legal issues, basic principles of child protection and development and interviewing
techniques. Id. at 13.
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B. The Coordination of Agencies
The Mills Bill 56 provided an opportunity for Florida communities
to identify problems in coordinating child abuse efforts. Although fur-
ther legislation may not be needed to enhance communication and co-
operation between agencies, certain refinements are necessary. One
commentator recommends that agencies establish an interdisciplinary
approach for handling sexual abuse cases157 in order to provide greater
efficiency, expertise and information sharing. 158 Presently in Florida,
for example, a law enforcement agency may not be notified about a
reported child abuse because HRS is only mandated to report serious
cases to the state attorney.159 The prosecution of cases in separate
criminal and juvenile court forums may also contribute to poor commu-
nication and inefficiency. This perception has led to recommendations
that a single prosecutor be assigned to handle all stages of a case, 60
and that procedures to coordinate child protective, criminal and other
judicial proceedings involving intrafamily sexual abuse be devised.'
C. Independent Representation of Children
The need for providing independent representation for children is
well recognized in Florida. 62 Legislative funding of the State of Flor-
ida Guardian Ad Litem Program has provided legitimacy and stability
156. FLA. STAT. § 415.501 (1983). See supra note 152.
157. SeeBuckley, supra note 102, at 7. Buckley recommends including proce-
dures to prevent duplicated interviews through the use of joint interviews by various
individuals needing information, or the use of one well trained investigator who can
address the nature and goals of interviews required by different agencies. Id. at 10. See
alsorecovery H.B. 873 language amending FLA. STAT. 415.505 (1983).
158. Id. at 8.
159. FLA. STAT. § 415.505(1)(8) (1983); formerly 827.07(10)(g) (1982), pro-
vides that HRS may notify law enforcement agencies. It is recognized that law enforce-
ment must immediately secure evidence in order to assure the possibility of criminal
prosecution to protect the long-term interests of the child. Sensitivity to the needs of
the child can be accomplished through training of law enforcement, as with other agen-
cies. See H.B. 873, supra note 116, which would require coordiantion between the state
attorney, HRS, and law enforcement and create liaisons with schools and hospitals.
160. SeeBuckley, supra note 102, at 11.
161. Id. at 8.
162. FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1983); formerly 827.07(16) (1981) has required the
appointment of a guardian ad litem in child abuse and neglect judicial proceedings
since 1978. See also proposed amendments in H.B. 873, supra note 116.
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to the concept of representing abused and neglected children. 163 The
statewide use of volunteer lay citizens has placed Florida in the van-
guard of guaranteeing abused children an effective voice.1 4 Expanding
since 1980 to fifteen of Florida's twenty judicial circuits, the Guardian
Ad Litem Program has recruited and trained over fifteen hundred vol-
unteer lay citizens and attorneys who have provided invaluable service
to over eight thousand victims of child abuse. Independent evaluations
have consistently recommended statewide implementation'6 5 of the pro-
gram and the legislature is urged to fund expansion in 1984 to the
remaining areas of the state. Some of the many important roles that
guardians ad litem perform on behalf of children are: 1) Investiga-
tor-the guardian ad litem independently conducts an investigation on
behalf of the child, including interviews with the child, child's coun-
selor, medical and mental health specialists, the parents, teachers, and
persons in the community. He also collects relevant records and con-
sults with experts; 2) Monitor-the guardian ad litem serves as a moni-
tor of the agencies and persons who provide services to the child, he
assures that orders of the court are followed and that families and chil-
dren receive needed services; 3) Protector-the guardian ad litem pro-
tects the child during questioning and helps support the child emotion-
ally to miminize the often harmful effects of being embroiled in the
adversary process; 4) Spokesperson-the guardian ad litem assures that
the child's wishes are heard, and that the best interest of the child is
presented to the court and to agencies dealing with the child; and 5)
Reporter-the guardian ad litem presents information to the court, rec-
ommending to the court what is in the child's best interest, and
prepares a written report which becomes a permanent part of the
child's record.'66
163. The program is part of the administrative structure of the circuit courts of
the state. It is funded through the Office of the State Courts Administrator of the
Supreme Court of Florida.
164. See National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection,
National Guardian Ad Litem Policy Conference Manual (1982); and National Legal
Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, An Evaluation of Federally
Funded Projects Providing Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse or Neglect Judicial
Proceedings (1983).
165. These recommendations are based upon quality representation as compared
with other models, and cost effectiveness. An Evaluation of Florida's Guardian Ad Li-
tem Program by M.G.T., Inc. (1982, 1983) An independent private contractor hired by
the State of Florida).
166. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.300 (West 1983). See E. Hoffenberg, Role of Guardian
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VI. Conclusion
The increased support and protection of child abuse victims in
Florida in recent years has provided the state with thousands of com-
munity and state advocates who are becoming more aware of the legis-
lative needs of Florida's children. As professionalism increases, practi-
tioners will continue to question irreconciliable conflicts in child welfare
laws. The growing respect for children's legal representatives will as-
sure continued input to state legislators. Florida's child victims of abuse
are beginning to command the attention of lawmakers. Comprehensive
reforms in the areas of permanency planning, effective prosecution of
cases and sensitivity to the special needs of children in the criminal
justice system are needed. Highly specialized training and maximum
efforts for coordination and communication among agencies are the
least that our most precious resource-our children-deserve. For the sake
of these children, the legislative challenges that await our lawmakers
and citizenry at this time must be met with the same enthusiasm and
creativity that has accompanied previous efforts. Innumerable genera-
tions of children who are yet to be born will reap the rewards of these
efforts.
Ad Litem in Permanent Commitment 7-18 (Sept. 1983) (proposed Manual of Minimal
Standards of Operation of the State of Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program).
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Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing Rehabilitation
Back Into Style
Jack Levine*
I. Introduction
As is the case nationwide, Florida is experiencing a philosophical
and fiscal tug-of-war over the issue of juvenile justice. The continuous
struggle between rehabilitation and punishment has resulted in major
statutory revisions in four of the past five years. In budgetary terms,
the state is attempting to pay for both treatment and punishment and
this dual emphasis hampers the potential for rehabilitative success.
This article is written with a dual purpose: to dispel several juvenile
justice myths and to present a factual account of Florida's juvenile jus-
tice program as it currently exists. It is hoped that this information will
give elected officials and their concerned constituents the impetus to
improve the ways we handle young persons who get into trouble. Dur-
ing the decade of the 1970s Florida played a leadership role in national
juvenile justice reform, but our status as the model state is slipping.
Only if certain statutory and budgetary changes are made can Florida
reclaim its position as the exemplary provider of justice to children and
their families.
II. Juvenile Crime in Florida: Myths and Facts
In 1982, approximately 76,000 youths aged seventeen and under
were arrested in Florida-a decrease of twenty-one percent over the
past five years.2 Less than seven percent of all arrests of juveniles are
for crimes of violence.8 Despite these facts, a mythology has developed
* B.A., Hunter College; M.S., Purdue University; Executive Director, Florida
Center for Children and Youth, Tallahassee.
1. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 88 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CRIME 1982].
2. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 104 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CRIME 1978].
3. CRIME 1982, supra note 1, at 88.
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which tells tales of "the rising tide" of youth crime. A perception that
our state and nation are in the midst of a juvenile crime wave is fueled
by shocking reports of isolated serious crimes perpetrated by young
persons. The justification for this perception is due in part to an actual
and significant rise in the crime rate of the eighteen to twenty-five year
old age group." The resultant outcry to "get tough on kids" has been
scattershot, however, and these calls for "toughness" have been misdi-
rected at a younger class of juveniles. It is helpful to look at the follow-
ing popular myths and the true facts concerning those issues:
Myth 1. The number of juvenile arrests is increasing and represents a
juvenile crime epidemic.
Fact: The number of juvenile arrests in Florida has declined twenty one
percent over the past five years, from 97,433 in 19788 to 76,381 in
1982.6
Myth 2. Florida's juvenile arrests account for a large and growing pro-
portion of total arrests.
Fact: Juvenile arrests account for a decreasing proportion of total ar-
rests. In 1978, juvenile arrests represented 25.8% of total arrests.7 In
1982, juvenile arrests accounted for 14.6% of total arrests.'
Myth 3. The number of juvenile arrests in Florida for violent crimes is
dramatically increasing.
Fact: The number of juvenile arrests for the four most serious violent
crimes (homicide, rape, armed robbery and aggravated assault) has
decreased approximately eighteen percent since 1979.9 These crimes
account for less than six percent of all juvenile arrests.10
Myth 4. Juvenile crime is increasing most significantly in Florida's ma-
jor metropolitan areas.
Fact: From the period of 1976 through 1982, juvenile arrests have de-
creased in each of the fifteen largest metropolitan counties of
4. Id. at 89.
5. CRIME 1978, supra note 2, at 105.
6. CRIME 1982, supra note 1, at 88.
7. CRIME 1978, supra note 2, at 104.
8. CRIME 1982, supra note 1, at 88.
9. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 112 (1979).
10. CRIME 1982, supra note 1, at 88.
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Florida.11
The explanation for the significant decrease in delinquency refer-
rals over the past five years cannot be based on a demographic shift in
Florida's population. In fact, the number of juveniles aged four to sev-
enteen has not appreciably changed over this period.12 Amendments to
Florida's delinquency laws cannot be used as an explanation for the
decrease in crime since the decline in juvenile arrests has been steady
all through the years of numerous statutory changes. The 1981 legisla-
tive changes which increased the use of secure detention and escalated
the adult court transfer rate were preceded by a year of markedly de-
clining juvenile arrest rates." In actuality, the decrease of juvenile ar-
rests is a national trend. There has been a steady decrease in juvenile
arrests since 1974, attributable, in part, to a concomittant decline in
the national youth population."
Demographics aside, the year 1974 saw a significant effort at the
federal level, through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act,15 to decriminalize status offenses and place restrictions upon cer-
tain harsh treatments of minor juvenile offenders; for example, jailing
juveniles with adults. It may be argued that the improved juvenile
crime statistics are a result of a more enlightened approach to the han-
dling of less serious offenders. Growing emphasis on the prevention and
treatment of child abuse, and a recognition that status offenders are not
offenders but victims, may be the most significant explanations for the
declining juvenile crime rates nationwide.
III. Policy Directions in Juvenile Justice
It is the responsibility of elected officials in the executive, legisla-
tive and judicial branches of government to guarantee to the public
that policy and budgetary decisions in the realm of juvenile justice are
based upon fact, not myth. Florida's delinquency statute and the range
11. Id. at 106.
12. Compare FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS IN FLORIDA PUBLIC ScHooLs 2
(1980-81), with FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS IN FLORIDA PUBLIC ScHoois 2
(1976-77).
13. Compare FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 110
(1981), with FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 107 (1980).
14. B. Krisberg & I. Schwartz, Rethinking Juvenile Justice 9 (June 9, 1982)
(unpublished manuscript from University of Minnesota).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
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of juvenile justice programming should reflect a clear view of the youth
crime issue, and project a clear vision of how to improve the system. In
October 1983, the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting re-
leased a report which documents the strengths of Florida's juvenile jus-
tice system, and points to those areas which require reform.16 It em-
phasizes the relative cost-effectiveness of current delinquency services.
If heeded, the report can serve as an outstanding planning document
for all branches of government. What follows is a summary of Florida's
juvenile justice program with accompanying recommendations for
improvement.
A. Diversion Programs
In 1978, the Juvenile Alternative Services Project (JASP) was
piloted in three districts of the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services (HRS). The Juvenile Alternative Services Project is a
court diversion program which provides services and sanctions such as
arbitration, restitution, family counseling and community work service
to non-serious juvenile offenders. After initial evaluations reported less
than twenty percent recidivism,1 7 JASP has been expanded to serve all
eleven HRS districts. In 1982-83 16,000 clients were served, more than
300,000 hours of community work were performed, and restitution pay-
ments totaled over $228,000.18 The cost for providing JASP services
averages $170.00 per client, 9 whereas traditional judicial handling
costs average $1,000.00 per case.20
Notable criticisms of service-oriented diversion programs focus on
their "net-widening" aspect.21 It has been asserted that the volume of
offenders served by JASP-like programs does not represent true diver-
16. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET-
ING, THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE FLORIDA JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
MULTIAGENCY POLICY ANALYSIS (1983) [hereinafter cited as POLICY ANALYSIS].
17. HRS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 6816, EVALUATION OF THE JUVENILE ALTER-
NATIVE SERVICES PROJECT 30 (1981).
18. Telephone interview with Mr. Lee Stapp, HRS, Children, Youth and Fami-
lies Program Office (Aug. 1983).
19. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 7.
20. Id.
21. See T. BLOMBERG, Widening the Net: An Anomaly in the Evaluation of Di-
version Programs, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION (M. W. Klein
and K. S. Teilman, eds., 1979) and C. FRAZIER, P. RICHARDS & R. H. POTTER, Juve-
nile Diversion and Net Widening: Toward a Clarification of Assessment Strategies, in
42 HUMAN ORGANIZATION passim (1983).
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sion because these individuals would not routinely receive court atten-
tion due to the minor nature of their alleged offenses. Basic to this
criticism is the argument that ninety-five percent of all adolescents
commit delinquent acts but are not apprehended, receive no sanctions,
and eventually mature out of their misbehavior. Opponents of diversion
services argue that this method widens the net of arrests, brings unnec-
essary formality to the diversion process, and may actually serve to la-
bel the child as a delinquent without court adjudication.
Despite the proliferation of JASP, the judicial handling of
juveniles has steadily increased in Florida. From 1976, when approxi-
mately one-third of all juvenile delinquency referrals were brought to
court for adjudication, the rate increased to fifty-four percent in
1982.22 The phenomenon, brought about by increased filings by the
state attorneys, reflects a public perception that "nothing happens" to
youths who are arrested. Court processing is viewed as concrete evi-
dence that "something happens."
In order to establish the cost-effectiveness of Florida's diversion
programs, evaluative studies must be undertaken to determine if JASP
clients are truly being diverted and whether these youths would be sub-
jected to court processing if the diversion service did not exist. Judicial
handling should be reserved only for violent or chronically delinquent
youth. Because so few juveniles who come to court are such serious
offenders, it is more appropriate to substitute the dollars which now go
into the bulk of court processing with diagnostic services, special reme-
dial education, and employment training. By reducing the judicial han-
dling rate from fifty-four percent to thirty percent, the state could real-
ize a savings in excess of fifteen million dollars annually. This amount
could then be directed to a range of appropriate family support and
skills training services.
B. Detention Programs
Florida has the highest pre-adjudicatory juvenile detention rate in
the nation.2 3 During fiscal year 1982-83, 25,089 youths were admitted
to secure detention-over one-third of all delinquency referrals during
that period.2 ' The total average daily population in Florida's twenty
22. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 8.
23. Id.
24. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES PROGRAM OFFcE, HRS, DETENTION POP-
ULATION ANALYSIS (fiscal year 1982-83) [hereinafter cited as POPULATION ANALYSIS].
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regional detention centers was 1,016 in 1982-83, with an average
length of stay per child of 12.7 days.25 During that same time, over
400,000 child days were spent in secure detention. 2 Funding for secure
detention represents one-quarter of the state's total budget for delin-
quency services.27 Due to the detainees' pre-adjudicatory status, the de-
tention program is not intended to offer any treatment services, just
custodial care. The cost of this care totals $1,200 per child per
month.2
In 1981, the Florida Legislature amended section 39.032, Florida
Statutes, which governs the detention decisionmaking process. Under
current law, the criteria for admitting a child to detention excludes
only the first-time accused misdemeanant, and even that child may be
admitted if there are reasonable grounds to believe that he will fail to
appear at any hearing. 9 In addition, the role of law enforcement and
the state attorney in making the detention decision was significantly
broadened by the 1981 statutory change.30 This legislation was passed
in direct reaction to a change enacted in 1980 which had restricted the
use of detention. The 1980 criteria created a storm of protest from the
law enforcement community. Specific cases of juveniles who were ar-
rested for certain crimes but could not be detained caused enormous
frustration. The perspective that "these youths must learn a lesson by
being locked up" was heard statewide. The fact that detention is not to
be used as punishment, that due process prohibits the arresting officers
from assuming the role of judge, and that the "lesson" learned in de-
tention may not be corrective but, on the contrary, destructive were not
considered. The 1980 change was depicted to the 1981 legislature as
promoting criminal behavior yet the facts did not justify this depiction.
During the 1980-81 year, detention populations were reduced by
twenty percent without any significant negative effect.3 1 During that
period, the number of arrested juveniles who were released pending ad-
judication increased less than one half of one percent, rates of appear-
ance at scheduled hearings were equal to previous years, and total ar-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. FLA. DEP'T HEALTH & REHAB. SERV., PUBLIC HEARINGS MANUAL 79
(1983) [hereinafter cited as HEARINGS MANUAL].
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 39.032 (1981).
30. Id.
31. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16.
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rests of juveniles dropped by ten thousand.32 According to the 1983
Governor's Office policy report:
[T]he 1980 detention criteria, which were designed primarily to re-
duce the detention rate for juveniles charged with victimless of-
fenses and minor property offenses, achieved their intended purpose
and should be considered a successful experiment in the effort to
increase the cost effectiveness (reduce the number detained without
increasing the juvenile crime rate) of detention practices. 33
After the criteria were expanded in 1981, the detention rate increased
forty percent.34 As a result, the need to expand existing centers and to
build new facilities has become a major fixed capital and operating
budget issue. The 1981-82 state budget contained $8,000,000 of fixed
capital for secure detention centers, and a biennial operating cost of
nearly $35,000,000. The 1983-84 operating budget for detention ser-
vices is $20,400,000 and an additional $2,500,000 for fiscal year 1984-
85 is being requested by HRS.3 5 Detention has become one of Florida's
major child-intensive growth industries.
Contrary to the intent of the federal Juvenile Justice Act of
1974,36 the clientele of Florida's secure detention centers now includes
a population of status offenders-youth who are held in contempt of
court for violating dependency orders. These orders stem from truancy,
runaway, or similar non-criminal behavior. Surveys of Florida's secure
detention centers during the past two years have revealed as many as
ten percent of those detained were status offenders serving specified
sentences by order of the court.3 These youths remain in detention
twice as long (24.8 days average) as the youths held pending delin-
quency hearings.38 Secure detention certainly curtails status offense be-
havior during the term of incarceration. The child cannot run through
the concrete block walls or steel doors, there are no parents to disobey,
and attendance at the detention school is mandatory. Such confine-
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 10-11.
34. Id. at 11.
35. FLA. DEP'T HEALTH & REHAB. SERV., SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET REQUEST 4
(fiscal year 1984-5).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
37. POPULATION ANALYSIS, supra note 24.
38. COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, FLA. HOUSE OF
REP., BILL ANALYSIS PCB 3 (relating to status offenders, 1983) [hereinafter BILL
ANALYSIS PCB 3].
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ment, however, operates to inflict harm by aggravating the complex
problems which gave rise to the original status offense behavior. Due to
family, school and court frustration, and the dearth of appropriate
treatment resources, incarceration has become the expedient option.
But detention of behaviorally dependent children is an expensive mis-
take, one which reduces the chances of resolving those children's real
problems.
An alternative to secure detention, the non-secure detention pro-
gram, has been established in each of the regions now served by a de-
tention center. Non-secure detention provides intensive supervision to
those youths who are in pre-hearing status at one-third the cost of se-
cure detention placement. These youths remain with their families, are
required to maintain regular school attendance, and adhere to defined
activity limitations. During 1982-83, 5,873 youths were placed in non-
secure detention status, averaging 364 youths on a daily basis. 9 The
success of this alternative to secure confinement is well documented.4 °
Most youths appear at their hearings and are not accused of additional
offenses in the interim. Due to budget constraints and a longer length
of stay required in non-secure status, 21.4 days versus 12.6 for secure,
the program continually operates at capacity.41
With minimal modification, the state should re-adopt the set of
detention criteria passed by the 1980 Florida Legislature which re-
stricted the use of secure incarceration while not presenting any signifi-
cant threat to the integrity of the court process. Currently the non-
secure detention program serves one-quarter of the total average daily
population of youth in detention status.42 The program should be ex-
panded to serve one-half of all detained youths as a cost effective alter-
native to secure confinement. This shift of resources would effect an
operating savings of some $5,000,000 in addition to removing the ne-
cessity for capital construction for expanded and new detention facili-
ties. The practice of utilizing secure detention as punishment for re-
peated status offense behavior should be curtailed. The fiscal cost of
this practice is overshadowed only by the human cost to the child. Ex-
pansion of well-staffed non-secure shelters at which behaviorally depen-
dent youth receive diagnostic and therapeutic services is the most cost-
39. CHILDREN, FAMILIES & YOUTH PROGRAM OFFICE, HRS, KEY INDICATORS
REPORT (1982-83) [hereinafter cited as KEY INDICATORS REPORT].
40. Id.
41. POPULATION ANALYSIS, supra note 24.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
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effective alternative to detention incarceration.
C. Community Control
Community control is a court-ordered non-residential supervision
program. A youth is required to perform specified tasks such as com-
munity work service or payment of restitution and adhere to certain
behavior limitations such as observing curfews and attending school or
a job training program for a period of time designated by the court.
Failure to obey the community control order results in the commitment
of the child to HRS.4'3 Each year less than ten percent of the clients
supervised on community control have failed the program and received
commitment status. 4 During 1982-83, 22,320 youths received commu-
nity control sanctions at a per client cost of approximately $350. 45
Since 1980 the community work service and restitution compo-
nents of the program have been expanded. During 1982-83, more than
150,000 hours of community work service, and $500,000 of victim res-
titution payments were generated by community control clients. 4' The
program operates at a per client cost which averages one-tenth of the
costs of the residential program, a clearly cost effective alternative.
The community control program's direction toward expansion of
work service and restitution should be continued. The caseworker's role
in this regard should involve creative involvement with the private busi-
ness sector in each community. Employment skills training, job devel-
opment and placement services should become primary functions of the
community control program so that clients can achieve economic and
personal success when their supervision is completed.
D. Commitment
The percentage of juveniles who are committed by the court to
HRS for treatment services is eight percent of all youths who are re-
ferred to HRS for alleged delinquency. 47 This is double the commit-
ment percentage of five years ago.' 8 Since the early 1970s the array of
43. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16 at 12.
44. Id.
45. Telephone interview with Mr. Dix Darnell, Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services, Children, Youth and Families Program Office (Nov. 1983).
46. Id.
47. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16 at 15.
48. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16 at 25.
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programs available as commitment options has expanded to a remarka-
ble degree. Fifteen years ago all youths committed for treatment in
Florida were sent to training schools." In 1982, training schools admit-
ted approximately thirty-two percent of all committed youth.50 The re-
maining two-thirds were served by numerous alternative programs
ranging from non-residential special intensive groups and marine sci-
ence institutes to residential wilderness programs, halfway houses,
group treatment homes, and START centers.51 During 1982-83, ap-
proximately 3,200 youths were committed to community alternative de-
linquency programs. These youths were served at less cost and with a
higher degree of success than those committed to training schools.5 2
Florida operates three training schools: the A.G. Dozier School in
Marianna, the A.D. McPherson School in Ocala, and the Florida
School for Boys in Okeechobee. The latter institution is operated by the
Jack and Ruth Eckerd Foundation under contract with the state. Dur-
ing 1982-83, the training schools housed a total average daily popula-
tion of 1,016 youths. 53 The average population over the third quarter of
1983 has been reduced to approximately 850 per day." The cost per
client of an average six-month stay in training school is $6,280.15 Al-
though training schools are perceived to be the "deep end" of the juve-
nile justice system, housing only serious offenders who have been
through numerous other programs without success, statistics point to a
different reality.
Over the past three years, as many as forty-five percent of training
school admittees were youths who had never received treatment in an
alternative program.56 Currently, one-third of training school clients
are first commitments.57 Fewer than fifteen percent of the juveniles in
training schools have been committed for violent offenses.58 Three-
fourths of them are not significantly different in terms of commitment
49. CHILDREN, FAMILIES & YOUTH PROGRAM OFFICE, HRS, COMMITMENT PRO-
GRAM DATA ANALYSIS (1982).
50. HRS, CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, STATISTICAL PACKAGE (1982).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. KEY INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 39.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. CHILDREN, FAMILIES & YOUTH PROGRAM OFFICE, HRS, COMMITMENT PRO-
GRAM DATA ANALYSIS (1982).
57. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 24.
58. Id. at 16.
[Vol. 8
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss2/13
Juvenile Justice
offenses and offense histories from those juveniles who are placed in
community programs.59 Although state policy prohibits the placement
of misdemeanants in a training school, waiver of this policy occurred
over a hundred times during 1981-82.60 This evidence points to the ran-
domness of placement practices which are more dependent on space
availability than on an individual client's history or specialized need.
The 1983-84 training school operating budget is $12,800,000.61
Unfortunately, little of this expenditure relates to appropriate mental
health services or even basic supervision. Psychologists' caseloads are at
a 1:200 ratio and general supervision is the responsibility of cottage
parents who earn less than $9,000 annually.62 Additionally, the history
of treatment in the training schools has not been the provision of care
"which will best serve the moral, emotional, mental and physical wel-
fare of the child."6 3 Corporal punishment was a prevalent practice until
its use was discontinued in the mid 1970s. Physical beating to discipline
children who have often been victims of child abuse over much of their
lives serves neither the client nor the program. To create a system of
violent punishment is tantamount to ignoring all but the toughest cli-
ents. The dilemma of training schools is whether rehabilitation will
ever be feasible in an environment that houses four hundred youths in a
rural setting which completely cuts off the realities of home and com-
munity.6 4 Nearly half of training school clients are age fifteen or
younger. Housing several hundred young adolescents in a closed envi-
ronment serves only to exacerbate emotional disturbance and to pro-
mote violent behavior.
Clear distinctions must be made between the treatment needs of
serious violent youth offenders and less-serious committed youth. De-
partmental screening procedures should be developed which diagnose
those youths with special needs such as emotional disturbances and de-
velopmental disability. Appropriate treatment resources should exist for
these individuals. Violent and repeat offenders, who represent less than
fifteen percent of all youths committed by the court, should receive in-
59. Id.
60. Letter from Melvin Herring of HRS Children, Youth, & Family Office to
author (Sept. 1982).
61. HEARINGS MANUAL, supra note 27, at 45.
62. SELECT COMM. ON Juv. JUSTICE, FLA. HOUSE OF REP., OVERSIGHT REPORT
ON FLORIDA'S TRAINING SCHOOLS 48 (1981).
63. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(c) (1981).
64. HRS, CHILDREN, FAMILIES & YOUTH PROGRAM OFFICE, STATISTICAL PACK-
AGE (fiscal year 1981-82).
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tensive therapeutic treatment in relatively small, secure programs of
twenty-five to thirty beds. If proper client evaluation and specialized
treatment services were available, large training schools would become
an unnecessary component of the delinquency program.
E. Adult Correctional Admissions
Since 1978, the number of juveniles admitted to adult prisons has
tripled from 257 in 1977-78 to 771 in 1981-82.11 Of the 771 juvenile
admissions in 1981-82, forty percent were aged sixteen or younger. 6
Statutory changes enacted in 1981 permit the transfer of sixteen and
seventeen year-olds for criminal prosecution as adults at the discretion
of the state attorney.67 The sole criterion for this transfer is a felony
charge; no prior record needs to be in evidence.68 Although it is as-
sumed that adult court transfer should be limited only to those
juveniles who are accused of violent crimes or have proven themselves
not amenable to juvenile court handling, the statutes do not set such
limitations on prosecutorial discretion. Under current law, a sixteen
year-old accused of grand larceny (theft of property valued at $100 or
more) may be tried as an adult, subjected to six months in jail pending
trial, and be incarcerated in the adult prison system if found guilty.69
Of the juveniles sentenced to the Florida Department of Correc-
tions in 1981-82, twenty-five percent had no prior arrests on record.
The median sentence for these juveniles was three years with a major-
ity of them having been found guilty of non-violent property offenses.70
Burglary accounted for forty-four percent of these commitments.7 1 By
placing a sixteen year-old burglar in prison for three years, the state
pays an initial $30,000 installment on a long-term debt. According to
the Youthful Offender Program Evaluation, these inmates are fre-
quently the target of severe exploitation and abuse by older, stronger
inmates.7 Prison, especially for the young, is a violent environment in
which the powerful prey upon the weak. A victimized offender cannot
65. Id.
66. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 25.
67. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 25.
71. Id.
72. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET,
YOUTHFUL OFFENDER PROGRAM EVALUATION (1981).
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be rehabilitated, and our prisons are producing hundreds of youthful
victims each year who will return to their communities worse off than
they were before being sent away.
The authority to transfer a juvenile to criminal court should be a
judge's decision, after the facts have been presented in a waiver hear-
ing. The waiver process should only be utilized for those juveniles who
commit serious crimes or whose records indicate that previous attempts
at juvenile court sanctions have failed. The Department of Corrections
should develop specialized programs which emphasize vocational train-
ing for juvenile inmates ages seventeen and under. No inmate who is
diagnosed as developmentally disabled or mentally ill should be incar-
cerated in mainstream prison environments.
IV. Juvenile Justice and the Educational System
In examining the problems of youth who enter the juvenile justice
system, the role of the school cannot be ignored. Sporadic attendance,
misbehavior and educational failure are all characteristics of young
people who get into trouble with the law. Although schools are respon-
sible for the enforcement of compulsory attendance laws, few school
districts in Florida have effective programs to respond to the complex
reasons for a student's non-attendance or misbehavior. The misbe-
having child is viewed by school administrators as a discipline problem
who requires punishment. In the 1981-82 school year, over 180,000
public school students in Florida received corporal punishment on sin-
gle or numerous occasions.73 Actual incidents of corporal punishment
may number a half million or million annually. In the 1981-82 school
year, over 83,000 Florida students were suspended from public school.74
In the 1980-81 school year, over 40,000 students dropped out of Flor-
ida's public schools,75 and another 112,000 were not promoted to the
next highest grade.78 Each year, for every two graduates of Florida's
schools, a third child is a dropout.
The discipline statistics are especially severe for black students. In
the 1980-81 school year, black students comprised twenty-three percent
of the Florida public school population but represented thirty-three per-
cent of the non-promoted students, thirty-seven percent of the corpo-
73. FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS IN FLORIDA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 29 (1981-2).
74. FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS IN FLORIDA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 28 (1981-2).
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. at 24.
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rally punished students, thirty-eight percent of the suspended students
and forty-three percent of the expelled students.77 In 1979, the federal
Office of Civil Rights released a study which ranked the nation's one
hundred worst school districts for overrepresentation of black students
among those who were corporally punished, suspended or expelled. Ten
Florida school districts were among those one hundred. These districts
are ten of the twelve largest Florida school districts, encompassing
nearly sixty percent of the state's public school population.7 8
The Florida Alternative Education Act was established in 1978 to
promote educational services which are "positive not punitive" and are
directed to provide special help to the disruptive and unsuccessful stu-
dent.7 9 A majority of Florida's school districts have implemented alter-
native education programs. An evaluation of these programs by the
Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting in 1981 revealed that
most district programs offered little in the way of specialized instruc-
tion or support services. 80 The majority of districts operated in-school
suspension and detention programs, without any cooperative planning
within districts, across districts, or with the Department of Education.,
Without the proper implementation of the Alternative Education Act,
the punitive and exclusionary practices of Florida's public schools have
continued to generate drop-out rates and a population of under-edu-
cated, unskilled, frustrated and desperate young people. Additionally,
the 1983 Florida Legislature's initiative in passing the RAISE Bill,
aimed at making graduation requirements more stringent, may result
in even higher drop-out rates. RAISE ignores the special needs of a
large population of students who are failing under current educational
standards.
After five years, the Alternative Education Act should begin to
show a positive impact on exclusionary discipline practices. To that
end, clear performance measures for district alternative education pro-
grams should be developed by the Department of Education and uti-
lized for evaluation purposes. The practices of corporal punishment and
suspension should be limited by statutory amendment. It is not in the
77. Id.
78. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE,
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS CIVIL RIGHTS SURVEY (appendix and tables,
1979).
79. FLA. STAT. § 230.2315 (1981).
80. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET,
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION: AN EVALUATION (1981).
81. Id.
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best interest of either the child, the school, or the state to continue to
over-utilize these ineffective punishment methods. The emphasis of the
RAISE improvements should be expanded to include increased coun-
seling and guidance services and expanded remedial education compo-
nents. Unamended, the RAISE initiative will result in higher drop-out
rates than presently exist. An enhanced career education program
should be developed utilizing the technical expertise of private business
and community agencies to promote improved job training and employ-
ment opportunities for Florida's student population.
V. Conclusion
The purpose of Florida's juvenile justice system is appropriately
stated in section 39.001, Florida Statutes, as the intent "to protect soci-
ety more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, when-
ever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation. . . which are consis-
tent with the seriousness of the offense .... ,,82 This state has
established, through statutes and programs, a proper framework for the
achievement of that rehabilitative purpose. Certain needed adjust-
ments, such as those suggested in this article, would bring our system
more expediently toward this rehabilitative goal.
82. FLA. STAT. § 39.001 (1979).
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Dealing with Child Abuse and Neglect: A
Prosecutor's Viewpoint
Janet Reno* and James Smart**
I. Introduction
Child abuse and neglect are among the most critical problems so-
cial service and law enforcement agencies face in Florida. Abuse and
neglect take many different forms and arise from a wide range of
causes. The problem is one of the most complex issues faced by law
enforcement agencies because conflicting medical, social and legal con-
siderations make it very difficult to formulate any set policy in deter-
mining what is necessary to protect the child and the public. For exam-
ple, the development of the facts in child abuse cases requires a
comprehensive child protection team effort. The Florida Legislature
has made some significant advances in this area, but it is imperative
that well-funded child protection teams composed of well trained coun-
selors, investigators and medical experts be available on a twenty-four
hour basis to respond to this critical community problem.
It is just as important to have the proper resources to treat chil-
dren who are victims of abuse and neglect. Convenient psychiatric, psy-
chological and medical assistance should be immediately available to
all children. Long term care and treatment should be provided when
needed to deal with the horrible scars left by abuse and neglect. Long
term follow-up should take place to make sure the child is protected
against future abuse and neglect. Too often a child does not receive
adequate follow-up treatment for abuse and neglect because he cannot
afford it. Florida must take steps to see that this care and treatment is
available for every child who is the victim of abuse and neglect. The
state must also provide programs to correct the behavior of those guilty
of abuse or neglect. Many offenders and their families need assistance
to correct behavior that has caused the abuse. We must provide famiy
support programs throughout the state to provide the medical, psycho-
logical and social support and treatment necessary to rebuild the family
*B.A., Cornell; L.L.B., Harvard; State Attorney, Eleventh Judicial CIrcuit.
**B.A.; J.D., University of Miami; Assistant State Attorney, Eleventh Judicial
Circuit.
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unit where appropriate.
This article concentrates on the legal aspects of abuse and neglect
from a prosecutor's viewpoint. It discusses such topics as the problems
involved in the detection and reporting of child abuse and neglect; the
crucial need for thorough investigation of these cases; the emergency
protective powers available; juvenile dependency proceedings; and the
various powers of disposition available. The article suggests various re-
forms that are urgently needed and calls for the provision of financial
resources to investigate and treat problems of abuse and neglect in chil-
dren. But all the laws in the world will mean nothing unless we provide
the financial resources to investigate and treat abuse and neglect.
II. Conflicting Types and Sources of Child Abuse and
Neglect
The following hypothetical fact patterns demonstrate the conflict-
ing forms and sources of child abuse and neglect. They demonstrate the
need for flexibility and sensitivity in determining the appropriate dispo-
sition of each case.
A. Physical Abuse
A father is a stern taskmaster who loves his daughter. He paddles
her for poor marks in school and becomes obsessed with her making
"straight A's." As a consequence he beats the child and inflicts seri-
ous physical injury requiring medical treatment.
A stepmother, frustrated at her husband's obvious preference for
his own children over her own, tortures her stepchildren by burning
them with lighted cigarettes and beating them with a belt when they
do the slightest thing wrong.
A father physically abuses his entire family when he drinks. When
he is not drinking, he is a gentle, loving father.
A mother's live-in boyfriend has a long criminal record of violent
crime and domestic violence. He beats, kicks, and strikes her chil-
dren, whose bruises are reported by a teacher.
A young, single mother lives with her three children in poverty.
She has few employable skills. She is without family in the area. Her
boyfriend has left her. The six year-old has a fever; the three year-
old is throwing up; the one year-old will not stop screaming. She
[Vol. 8272
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slaps the baby in the head as hard as she can in frustrated despair
and anger. He falls unconscious and is taken to the emergency room
suffering serious injury.
Each case is an example of child abuse, but each case must be
looked at individually, based on the people involved, to determine what
combination of treatment and punishment will work to protect the child
and to make sure the offender never does this again to anyone.
B. Neglect
A mother cf four whose husband makes enough to support the
family totally neglects her children. She watches television all day
and lets the children fend for themselves. The baby lies in her crib in
her own waste. Neighbors complain and counselors respond to find
the baby dying and all the children suffering from malnutrition. The
mother is determined to be of average intelligence and mentally
competent.
A young, single mother works and goes to school at night in order
to obtain a better job. The children are left by themselves. Some-
times she remembers to leave food. One child is found wandering in
the neighborhood with a high fever. All the children are found to be
ill with a virus they have had for two weeks. They have not been
treated, nor have they seen a doctor.
The wealthy parents supply their child's every material need and
make sure he has "round the clock supervision." Yet the parents
spend little time with the child; they show him no affection, and are
uninterested in his activities. The child becomes withdrawn and mo-
rose. He does poorly in school. His peers tease him as being different.
Each case is an example of neglect but different sanctions and
treatment would be appropriate in each case and the last case could
never be proven in a court of law. This case raises the question as to
when or at what point government should intervene.
C. Sexual Abuse
A father is a successful mid-management professional. Business
pressures and subsequent financial reverses cause him to start drink-
ing to excess. During these drinking episodes, he has sexual relations
with his six year-old daughter. She tells her mother who consults the
1984]
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family physician. The child loves her father. The mother does not
want the family destroyed. She wants treatment for the father and
for her daughter in order to help her cope with what has happened to
her.
A sixty year-old activities director at a camp fondles a nine year
old girl who is a student at the camp and inserts his finger into her
vagina. The child's family is outraged and demands the maximum
prison sentence. The offender has no prior record and is considered
an excellent counselor by teachers and parents. Every psychologist
and psychiatrist who examines him says he is a mentally disordered
sex offender who would benefit from extended outpatient treatment.
A boyfriend beats and rapes the twelve year old daughter of the
woman he lives with.
Each of these cases is an example of sexual abuse against a child,
where different sanctions and treatment would be appropriate. All of
these hypothetical situations demonstrate the need to look at each case
on its own merits. One case may require vigorous criminal prosecution
of the offender and a request for a lengthy prison sentence. Another
case may require sensitive treatment of an entire family by a juvenile
judge in a dependency proceeding. Other cases will require both reme-
dies. Every case of child abuse and neglect requires a sensitive,
thoughtful analysis by all concerned of what is best for the child and
what will protect others from such conduct in the future. The answer
may often be based more on the intuition of those skilled in the han-
dling of child abuse cases than on any doctrinaire legal position or phi-
losophy. Yet, the law will inevitably play a role, especially in attempt-
ing to ensure due process for those suspected of child abuse. The key to
each case of child abuse is to learn the facts about the abuse, its causes
and the family's social and medical history. Problems of proof may pre-
vent a criminal prosecution otherwise warranted. Lack of a full social
history may cause the court to award custody to an inappropriate fam-
ily member. The full development of the facts is as important as the
legal issues involved.
III. Detection and Reporting of Child Abuse and Neglect
An effective detection and reporting system must be developed in
order to adequately address the problem of child abuse. The one year-
old who is beaten by a parent cannot report it and cannot dispute the
274 [Vol. 8
53
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Child Abuse and Neglect
parent's claim that he fell out of the crib. Florida has taken significant
steps to develop an effective reporting mechanism which must be publi-
cized and perfected. Florida's child abuse reporting mechanism is
spelled out in its statutes.' Anyone having knowledge or a reasonable
suspicion that a child is abused or neglected in Florida must report
such knowledge or suspicion to the Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services (HRS).2 Knowing and willful failure by anyone
required to report known or suspected child abuse or neglect or the
knowing and willful prevention of another from making such a report is
a second degree misdemeanor.' The report is made to the statewide
Child Abuse Registry on a toll free telephone or to the local office of
HRS. Immunity from liability is provided for anyone making a report
in good faith, and the reporter's confidentiality is respected.4 Relatives
are usually the first to detect abuse and neglect. These relatives often
have conflicting motivations because while wanting to protect the child
they may want to see the offender helped rather than punished and are
afraid the state will only take punitive action. Moreover, they may be
fearful of retribution if they report the abuse. One goal of any system
1. FLA. STAT. § § 415.501-.514 (1983).
2. Id. § 415.504.
3. Id. § 415.513.
4. Id. § 415.511. In addition to immunity, the statutory scheme contains many
other provisions designed to encourage reporting and facilitate the enforcement process.
For example, the name of any person reporting child abuse or neglect may not be
released except to certain authorized persons, absent the written consent of the re-
porter. Id. § 415.51(5). A reporter, however, may be called as a witness by HRS or the
State Attorney, in a proceeding involving the child who is the subject of a report. The
fact that such person made the report may not be disclosed. Id. § 415.51(5). Anyone
releasing the name of a reporter, except as authorized, is guilty of a second degree
misdemeanor. Id. § 415.513(3).
No communications except communication between an attorney and his client
shall be privileged in any case of child abuse or neglect and no privilege except the
attorney/client privilege shall constitute grounds for failure to report abuse and neg-
lect, failure to cooperate with the investigation or failure to give evidence in a judicial
proceeding relating to abuse or neglect. Id. § 415.512.
The statute presents a problem which must be sensitively handled by prosecutors
and police. If a reporter expects confidentiality, he will be upset if he is subpoenaed and
made to testify. Thus, on first contact with a reporter, the investigator should stress the
fact that the witness was the reporter will not be revealed. However, the reporter
should be made to understand that in cases in which it is imperative for the State to
proceed in order to protect the child or the public, he may be called as a witness. Clear
communication at the outset of cases can avoid many problems with a witness in subse-
quent proceedings.
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must be to develop public confidence that, when reported, the case will
be handled sensitively and fairly and the reporter will be shielded from
retribution and harassment. As confidence is developed, the public
must also be advised through public service announcements, neighbor-
hood and Parent-Teacher Association meetings, churches and schools,
of the need to report abuse and neglect.
After family members, teachers and doctors are the second most
likely group to detect child abuse and neglect. However, teachers are
often fearful they will be sued or called on the carpet by an angry
parent in the principal's office. Each school system should make sure all
personnel are advised of the critical need for reporting and the immu-
nity provided by the reporting statute. Emergency room doctors and
pediatricians are also key observers. Specialists can often tell that the
seemingly innocent broken leg of a three year-old, reported as suffered
in a fall, was in fact caused by a severe blow. It is important that the
medical profession train physicians to identify child abuse and that all
child protection teams are staffed with doctors specially trained in such
detection. The diagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease in children is
a significant indicator of possible sexual abuse. Early detection followed
by immediate investigation is often the key to successful disposition of
the case.
IV. The Need for Thorough Investigation
Successful efforts against child abuse will succeed only if there is a
thorough investigation by competent law enforcement agencies along
with skilled counselors and physicians functioning, whenever possible,
as a team. Law enforcement officers and counselors should be trained
to develop legally sufficient proof of the abuse or neglect. Counselors
should develop a thorough and fair social history of the child, the of-
fender and the family to determine the appropriate disposition of the
case. If initial investigation indicates child abuse or neglect, the investi-
gators should be able to consult with prosecutors skilled in dependency
matters and criminal prosecution to obtain advice on any legal
problems which may arise during the investigation.
Investigators should have access to experts skilled in pediatric
trauma and rape treatment. Laboratory tests revealing a sexually
transmitted disease in a child is important, although not conclusive, ev-
idence of sexual abuse. Child abuse is one of the worst ills of any com-
munity and sufficient medical and laboratory resources should be com-
mitted to assure a full investigation. When a child is the suspected
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victim of child abuse or neglect, the child abuse investigator with HRS
may have the child medically examined for diagnosis, without parental
permission, if there is a need for such an examination. Further, a li-
censed physician who suspects that a child is the victim of abuse may
authorize a radiological examination without parental consent. 5
Too often, the abused or neglected child is subjected to repeated
interviews in which he has to relive the nightmare. They are questioned
first by investigators from the child protection team, then the police,
then by doctors and then by prosecutors. Any investigator or prosecutor
assigned to child abuse cases must be sensitive and should be trained in
interviewing and dealing with children. Such persons can often per-
suade a child to tell the full story while others who are not skilled in
eliciting a child's response cannot get the child to say anything. It is
imperative that the investigative effort is unified and that the child is
required to appear and talk to as few people as possible as the case is
investigated. The office or scene in which the child is interviewed
should be one especially set aside for children and should be as pleasant
and as non-threatening as possible. The trauma of reliving the past ex-
perience can be very damaging to the child and every effort should be
made to minimize the child's involvement and make the experience as
tolerable as possible. Recently, it has been the practice of police and
prosecutors, especially in cases of sexual abuse or sexual battery involv-
ing children, to attempt to create a situation where a child victim is not
compelled to repeatedly explain what took place. This can often be
done by conducting an interview where one trained person questions
the child and others observe unobtrusively, such as through one way
mirrors or closed circuit television. The courts should limit discovery so
that depositions take place in the least oppressive atmosphere possible.
However, because of current law and the constitutional right of con-
frontation, when a child victim is deposed or testifies at trial, the ac-
cused has a right to be present.
V. Appropriate Legal Remedies for Child Abuse
After all the facts are gathered police, prosecutors, counselors and
doctors should reach a joint decision on the legal remedy to be pursued.
Medical, social, evidentiary and legal criteria are all involved in the
ultimate decision. Prosecutors can proceed either civilly through depen-
5. The county bears the medical costs but the ultimate costs are borne by the
parents or legal custodian or guardian of the child. FLA. STAT. § 415.507(3) (1983).
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dency proceedings or through criminal prosecutions. Florida Statutes
Chapter 827 categorizes criminal child abuse as Aggravated Child
Abuse, Child Abuse and Negligent Treatment of Children.6 Of course,
criminal statutes defining homicide, kidnapping, sexual battery and in-
cest apply as well.
Dependency proceedings are governed primarily by Florida Stat-
utes Chapter 39, "Proceedings Relating to Juveniles," Parts I and III.
If a child is adjudicated dependent, the court may place him under
protective supervision or commit him to the temporary or permanent
custody of others.7 A child who is found by the court to be abused or
neglected is designated a dependent child." If a parent who is capable
of providing support fails to provide that support and either makes no
effort or a marginal effort to communicate with the child for six
months, the child is "abandoned." 9 A child is "abused" by "any willful
act that results in a physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is
likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be
significantly impaired." 10 A parent "neglects" a child by depriving or
allowing the child to be deprived of any basic necessity, or by permit-
ting the child to live in an environment where his health, physical or
otherwise, is in danger of significant harm.11 The definitions used in the
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 827.03-.05 (1983); See Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.
1979); Faust v. State, 354 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1978); Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589
(Fla. 1976) upholding constitutionality of FLA. STAT. § 828.04 (1969) (which was later
renumbered § 827.93 and amended by 1974 Fla. Laws 383). See Comment, Constitu-
tional Law: The Element of Scienter Saves the Florida Simple Child Abuse Statute
from Being Unconstitutionally Vague: State v. Joyce, State v. Hutcheson, 3 NOvA L.J.
313 (1979).
7. See infra, notes 46 through 84 and accompanying text.
8. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9) (1983).
9. Id. § 39.01(1)
"Abandoned" means a situation in which a parent who, while being able,
makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to commu-
nicate with a child for a period of six months or longer. If a parent's effort
to support and communicate with a child during such a six month period
are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a
settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the
child to be abandoned.
Id.
10. Id. § 39.01(2).
11. Id. § 39.01(26).
"Neglect" occurs when a parent or other legal custodian, though
financially able, deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of,
necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or permits a child to
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juvenile statutes are fairly straightforward except for the confusion
generated by the term "financially able" in the definition of "neg-
lect."12 The financial ability requirement was added by the Florida leg-
islature in 1978 to prevent a child from being taken from his parents
simply because they are poor.13 This requirement may, however, pre-
clude the protection of a child whose parent is poor but who has some
condition other than poverty that prevents him or her from being a
proper parent.
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal addressed this issue in
State v. M.T.S. 4 The state petitioned the court to declare dependent a
two week-old baby displaying symptoms of drug withdrawal and brain
damage. 5 The mother was hospitalized for a mental condition, had cut
her wrists, suffered from a hereditary mental illness, had another child
in foster care, and her sole means of support was $220.00 per month
from social security.' The court found the child was not abandoned for
a period of six months or longer as required by statute17 It held the
child was not neglected because the mother was not financially able to
care for the child and affirmed the trial court's order denying the peti-
tion for dependency."8 The appellate court rejected the contention that
the trial court had inherent jurisdiction to protect the child and held
that "Chapter 39, supra, constitutes the sole and exclusive means by
which the circuit court can declare a child to be dependent." 9 Accord-
ing to the court, the legislature had supplanted and limited the old
common law doctrine of parens patriae and any remedy for parental
maltreatment of children was strictly determined by statutory defini-
tion.20 Calling it a "tragic oversight," the court said "[o]bviously, there
is a hiatus in Chapter 39, whereby, a child of a parent who is impover-
live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the
child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or
to be in danger of being significantly impaired.
Id.
12. Id.
13. See Wright v. State, 409 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
14. 408 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for review denied, 419
So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1982).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 662-63.
19. Id. at 663.
20. Id.
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ished and suffering from mental illness, drug abuse or alcoholism will
not be protected for six months after the onset of the parent's ill-
ness."21Following the Third District Court of Appeal's rationale, chil-
dren whose parents are poor cannot be declared "neglected" because
their parents are financially unable to provide for them. An abandon-
ment theory gives no protection for a period of six months. 2 It appears,
by statutory definition, that the children of poor parents are not enti-
tled to the same quality of protection as children of more affluent par-
ents. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal in Wright v. State
avoided this problem by considering "neglect" as composed of two dif-
ferent categories: 1) deprivational neglect and 2) environmental neg-
lect. 3 The court held that the term "financially able" applied only to
the parent who deprived the child of necessary food, clothing, etc.,
under the first prong of the "neglect" definition and not to the parent
who permitted a child to live in an environment which impaired his
health under the second prong.24 The court then stated:
That is not to say, however, that poverty could never constitute a
defense to a charge of neglect bottomed upon an allegation of harm
resulting from an unhealthy environment. We hold only that the
burden is on the parent or other legal custodian to come forward
with evidence that the condition was unavoidable because of pov-
erty, under such circumstances.25
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has indicated financial inabil-
ity may not even be a bar to a finding of dependency in a case of
deprivational neglect. In the case In Interest of J.L.P.,26 that court re-
jected the mother's contention that since she had never had custody of
the child she could not legally neglect him. The court held that both
neglect and abuse could be established prospectively by evidence, based
on the mother's current condition, that neglect and abuse would occur
if the child were placed in her care.27 The court did not directly address
21. Id.
22. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1) (1983); See M.T.S., 408 So. 2d at 622-23.
23. 409 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
24. Id. at 1184-85.
25. Id. at 1186.
26. 416 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
27. Id. at 1252. The court further stated: "Under the statutes, we hold that in
order to sustain a final order of permanent commitment because of neglect or abuse,
there must be clear and convincing evidence that the child has been or will be ne-
glected or abused." Id. (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
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the financial ability issue but simply quoted Wright, saying:
We are not insensitive to appellant's plight, which is woeful, and
her circumstances are a stark reminder that life can be wretched in
this country at this time for the poverty stricken. Furthermore, as
this court said in Wright v. State, 409 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1982),
The purpose of the phrase "financially able" in subsec-
tion (27) is to ensure that financially disadvantaged par-
ents may not be divested of their children simply be-
cause they are poor. It does not, however, constitute a
license for child abuse for either rich or poor. We need
not draw that fine line which the circumstances of some
future case will require of a court confronted with a
deprivation of necessary food, clothing, shelter or medi-
cal treatment. The term "financially able" rather
clearly applies in that situation and poverty, under ap-
propriate circumstances, may be found to constitute a
bar to a finding of dependency.2 8
The court in J.L.P. could have based its decision on a finding of
abuse alone, thus making financial ability irrelevant. Nonetheless, these
cases indicate the Fourth District, in attempting to protect the child,
will limit the impact of the financial ability requirement as much as
possible.29
An epilogue to the M.T.S. case is that during the period in which
the state appealed the trial court decision, the child's mother died. Af-
ter the Third District Court of Appeal ruled, the state filed a depen-
dency petition alleging neglect on the part of the child's father who was
unknown even to the child's mother. Based upon the neglect allegation
against the father and following a diligent search for him, the child was
adjudicated dependent and placed in the temporary custody of the
state.
An attempt was made in the 1983 Florida legislative session to
amend the neglect definition but the legislature did not act on the pro-
posal. One other aspect of the definition of abuse and neglect deserves
mention. A parent legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, who as a
result of those beliefs fails to provide needed medical treatment for his
child, shall not be considered abusive or neglectful for that reason
28. Id.
29. In the Interest of Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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alone. 30 However, the court may order that the child receive medical
services if his physical condition requires it.3 1
In cases of child abuse and neglect, prosecutors have the following
options: 1) prosecute criminally for child abuse and seek sanctions
against and treatment of the offender; 2) file a petition for dependency
seeking treatment, supervision and protection of the child; or 3) do
both. In making a decision about how to proceed the following consid-
erations are important:
A. Burden of proof
In criminal prosecutions the state must prove its case beyond and
to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. In dependency proceedings,
the state has a much lesser burden of proof since it is required to estab-
lish a state of dependency by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 In
many cases, the child may be too young to testify and there may be no
independent witnesses, no confessions and insufficient evidence to make
a circumstantial case against the parent criminally. The dependency
route may be the only alternative.
B. Effect of prosecution on the child
In some cases the experience of reliving the abuse or neglect as he
testifies in the formal setting of a courtroom before a judge and jury
may be too traumatic for the child. Florida law allows the videotaping
of victims under the age of twelve in sexual battery and criminal child
abuse cases. 3 This provision, while still requiring that a judge preside,
helps to alleviate the formal setting of a normal court proceeding. After
balancing the interests, however, all involved may conclude that the
dependency route is preferable in order to minimize the emotional
strain on the child. In dependency proceedings, the child will appear
before a judge of the juvenile division of the circuit court in a more
informal, less threatening setting.
30. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(26) (1983); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(2) (1983).
31. See Ivey, 319 So. 2d at 59.
32. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(1)(b) (1983).
33. Id. § 918.17 (1983). See also articles by Haas and Hoffenberg in this issue.
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C. Culpability of the offender
Oftentimes the parent is a well-meaning, loving parent who went
too far or did not know how to cope. In such cases, criminal prosecu-
tion would not be appropriate.
D. Punishment of the offender and the need for leverage for
treatment
Although removal of a child may be a severe punishment to a par-
ent, in other cases it will be inadequate. The only means of securing
punishment for malicious offenders is through criminal prosecution.
Punishment, including probation if appropriate, may also provide an
effective leverage for treatment of an offender who needs to be pushed
to treatment.
E. Deterrence
A prosecutor must constantly consider a sentence which deters
others from committing such offenses in the future. Child abuse and
neglect is a serious community problem and criminal prosecution is the
only route to full exposure and deterrence of the defendant's actions.3 4
VI. Emergency Protective Powers
A child may be taken into custody by a law enforcement officer or
representative of HRS prior to the initiation of court proceedings if
the officer or agent has reasonable grounds to believe that the child
34. The following statutory goals should govern the decision as to how to proceed
in all cases of child abuse and neglect:
1. "To assure... (the child)... the care, guidance and control, prefera-
bly in (his) own home, which will best serve the moral, emotional, mental
and physical welfare of the child and the best interests of the state." FLA.
STAT. § 39.001(2)(b) (1983).
2. "To preserve and strengthen the child's family ties whenever possi-
ble. . ." Id. § 39.001(2)(e).
3. To deter the offender and others from committing similar acts in the
future. Id.
4. To make sure the applicable laws "are executed and enforced as will
assure the parties fair hearings at which their rights as citizens are recog-
nized and protected." Id. § 39.001(2)(d).
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has been abandoned, abused, or neglected, is suffering from illness
or injury, or is in immediate danger from his surroundings and that
his removal is necessary to protect the child.35
Once taken into custody, the child should be released to a parent,
guardian, a responsible adult relative, or responsible adult approved by
HRS who can properly care for the child.36 The child should not be
placed in a shelter prior to a court hearing unless shelter is required to
protect the child, or he has no parent, legal custodian, or responsible
adult relative to provide supervision and care for him. 7 A "shelter" is
the statutory term for a residential facility designed to provide tempo-
rary custodial care for dependency children. 8 In abuse cases, when
counselors and medical experts agree that the home is otherwise ap-
prorpriate and safe, efforts should be made to keep the child in the
home with a responsible adult and to remove the offender from the
home.
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure require that a detention
hearing be held within twenty-four hours after a child has been taken
into custody, excluding Sundays and legal holidays.39 At the detention
hearing the court must determine whether the placement of the child in
a shelter is necessary to protect him, or is necessary because there is no
one to whom the child can be released; whether placement in a shelter
is in the best interest of the child; and whether probable cause exists to
believe that a child is dependent.40 In determining probable cause at a
detention hearing, the court must use the standard of proof necessary
for an arrest warrant and may base its findings upon a sworn statement
or sworn testimony.41 The detention hearing is not adversarial in na-
ture, and hearsay evidence is permissible.42
No child shall be held in a shelter longer than fourteen days with-
35. Id. § 39.401(1)(b) (1983).
36. Id.
37. Id. § § 39.402(1)(a)-(b) (1983).
38. Id. § 39.01(31) (1983).
39. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(6)(a) (1983); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.040.
40. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(6)(a) (1983).
41. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.040.
42. Id. See Moss v. Weaver, 525 F. 2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976). State v. I.B.,
366 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979). See Moss v. Weaver, 525 F. 2d 1258,
1261 (5th Cir. 1976); Moss and LB. are delinquency cases, but the sections of the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure which govern detention apply to both dependency
and delinquency.
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out an adjudication of dependency nor longer than thirty days follow-
ing an adjudication without the entry of an order of disposition." The
statute provides for the extension of the twenty-four hour and fourteen
day time periods described above, but the language providing for such
extensions is confusing and needs to be revised by the legislature."
Greater time is often needed to prepare for trial. Allowing a pre-adju-
dication shelter period of twenty-one days, which is the period for de-
linquency detentions, is preferable. The statutory standard for ex-
tending the shelter periods should be the same as the delinquency
standard which is "good cause."
In any case of child abuse or neglect, it is imperative that immedi-
ate steps be taken to provide medical treatment and counseling for the
child. Often, the mental and emotional trauma suffered by the child is
as great as the physical injury. In cases of sexual abuse there may be
no physical injury but the emotional trauma may be severe. Every ef-
fort must be made to secure appropriate counseling for the child when
it is necessary, particularly in cases in which the parent or custodian
cannot afford to pay for such treatment. Generally, the parents and the
child must consent to examination and treatment, but Florida law pro-
vides for emergency treatment in certain situations. 45
VII. Juvenile Dependency Proceedings
Dependency proceedings are initiated by a petition for dependency
"filed by the State Attorney, authorized agent of the department, or
any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed of
them and believes that they are true. '46 The proceeding is governed by
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The essential parties in a de-
pendency proceeding are the petitioner, the child and any person re-
quired by law to be summoned. 7 Parents and legal custodians, actual
custodians, and guardians ad litem are among those required to be
summoned.48 Foster parents can have standing in dependency proceed-
ings as the actual, if not legal custodians, of a child; their special status
is recognized by Florida law.49 It appears it is more important to be, or
43. FLA. STAT. § 39.407(7)(8) (1983).
44. Id. § 39.402(9)(a); FLA. STAT. § 39.03(7) (1977).
45. FLA. STAT. § 415.507(1) (1983).
46. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1) (1983).
47. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.340.
48. FLA. STAT. § 39.405(4) (1983).
49. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(4)(b) (1983). See Smith v. Organization of Foster
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to have been, an actual custodian of a child than to be a relative in
gaining standing in a dependency proceeding. Previously, Chapter 39,
Florida Statutes, contained a provision requiring placement of a depen-
dent child with able relatives, if possible, rather than in foster care. 1
Thus a relative had standing to intervene in a dependency proceeding.
However, this provision has been repealed. Now, the law only provides
for notice and although relatives are to be notified in the case of a
permanent commitment where parents are dead or unknown, the court
now may exercise discretion as to whether to permit a relative to
intervene.52
Insolvent parents or custodians have a right under the Rules of
Juvenile Procedure to court-appointed counsel in cases involving per-
manent commitment and where criminal child abuse charges might re-
sult. 3 This gives a parent a greater right to appointed counsel than
that spelled out recently by the United States Supreme Court in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.4 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that parents had a right to appointed counsel only in those
cases involving allegations which could result in criminal prosecution. 5
However, it recognized that the states could provide and require coun-
sel for parents in other cases as well.56 It is advisable in more compli-
cated cases involving very unsophisticated parents, or in cases involving
mentally ill or retarded parents, that counsel be appointed if the par-
ents are indigent.
Any child who is the subject of a judicial proceeding has the statu-
tory right to be represented by a guardian ad litem,57 but there is no
constitutional right to counsel for a child in a dependency proceeding.5 8
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
50. In the Interest of J.R.T., 427 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In
the Interest of J.S., 404 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); In the Interest of
K.S.K., 294 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
51. FLA. STAT. § 39.10(6) (1977); In Re R.J.C., 300 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct.
App. 1974).
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(3)(a)4 (1983); In the Interest of J.S., 404 So. 2d 1144,
1146 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1981).
53. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(c)(2). This procedural rule is consistent with the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's holdingin In the Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
54. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
55. Id. at 31-2.
56. Id. at 33-4.
57. FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1983). FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.300 reflects the statutory
provision and further details the duties of a guardian ad litem.
58. In the Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980).
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The appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent a child in depen-
dency proceedings involving abuse or neglect is mandatory by statute.59
Any responsible adult can be a guardian ad litem.6 0 Parents must pay
for the services of the guardian ad litem, but if they do not or are
unable to pay, HRS is responsible for these fees."1
The ninety-day speedy trial rule applies to dependency proceed-
ings.62 It begins to run from the date the child is taken into custody or
the date the dependency petition is filed whichever occurs first."3 If the
adjudicatory hearing has not begun within ninety days, or an extension
is granted, the dependency petition is dismissed with prejudice.6 4 Thus,
in determining whether to take a child into custody or file a petition,
investigators must act promptly to protect the child from abuse or neg-
lect while at the same time assuring themselves they have enough evi-
dence to proceed to trial within ninety days. Once the dependency peti-
tion has been filed, the court has the authority to order the child to be
examined by a physician or psychologist.65 The court can also order, as
part of non-testimonial discovery, that the child provide samples of his
blood, hair, or other bodily materials or to submit to a reasonable,
physical or mental inspection of his body.6 There is no statutory provi-
sion that the parents, custodians, or guardians of dependent children
can be compelled to submit to mental or physical examinations or
evaluations.67
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Chapter 39 Florida
Statutes provide a way to circumvent this problem. Section
39.408(1)(b)6 8 provides that rules of evidence in civil cases apply to
dependency and adjudicatory hearings. Thus, when the juvenile rules
are silent on an issue, civil rules may be referred to for guidance.69
Rule 1.360(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, allows for physical or
59. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.300(b).
60. The duties of guardians ad litem together with a description of the State of
Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program are outlined in article by Hoffenberg/Scheibler
in this issue.
61. In the Interest of R.W., 409 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1981).
62. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180.
63. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(a).
64. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(b).
65. FLA. STAT. § 39.407, (1983).
66. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(h)(i).
67. In the Interest of D.A.W., 178 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1965).
68. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(1)(b) (1983).
69. In the Interest of D.B., 383 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1980).
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mental examination of a person when the physical or mental condition
of the person is in controversy and there is good cause shown for the
examination. This rule has been held to apply in dependency cases be-
cause the juvenile rules are silent on this issue and also because this is
a rule for obtaining evidence in civil cases.70 A mental examination of a
parent or custodian of a child may be ordered only when the mental
condition of the party is directly involved in some material element of
the parent or custodian's abuse or neglect and when the mental condi-
tion cannot be adequately evidenced without the assistance of expert
medical testimony.7 1 Florida should adopt a statute providing for com-
pulsory examination of parents, as well as children, in applicable abuse
and neglect cases.
The court, as a condition of disposition, can order the parents or
guardians of a dependent child to receive family or professional coun-
seling to rehabilitate the child.7 2 Furthermore, nothing appears to pre-
vent the court from requiring psychological or psychiatric examinations
or evaluations of parents or custodians as a condition of a plan or per-
formance agreement.73 In less serious cases of abuse and neglect where
there is a high degree of cooperation on the part of the parents and the
likelihood of a successful resolution is great, the parties may agree to a
plan of treatment, training or conduct as provided for in Rule 8.130,
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Such a plan places the depen-
dency petition in abeyance and usually requires counseling and supervi-
sion for the family of an abused or neglected child who most often
remains at home. The speedy trial requirement must be waived so that
the petition may be acted on, if the court finds a violation of the plan
after the ninety days have expired.74 The court has the power to accept
or reject the plan.7 5 The plan is not an admission of the allegations of
the dependency petition and successful completion of the plan can re-
sult in the ultimate dismissal of the dependency petition.
In the Interest of J.R.M.,76 the court held that the state attorney
is not a party to a plan in a delinquendy case and has no right to veto
70. Fruh v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 430 So. 2d
581 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
71. Id. at 584.
72. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(5) (1983).
73. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.41 (1983); FLA. STAT. § 409.168 (1983).
74. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.130(a)(3)(ii).
75. Id. 8.130(a)(3)(iii).
76. 340 So.2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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it, although he can object to its acceptance.77 The rule has now been
changed, in delinquency cases, to require the state attorney's consent to
defer prosecution.7 8 However, the court's ruling in JRM appears to
continue to apply to dependency cases and the state attorney does not
have veto power over a plan developed by the parties, HRS, and the
court in a dependency action.
The adjudicatory hearing is the trial at which the court initially
determines whether a child is dependent. The state attorney represents
the state and the hearing is held before a judge without a jury.7 9 Rules
of evidence are the same as those for civil cases and a preponderance of
the evidence is required to establish dependency. 80 The parents or cus-
todians who are charged with abuse and neglect may testify on their
own behalf but must be warned of the danger of self-incrimination or
the prosecutor must be willing to grant them use immunity. They may
be cross-examined like any other witness. The adjudicatory hearing is
open to the public except in cases involving unwed mothers, custody,
sexual abuse, or permanent placement. However, the court has discre-
tion to close any hearing to the public.8 ' The hearing is also open to the
electronic media but, again, at the court's discretion.82
Dependency proceedings, including the adjudicatory hearing, must
be conducted pursuant to statute, and with regard for procedural and
substantive due process.83 Dependency proceedings fall under the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and that statute must be given
proper regard in a dependency proceeding. 4 If, at the adjudicatory
hearing, the court finds the child dependent but finds that only home
supervision is required, it may withhold adjudication and place the
child's home under the supervision of HRS. However, in most cases,
the court conducts a separate dispositional hearing after the initial de-
pendency hearing.
77. Id. at 938-39.
78. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.130(a)(3)(ii).
79. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(l)(b) (1983); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.190 (c).
80. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(1)(b) (1983); See Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 260
(S.D. Fla. 1977).
81. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(1)(c) (1983); See also FLA. STAT. § 918.16 (1983).
82. See In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, 370 So. 2d 764, 779
(Fla. 1979).
83. A.Z. v. State, 383 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
84. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.1302-.1348 (1983); In the Interest of T.L., 392 So. 2d 288
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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VIII. The Powers of Disposition
A. The Disposition Hearing
The disposition hearing is the equivalent of the sentencing in crim-
inal cases. At this hearing the court determines what to do with a child
who has been found dependent, either after the plea of the parent or an
adjudicatory hearing. Although adjudicatory and dispositional hearings
may be combined, usually they are separate proceedings. Although the
court can proceed without a written report, at a typical hearing it re-
ceives a written predisposition report from HRS, any relevant reports
such as psychological or psychiatric evaluations, and other relevant evi-
dence. Parents or custodians, the child, and the guardian ad litem are
entitled to disclosure of any information in HRS's predispositional re-
port. 5 The only rule of evidence in a dispositional hearing is relevancy
and materiality. 6 Written or oral information can be received into evi-
dence for its probative value, even though the information would not be
admissible at trial.87 Procedurally, the burden of proof shifts to the par-
ent at a dispositional hearing. 88
The courts have broad powers of disposition.8" Among these is the
power to grant HRS or another child caring agency permanent com-
mitment of a child for subsequent adoption.90 Permanent commitment
terminates both the rights of the parents and the jurisdiction of the
court over the child. 91 Since it is such a significant action this power is
usually not exercised at an initial disposition hearing but usually occurs
in subsequent proceedings.92
As a less drastic alternative, the court may place a child with a
parent, relative, or third person, under the supervision of HRS, with
court-ordered conditions. It may commit the child to a childcaring
agency, or to the temporary custody of HRS."3 Additionally, the court
may also order that reasonable support be paid by a natural or adoptive
parent for a child in the custody of an institution or person other than
85. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2) (1983); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.200(b).
86. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.200(a).
87. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2) (1983).
88. See Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 261 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
89. FLA. STAT. § 39.41 (1983).
90. Id. § 39.41(1)(f).
91. Id. § 39.41(4).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 103 to 126.
93. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.41(1)(a)-(d) (1983).
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the natural parent.9' It may further order that the parents or legal
guardian of a dependent child receive counseling. 95 The court may
change the supervision or custody status of a child at a subsequent pro-
ceeding without a new adjudicatory hearing.90 However, if the parents
or custodians object to this modification, the court must hear all parties
before any change may be ordered. As a matter of practice, any con-
tested change in supervision or placement of a dependent child usually
results in a full hearing. The court has the power to enforce all of its
disposition orders through contempt proceedings.98
B. Foster Care
Florida Statutes, section 409.168, a relatively new statute, man-
dates that certain steps be taken to ensure that children who are placed
in temporary state or private agency custody do not languish in foster
care.99 It specifically states that "[it is the intent of the Legislature
that permanent placements with their biological or adoptive families be
achieved as soon as possible for every child in foster care and that no
child remain in foster care longer than one year."100 It provides for a
performance agreement and spells out detailed procedures and time
limits for the court to review the parties' performance and determine
whether the child should be returned to his natural parents, remain in a
foster home, or be permanently committed. It creates a right of judicial
review in all cases in which children have been adjudicated dependent
and have remained in continuous foster care for six months.101
In some cases, the statute may result in the court's returning chil-
dren to their home or placing them into permanent commitment for
adoption prematurely. In those cases where a child's chances of adop-
tion are virtually nonexistent, permanent commitment cuts him off for-
94. FLA. STAT. § 39.401(1)(g) (1983); Saulpaw v. Singer, 423 So. 2d 943 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
95. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(5) (1983).
96. Id. § 39.41(1)(e).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 39.412; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.270, 8.280; R.M.P. v. Jones, 419 So. 2d 618
(Fla. 1982).
99. FLA. STAT. § 409.168 (1983). Pingree v. Quaintance, 394 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
1st Dist Ct. App. 1981). In this case, HRS was enjoined to initiate the required judi-
cial review. Id. at 162.
100. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(1) (1983).
101. Id. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(3)(g)(2).
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ever from his natural family.1"2 Great care should be taken to avoid
such situations and the legislature should consider amending the stat-
ute to permit a child to remain under foster care in extraordinary
situations.
C. Permanent Commitment
Permanent commitment is the ultimate and most extreme action
which can be taken by the court in dependency cases involving abuse
and neglect. Permanent commitment terminates the parent's rights
over the child."0 3 The permanent loss of custody of a child is a far more
severe remedy than any other available in dependency proceedings and,
indeed, it is one of the most severe decisions courts can make. Since it
is such an extreme remedy, courts will usually first attempt other reme-
dies including treatment, counseling, protective supervision and foster
care. They will use performance agreements to attempt to push the
parents or custodian into providing a proper setting for the child. When
all else fails, and the prospect for abuse and neglect continues, the
court must consider permanent commitment proceedings. These will
usually occur as a separate proceeding after other alternatives have
been tried. There are procedural and evidentiary requirements for per-
manent commitment which do not exist in the usual dependency pro-
ceeding because of the significant impact on parent and child.
The United States Supreme Court has held that an indigent par-
ent in a proceeding involving termination of parental rights is not enti-
tled to appointive counsel as a matter of right because the parent's in-
terest in the custody of his child is not the same as a criminal
defendant's interest in keeping his liberty when faced with incarcera-
tion.104 However, Florida has held that an indigent parent is entitled to
court-appointed counsel in permanent commitment proceedings. 10 5 A
request for permanent commitment in Florida must be initiated by a
formal pleading entitled "Petition For Permanent Commitment" con-
taining the allegations of facts necessary for such commitment.106 An
action to have a child declared dependent and a permanent commit-
102. Id. § 39.41(4).
103. Id.
104. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
105. In the Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.260(a).
106. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.260(a).
[Vol. 8
71
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Child Abuse and Neglect
ment action may be combined.1 17 A circuit judge on his own motion
may initiate permanent commitment proceedings in a dependency pro-
ceeding even if HRS does not concur in the need for permanent
commitment.108
A court must strictly adhere to statutory standards for a perma-
nent commitment and make findings of facts showing why the child
should be permanently committed. 10 A court may permanently com-
mit a child if the court finds this to be in the manifest best interest of
the child and the parents have abused, abandoned or neglected the
child.110 Courts have held that a child can be permanently committed
for prospective abuse or neglect.11 Care must also be taken in perma-
nent commitment cases not to overlook the due process rights of fathers
who have shown an interest in their children, even though the children
were conceived out of wedlock."1 Notice requirements to all parties are
spelled out in detail by statute and rule. 13
The grounds for termination of parental rights or permanent com-
mitment must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence. 11 4 The
Florida Supreme Court first enunciated the standard of clear and con-
vincing proof in an adoption case which resulted from an initial depen-
dency action.11 5 However, the language used by the court can be ap-
plied to any proceeding involving termination of parental rights. All
Florida district courts of appeal have adopted the clear and convincing
107. Id. 8.260(a); Noeling v. State, 87 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1956).
108. Jenkins v. C.A.J., 434 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In the Inter-
est of T.G.T., 433 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In the Interest of J.R.T.,
427 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
109. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.260(0; Noeling v. State, 87 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1956); G.S.
v. State, 190 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
110. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(1)(f)1 (1983). See In the Interest of C.M.H., 413 So.
2d 418 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In the Interest of D.A.H., 390 So. 2d 379 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Carlson v. State, 378 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
111. In the Interest of J.L.P., 416 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
112. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). However, "inactive" fathers
are not necessarily vested with a right of due process in such cases. Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978). See discussion of indigent father's right to counsel, In the Inter-
est of D. B., 385 So. 2d 83, 93 (Fla. 1980).
113. FLA. STAT. § § 39.41(3)(a)-(d) (1983); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070 (e); FLA. R.
Juv. P. 8.260.
114. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
115. Torres v. Van Eepoel, 98 So. 2d 735, 735 (Fla. 1957).
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standard of proof.116 However, the First District Court of Appeal has
held that a permanent commitment proceeding is a type of dispositional
hearing and that the court can accept as res judicata a prior finding
that a child had been abandoned, neglected, or abused and the state
need only prove, by clear and convicing evidence, that it is in the best
interest of the child to be permanently committed. 117 Requiring a peti-
tioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence only the best interests
of the child and not the child's best interest and that the child has been
abandoned, neglected or abused is contrary to other Florida cases.
These cases plainly hold that both of the two-prong requirements for
permanent commitment must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.11 8
In applying the clear and convincing standard the courts will go to
great lengths and give parents considerable latitude in correcting the
conditions generating abuse and neglect before requiring a child's per-
manent commitment. In one case, by the time the mother was nineteen,
she had almost killed a girl in a fight, had run away from home, lived
with the Hell's Angels, and attempted suicide.119 She tried to give her
baby away at a shopping center. She refused mental treatment, voca-
tional rehabilitation and counseling and voluntarily placed the baby in
foster care.1 20 Warned by HRS that permanent commitment proceed-
ings would be initiated if she did not assume responsibility for the
child, she refused rehabilitation and gave birth to another child.112
When the second baby was left unattended by a babysitter, HRS pick-
ed up the baby. The mother broke most appointments to visit the see-
116. In the Interest of T.C., 417 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In
the Interest of J.L.P., 416 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In the Interest
of C.M.H., 413 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In the Interest of D.A.H.,
390 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); In the Interest of J.F., 384 So. 2d 713
(Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Carlson v. State, 378 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); In the Interest of C.K.G., 365 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
117. In the Interest of C.M.H., 413 So. 2d 418, 423-24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
118. See In the Interest of T.C., 417 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
In the Interest of J.L.P., 416 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In the Inter-
est of D.A.H., 390 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); In the Interest of J.F.,
384 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Carlson v. State, 378 So. 2d 868 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
119. In the Interest of D.A.H., 390 So. 2d 379, 382 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (Cobb, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 382.
121. Id.
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ond baby despite the fact that an HRS caseworker went to her house to
pick her up. 2' Yet, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that these
facts fell short of the required clear and convincing proof.123
In another case,1 24 the child was permanently committed at the
age of three and-a-half years only after a history of abuses by the
mother beginning when the child was only four weeks old. On six dif-
ferent occasions the child had been temporarily committed to the state
as a result of parental abuse and neglect prior to the time the court
permanently committed the child.1 25 Even though permanent commit-
ment is a drastic measure, courts should draw the line and permanently
commit a child if the evidence of abuse and neglect or prospects for it
are clear and convincing, and the parents have been given numerous
legitimate opportunities to rehabilitate themselves."2"
IX. Conclusion
Protection of a child is one of society's most important goals. Ev-
eryone seems to agree that the family, in the long run, is the best place
to provide that protection. At some point, however, the state must step
in if the family fails in its obligation to the child. In Florida, the state
attorneys' offices and social service agencies can and do work together
to prevent and correct child abuse and neglect. But these efforts are in
vain unless the Florida legislature provides adequate resources for diag-
nosis, treatment, and correction of the often tragic circumstances that
generate abuse and neglect. Additionally, more legislation is needed
which shows a greater awareness of the magnitude and complexity of
the problems which many of Florida's children encounter. The follow-
ing contains a few suggestions to help improve the current situation:
1) Child protection teams should include among their members a
skilled counselor-investigator and police-investigator whose salaries
make them competitive with the best in their field. These teams should
be responsible for an optimum population at risk. Staff should not be
assigned based on some historical caseload figure. These teams should
have sufficient personnel to enable them to immediately respond to all
122. Id. at 382-83 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. In the Interest of Contrino, 338 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
125. Id. at 247.
126. See Partin v. State, 396 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); In the
Interest of J.L.P., 416 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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complaints of abuse or neglect around the clock. The staff should be
trained to deal sensitively with children and families in crisis and
should consider racial, ethnic and cultural differences.
2) Medical schools working with existing specialists in the diagnosis
of child abuse should specially train physicians in this area and every
child protection team should have immediate access to such physicians
and to rape treatment centers trained in identifying sexual abuse of
children. These physicians should be trained in courtroom work and
should testify in dependency proceedings and prosecutions for child
abuse.
3) Emergency medical, psychiatric and psychological care should be
immediately available for all abused and neglected children. Follow-up
care should be provided as long as the child needs it, regardless of the
parent's ability to pay.
4) Counselor-investigators should make regular follow-up visits to
make sure that incidents of abuse or neglect are not recurring and that
the child is receiving the support and treatment needed.
5) Convenient transportation should be provided for children to go to
treatment facilities when their family or foster parent cannot afford to
take them. Tragically, treatment has often been discontinued because
of failure to follow-up and lack of transportation.
6) Prosecutors trained in working with children should handle abuse
and neglect cases and the same prosecutor should handle a case from
beginning to end. Every child protection team should have access to a
lawyer skilled in dependency proceedings who will work with them.
7) A pleasant and sensitive environment should be created for chil-
drens' interviews and depositions.
8) Adequate counselors and foster care facilities should be provided.
Again, these resources should be provided based on the population at
risk and not some arbitrary formula unrelated to the children to be
served.
9) The salaries of child care workers in all categories should be thor-
oughly competitive to attract and retain competitive and sensitive
counselors.
10) Treatment programs should be provided for all offenders serving
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short term prison sentences for abuse or neglect.
11) Appropriate programs for mentally disordered sex offenders
should be readily available.
12) Support and professional assistance should be provided for all
parents who neglect their children through ignorance or inability to
cope.
13) Psychological and psychiatric assistance should be made available
in appropriate residential and non-residential settings to identify and
correct the causes of child abuse and neglect.
Child abuse and neglect are truly a tragedy for all of us. The
victims cannot help themselves. The community, legislators and constit-
uents alike, must all work together to help alleviate this tragic problem.
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Florida's Dependent Child: The Continuing Search for
Realistic Standards
Christina A. Zawisza*and Mary K. Williams**
I. Introduction
The Florida Legislature in 1984 will once again revisit the state's
juvenile dependency laws in their entirety. These are the laws which
deal in the civil context with abused, neglected, abandoned, truant,
runaway and ungovernable children and are contained in Chapter 39
and section 409.168, Florida Statutes.' The Health and Rehabilitative
Services (HRS) Subcommittee on Health, Economic and Social Ser-
vices of the Florida House of Representatives has drafted and passed
Proposed Committee Bill 22 which extensively revises the present de-
pendency provisions of these two statutes.
Such major effort gives pause to look back at Florida's previous
efforts to forge realistic dependency standards, to look at the previous
efforts of other states and Congress, and to look forward to the in-
formed legislative decisionmaking Florida must now make. Observers
and participators in Florida's dependency process approach the search
for standards from different perspectives: children's rights; parents'
rights; state interests; fiscal constraints; religious implications; and po-
litical considerations. When issues concern children, particularly chil-
dren at risk, the debate is often filled with emotion and fraught with
legal and social dilemmas. This article discusses the state of Florida's
role in the lives of dependent children from the perspective of family
autonomy, preservation and reunification. It looks first at previous
quests for realistic standards in dependency law by summarizing the
* B.A., State University of New York at Albany; M.A., University of Wisconsin;
J.D., University of Virginia; Staff Attorney and Head of Family/Education Impact
Unit, Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Jacksonville, Florida.
** B.A., Smith College; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, Staff attor-
ney and member of Family/Education Impact Unit, Jacksonville Area Legal Aid,
Jacksonville, Florida.
I. Other Florida laws related to the dependency process but not discussed in this
article are: FLA. STAT. §§ 409.145-409.166; 415.101-415.513 (1983).
2. The Subcommittee passed this on October 31, 1983. The bill has been filed as
H.B. 399. Its Senate companion bill is S.B. 273.
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work of certain legal and social work commentators and analyzing the
constitutional basis for family preservation standards. Part III exam-
ines both Congressional efforts to develop federal family preservation
standards and Florida's previous reform efforts. The article concludes
with a discussion of those crucial family preservation issues which Flor-
ida currently faces and how these can be resolved.
II. The Past Search for Realistic Standards
The origin of the present dependency system which mandates state
intervention in family life whenever a child is abused, neglected, aban-
doned, or in need of supervision lies in the state's historical role of
parens patriae,3 and in its police powers.4 This intervention system his-
torically was managed through juvenile courts and public social welfare
agencies. The original statutory dependency framework was established
to provide work or training for poor children and to minimize welfare
costs and fraud. Much later, the development of Aid to Dependent
Children and new awareness of the special needs of children resulted in
a statutory dependency process that became much less a financial assis-
tance program and much more a system in which the state served as
the arbiter of acceptable parental behavior. The patchwork nature of
old dependency laws and their intent to serve these divergent purposes
led to increasing concern in the mid-1970s, a concern which continues
to the present. The dilemma centers around the limits of state interven-
tion in family life and the search for realistic standards that provide
certainty to decision-makers, and at the same time produce more good
than harm to children and families.
A. Legal and Social Work Commentary
The leading proponent of the need for workable standards in the
dependency process is Michael Wald, an attorney, who in a pair of
articles written in the 1970s set forth both his proposed standards and
3. Literally "parent of the country," parens patriae refers to the sovereign power
of guardianship over persons under disability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed.
1951).
4. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEORGETOWN L.J. 887 (1975) and
R. DE LONE, SMALL FUTURES (1979).
5. Areen, supra note 4, at 917.
[Vol. 8
78
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss2/13
Florida's Dependent Child
his rationale for their viability.' Wald articulated the need for the nar-
rowing of child neglect laws, arguing that in a society which values
individual and family autonomy and privacy, it is preferable to solve
family problems through noncoercive intervention. The remedy of coer-
cive intervention, Wald emphasized, will do more harm than good to
children and families.7 In a second article, Wald developed a model
rule-oriented dependency law and argued that specific value judgments
about family intervention should be made at the legislative level, rather
than in the courts.8 The key problems Wald saw in the dependency
process in 1976 were: 1) lack of adequate funding for noncoercive in-
tervention services and reunification services; and 2) laws and adminis-
trative processes that did not reflect and facilitate a set of consistent
goals for intervention.9 The result, Wald felt, was an existing statutory
system that focused on parental behaviors rather than harm to the
children.1 °
In elaborating on the weaknesses of the child welfare system,
Wald pointed to substantial evidence that state intervention is harmful,
not beneficial, to children and parents."' Most children are strongly at-
tached to their parents whether "fit" or "unfit." Another problem dis-
cussed by Wald was the application of neglect standards in an arbi-
trary, discriminatory way, with neglect standards being applied more
stringently to poor families than to middle class families. Wald feared
the massive reallocation of children to new parents under the 1970s
standards. 2 As a more realistic approach, Wald suggested an interven-
tion system in which standards for final termination of parental rights
are related to standards for initial removal of children from their
homes and to standards for return of children to their homes. He sum-
marized his proposals as follows:
6. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wald I];
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children Standards for Removal
of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Wald II].
7. Wald I, supra note 6, at 987-1005.
8. Wald II, supra note 6, at 649-52.
9. Id. at 627-28.
10. Id. at 629.
11. Id. at 644-45.
12. Id. at 651.
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I propose that neglect statutes be revised to allow intervention only
when a child has suffered or is likely to suffer certain serious
harms. When intervention is needed to protect a child, the child
should be left in her home unless she cannot be protected from the
specific harm justifying intervention without removal. If a child
must be removed, intensive services should be provided to reunite
the family and the child should be returned when she will no longer
be endangered in her home, not when it is in her 'best interest' to
return. However, to prevent children from remaining in imperma-
nent foster care, parental rights should be terminated and a perma-
nent placement provided for most children under age three at the
time of removal after six months of placement if the child cannot
be returned home at that time. For children over three termination
would occurP if they cannot be returned home after one year in
placement.1 3
A formulation similar to the Wald proposals was offered even ear-
lier by commentator Robert Mnookin.14 He maintains that three prin-
ciples should govern state intervention in family life and the removal of
children from their homes: 1) removal should be a last resort, used only
when the child cannot be protected within the home; 2) the decision to
require foster care placement should be based on legal standards that
can be applied in a consistent and even-handed way, and not be pro-
foundly influenced by the values of the particular deciding judge; 3) if
removal is necessary, the state should actively seek, when possible, to
help the child's parents overcome the problems that led to removal so
that the child can be returned home as soon as possible. In cases where
the child cannot be returned home in a reasonable time, despite efforts
by the state, the state should find a stable alternative arrangement such
as adoption for the child. A child should not be left in foster care for an
indefinite period of time.15 Mnookin was troubled by the use of only the
vague best interests standard when making decisions as to state inter-
vention in family life. Society's knowledge of human behavior provides
no reliable predictors of future abuse and neglect, and thus courts lack
substantial predictive information. Our pluralistic society, Mnookin ar-
gues, lacks consensus about child-rearing strategies and values, and
13. Id. at 637-38. These proposals are explained in detail, id. at 700-06.
14. Mnookin, Foster Care: In Whose Best Interests?, 43 HARV. ED. REV. 599
(1973).
15. Id. at 602.
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thus courts are left to rely on personal values.1 6 The lack of consistent
standards makes it too easy to ignore detriments to removing children
and children separated from natural parents suffer "separation
trauma". 17 Finally the best interests standard ignores parental
interests.18
Judith Areen has proposed several principles which balance the in-
terests of child, parent, and state:191) standards for court intervention
in a family should focus on the emotional and physical needs of the
children rather than on parental fault; 2) decisions on whether and how
to intervene in a family situation should serve to enhance the social and
emotional bonds.of that family, 3) courts should require a permanent
placement for any child who has been removed from his family and
who cannot be returned safely within a period of time that is reasona-
ble in view of the age and needs of the child.2°The reasons for the
Areen principles are similar to those of Wald and Mnookin: history has
indicated that the enhancement of family ties is normally the best way
to protect the best interests of children;21 separation of children and
parents can be harmful to a child's emotional development whatever
the fault of the parent;2 2 and the most prevalent characteristic of fami-
lies charged with neglect is poverty.2 3
The need for narrower and more specific statutory standards in the
dependency process has been urged from a social worker viewpoint as
well as the legal viewpoint. Douglas Besharov very recently referred to
the problem of increasing liability, both civil and criminal, because of
the failure of social workers to properly investigate and treat child
abuse and neglect cases.24 Inadequate funding of social services has
meant that the number of child welfare staff required to serve abused
16. Id. at 615-22.
17. Id. at 623.
18. Id. at 614-15.
19. Areen, supra note 4, at 918.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 919.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 888. See also Gartison, Why Terminate Parental Rights? 35 STAN. L.
REV. 423 (1983).
24. Besharov, Protecting Abused and Neglected Children: Can Law Help Social
Work? 9 FAMILY LAW REP. 4029 (1983). See G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030
(W.D. Mo. 1983) (consent decree) for an example of such a liability suit. See also
National Center for Youth Law, Sweeping Consent Decree Protects Rights of Foster
Children, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 555 (1983).
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and neglected children has not kept pace with the reports of suspected
incidences of dependency.2 5 Besharov maintains that existing depen-
dency laws are too broad to set the ground rules for appropriate deci-
sionmaking by social service agencies charged with the duties of inves-
tigation and treatment. Existing laws place too much responsibility for
decisionmaking on social workers, charging them with the burden of
making sophisticated predictions of parental failure, when the predic-
tive capacity of the social sciences makes it impossible to show with
any degree of certainty whether a particular parent will abuse or neg-
lect a child.26 Besharov suggests that existing laws be redrafted to deal
only with past abusive and neglectful behavior with only very narrow
exceptions. He recommends that dependency laws legislate on serious
harm to children, but avoid dealing with minor assualts or marginally
inadequate care.27
Anne Selinske, a social worker, agrees that the increased demand
for services has overloaded the child welfare system and the increase
has not been matched with additional resources.28 Her solution to this
critical problem is the passage of legislation delineating the children
who need help the most and determining how services are to be pro-
vided to them. Existing dependency laws, Selinske maintains, have not
sufficiently limited the situations justifying invervention.29
The basic weaknesses in state care of children was even recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in 1977 in Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families (OFFER).30 The Court found a disproportionate re-
sort to foster care by the poor and victims of discrimination, due partly
to the disruptive effect of poverty on family stability but partly to the
fact that middle and upper income families purchase private care for
their children. 31 "The poor have little choice but to submit to state-
supervised care when family crises strike. '3 2 The Court also noted the
"hostility of agencies to the efforts of natural parents to obtain the re-
25. Besharov, supra note 24, at 4031.
26. Id. at 4032 (citing the U.S. National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect,
Review of Child Abuse Research: 1979-81).
27. Id. at 4034.
28. Selinske, Protecting CPS Clients and Workers, 41 PUBLIC WELFARE 31
(1983).
29. Id. at 32-3.
30. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
31. Id. at 834.
32. Id.
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turn of their children" and gave various explanations for this hostility.33
Studies show that social workers of middle class backgrounds tend to
favor placement with generally higher status families, thus reflecting a
bias that treats the natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial
to the best interests of the child.3' Other problems discussed by the
Court include lack of staff to provide social work services to enable
natural parents to resolve their problems and prepare for return of the
child, and agency policies which discourage involvement of the natural
parent in the care of the child.3 5
All these comments have in common the recognition of the fallibil-
ity of human services, the limitations of funding, the lack of predictive
capacity, and the disruptive effect of poverty. They give cause for cau-
tion in the drafting of dependency statutes, and urge the need for clar-
ity, specificity and narrowness.
B. The Constitutional Basis for Family Preservation Standards
Not only have legal and social work commentators and the United
States Supreme Court in Smith v. OFFER recognized the importance
of family autonomy and preservation as a paramount value in Ameri-
can society, but the principle has also been firmly established as a man-
date of constitutional law. The Supreme Court's decisions in the field of
family law show three distinct lines of analysis that are relevant to pro-
posed legislation on dependency: 1) family autonomy 2) family privacy
and 3) the requirements of family preservation. While these lines over-
lap, a separate discussion of each will assist in the later analysis of the
Proposed Committee Bill 2.
1. Family Autonomy.
The state's interest in promoting family autonomy derives from its
parens patriae objective of ensuring the welfare of children and its po-
lice power goal of promoting the strength and stability of society. There
are, however, definite constitutional limits on the state's power to con-
trol the substantive values and beliefs of its citizens.36 The United
States Constitution strictly limits the state's power to impose on its citi-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. n.35.
36. Note, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1213 (1980).
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zens any particular moral, religious, or ethical values although any in-
dividual is free to hold such views. In that sense, families are constitu-
tionally autonomous. Thus in Pierce v. Society of Sisters the Supreme
Court held that the state may not standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public school teachers only.37 The
Court pointed out that "[t] he child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions."3 In Meyers v. Nebraska, the Court held that the state may not
foster a homogeneous people with American ideals by forbidding the
teaching of foreign languages to young children. 9 Wisconsin v.
Yoder,40 stands out as a particularly poignant reminder of the weight
of family autonomy. In this case the Court acknowledged that the in-
terest of the state in providing a system of compulsory public education
is a "paramount" concern. 41 It might even be said that the best inter-
ests of Amish children required their participation in the American
educational mainstream.4 12 But the Court firmly emphasized that the
state interest in protecting children must still be balanced against the
fundamental rights of parents, and thus the Court refused to enforce
the law requiring compulsory school attendance until the age of
sixteen.43
A compelling recent decision is Bellotti v. Baird, in which the Su-
preme Court discussed parental ability to regulate a child's abortion."
The Court stated that "affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, re-
ligious or political beliefs is something we expect the State not to at-
tempt in a society constitutionally committed to individual liberty and
freedom of choice."'4 5 In short, the limits placed on the state's police
power by the Constitution and the mandates of family autonomy pre-
vent the state from imposing social norms and moral values on families
and accord parents the dominant role in childrearing and childbearing
decisions.4" Any standards of parental fitness, therefore, must remain
37. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
38. Id. at 535.
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
41. Id. at 213.
42. Id. at 229.
43. Id. at 213.
44. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
45. Id. at 638.
46. Note, supra note 36, at 1216.
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sensitive to the principle of family autonomy.
2. Family Privacy
A second line of constitutional cases deals with the right to family
privacy concerning intimate family activities. Prince v. Massachusetts
mentioned a private realm of family life which the state connot enter.47
Skinner v. Oklahoma invalidated a state statute providing for
mandatory sterilization of persons convicted of three or more selected
felonies.48 Griswold v.Connecticut struck down a state statute forbid-
ding the use of contraceptives.49 Roe v. Wade overturned a state statute
prohibiting non-therapeutic abortions.50 Eisenstadt v. Baird51 struck
down a state statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to unmarried
persons. In Eisenstadt, the Court said: "if the right to privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child. ' 52
The right of privacy has been expanded to the right of extended
families to live together. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland53 the Su-
preme Court invalidated a local ordinance which defined "family", so
as to exclude Moore's grandchildren from living with her in subsidized
housing. The Court explained, "[b]ut when the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must ex-
amine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regula-
tion."" Thus the Supreme Court has clearly established that individu-
als have a group of rights related to intimate family decisions. The
state can not advance a countervailing interest that is compelling
enough to interfere with these rights.
3. State Intervention and Family Preservation
The final area of constitutional concern deals with the state's abil-
ity to intervene in family life to affect a decision about the person with
47. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
48. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
52. Id. at 453.
53. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
54. Id. at 499.
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whom a child shall live. This line of cases has occasionally dealt with
private party custody disputes but has more often focused on disputes
between the state and private parties. Because of the fundamental right
to family integrity and family privacy, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the right to care, custody and control by a parent is a recip-
rocal right of the parent and the child. The Court stated, in Stanley v.
Illinois,55 that the issues of competency and care are important issues
for both parent and child,56 and, in Ford v. Ford,57 that the question of
with whom the child resides is "vital to a child's happiness and well-
being.""B
The Supreme Court has recognized the differing constitutional
rights of parents who reside with their children and those who do not.
Parental rights are at their pinnacle when parent and child live to-
gether in an intact domestic unit. Thus in Stanley v. Illinois,59 the
Court held that a single, widowed father who lives with his children has
a due process right to a hearing before a child can be removed from the
home.60 In contrast, the Court held in Quilloin v. Walcott6 l that an
unwed father who did not reside with his children did not have a con-
stitutional right to withhold consent to their adoption by the stepfather
with whom they lived.6 2
In Smith v. OFFER63 the Supreme Court faced for the first time
the issue of the right of natural parents to family integrity, contrasted
with the interests of the foster parents in continued custody of the fos-
ter children and the state's interest in protecting the child. Even after
the family has been separated, the liberty interest of natural parents in
family privacy rests on a higher plane than the rights of any other indi-
vidual, because:
its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in
intrinsic human rights. Any emotional ties that may develop be-
tween a foster parent and a child--or arguably between a legal
custodian and a child-are of less constitutional significance than
55. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
56. Id. at 657.
57. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
58. Id. at 193.
59. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
60. 405 U.S. at 658.
61. 434 U.S. 246 (1977).
62. 434 U.S. at 256.
63. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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the ties between natural parents and children because the former
are relationships created by the State and in which the State has
been a partner from the outset."
The Smith decision recognizes for the first time the inchoate substan-
tive due process rights to future custody of natural parents whose chil-
dren have been removed from their homes. 5 It also reinforces the con-
stitutional distinction between family rights when the state is an
intervenor as opposed to family rights when only private parties are
involved.
Although a parent may lose temporary custody of a child, the par-
ent does not lose the right to family integrity. The Supreme Court
noted in Santosky v. Kramer6 6 that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child
does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State."6 7 While par-
ents retain their fundamental family rights even after removal of the
child, the state's interest is distinct.68 When the state has reason to
believe that a positive nurturing parent-child relationship still exists the
state has an interest in preservation of the family unit .6 But when it is
clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal family
home then the state's interest is in finding the child an alternative per-
manent home.70 The limitations on state intervention through its parens
patriae powers lie in the lack of constitutional permission to separate
children from fit parents and in the recognition that even parents who
are separated from their children have a right to future custody. Be-
cause these are fundamental rights, the state may pursue its protective
powers only when a compelling state interest has been demonstrated
and only when the least drastic alternatives are used.",
64. 431 U.S. at 845.
65. Note, The Fundamental Right to Family Integrity and Its Role in New
York Foster Care Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 63, 64 (1977).
66. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
67. 455 U.S. at 753.
68. 455 U.S. at 766, 102 S. Ct. at 1401.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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III. Statutory Responses to the Search for Realistic Standards
Progress has been made to ameliorate the patchwork nature of this
country's dependency system and to implement constitutional law.
These efforts have come from both federal legislation and through re-
form efforts in the Florida legislature.
A. The Federal Response: The Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980
In the late 1970s Congress studied problems related to foster care,
and the public welfare systems which served children. Child welfare
advocates articulated many of the weaknesses identified by Wald,
Mnookin, Areen, which were discussed in Part II of this article. Until
1980, federal government participation in public child welfare systems
serving dependent children was largely limited to funding provided
through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) foster
care program under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act.72 This pro-
gram provided federal funds to reimburse some of the costs of foster
care for "eligible" children, primarily those from poor families. This
form of federal financial assistance encouraged court-ordered place-
ment in foster care, even though other federal monies were available
for foster care related services and general child welfare services.73
However, no uniform federal standard existed to encourage states to
provide services to prevent removal of children and to aid in reunifying
families with their children placed in foster care. In response, the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Adoption Assistance Act) was enacted by Congress on
June 17, 1980.7" This is the first major federal effort to reform the
foster care system and to provide fiscal incentives to states to empha-
size the goals of prevention and reunification. This law imposes numer-
ous legal requirements on states to ensure that preventive efforts are
made to avoid separation of dependent children from their families,
that states are accountable for the status of children in foster care, and
that stays in foster care are as short as possible.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1976).
73. Title XX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1400 (1976) and Title IV-B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-
626 (1976).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 627-28 (Supp. V 1981) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-76 (Supp. V
1981). A detailed analysis of the Act is contained in A. ENGLISH, FOSTER CARE RE-
FORM (1981).
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The Act has several components. It creates a new Title IV-E76
governing foster care maintainence payments and adoption assistance
payments. It amends the child welfare services program under Title
IV-B.76 Title IV-E (Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption
Assistance) requires each state participating in the AFDC program to
develop a plan for meeting the new requirements of the Act as a condi-
tion for federal foster care funding.77 Each state's plan must include
the following components: 1) a judicial determination that continua-
tion in the home would be "contrary to the welfare of the child" prior
to placement in foster care;7 8 2) effective October 1, 1983, a judicial
determination that "reasonable efforts" have been made to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home, prior to
placement in foster care;79 3) case plans for each child discussing the
appropriateness of the particular placement, the services which will be
provided to facilitate the child's return home or other pernianent place-
ment, and the services which will be provided to the child;80 4) a case
review system to assure that the status of each child is reviewed at least
every six months "to determine the continuing necessity for and appro-
priateness of the placement, the extent of compliance with the case
plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviat-
ing or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care, and
to project a likely date by which the child may be returned home or
placed for adoption. . .";81 5) a dispositional hearing within eighteen
months of placement in foster care to determine the future status of the
child, 2 6) procedural safeguards as to parental rights pertaining to re-
moval of the child from the home, changes in placements, and decisions
affecting visitation rights;8 3 7) for voluntary placements in foster care,
a voluntary placement agreement which provides for return of the child
to the parents upon request, and limits the duration of voluntary place-
ments to six months, absent a judicial determination that the child
should not be returned home;8' 8) a fair hearing procedure before the
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-76 (Supp. V 1981).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 627-28 (Supp. V 1981).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 673 (Supp. V 1981).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 671(16) (Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (Supp. V 1981).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(b) (Supp. V 1981).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c) (Supp. V 1981).
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. §672(g) (Supp. V 1981).
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state agency, for anyone denied benefits under the Act.8"
The requirement that reasonable efforts be made to prevent the
need for placement in foster care is a requirement which must be met,
not only by the state plan, but also in each individual case in which
federal funding is sought. This provision furthers the goal of preventing
removal frorri the home and gives the state a fiscal incentive to provide
preventive services. The requirements for case plans and case reviews
emphasize the goal of family reunification. By focusing on "alleviation
or mitigation" of the problems causing the placement in foster care, the
Act departs from the more subjective standard of "the best interests of
the child", and adds certainty and enforceability to legal standards for
returning the child home.
The amendments to Title IV-B (Child Welfare Services) con-
tained in the Act also further the goals of removal prevention, account-
ability for children in the state foster care system, and reunification of
natural families. Before its enactment, actual appropriations for child
welfare services never exceeded $56.5 million. 6 Although a broad ar-
ray of services were authorized under the program, services to prevent
removal and reunify families were not required. In fact, foster care was
defined as a §ervice under Title IV-B and many states used the bulk of
their IV-B funds to subsidize foster care maintenance payments. The
Adoption Assistance Act made a number of important changes in this
Title IV-B program. First, states are precluded from increasing the
amount of their child welfare services grant expended for foster care
maintainance above 1979 levels.8 ' Thus, additional appropriations
(which as of 1982 have reached $163 million)8 8 must be used for other
service programs. The specific guidelines for the use of additional funds
consist of a two-step process. The first set of requirements comes into
play when appropriations under Title IV-B exceed $141 million. 9 For
any year in which appropriations are at least that high, a state can only
receive its share of amounts over $141 million by meeting the following
guidelines: 1) conducting an inventory of all children who have been in
foster care for over six months to determine whether the child needs to
85. 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(12) (Supp. V 1981).
86. A. ENGLISH, supra note 74, at 38.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 623(c) (Supp. V 1981).
88. Interview with Abigail English, author of FOSTER CARE REFORM, in Orlando,
Fla. (April 28, 1983).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a) (Supp. V 1981). Florida self-certified that it met these
requirements as of Sept. 30, 1982.
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remain in care and what services are needed to allow the child to go
home or to be adopted, 902) implementing a statewide information sys-
tem documenting demographic data, location, and goals for each child
in foster care or who has been in care within the past 12 months,913)
implementing the case review system required by Title IV-E, for all
children in state-supervised care,92 and 4) establishing a program to
provide services designed to reunite children in foster care with their
natural families if possible, or to facilitate placement for adoption. 93
The second stage of the Title IV-B requirements becomes opera-
tive when appropriations for the program reach the level of $266 mil-
lion for two consecutive years. At that point, in addition to meeting all
of the first stage requirements, states must have a preplacement pre-
ventive service program in place geared toward preventing placements
in foster care and preserving the natural family unit. Any state not
meeting these requirements will only be eligible to receive its share of
$56 million, the 1979 child welfare program appropriation.9
While the Act clearly imposes affirmative duties upon states to im-
plement the law's protections as a condition for receipt of federal funds
and to oversee compliance, it is still too early to determine the extent to
which courts will allow individuals to enforce the requirements through
litigation. Questions such as whether the law creates a private right of
action, whether the law creates substantive rights, whether individuals
may assert those rights, and whether an administrative, state, or fed-
eral judicial forum is appropriate for asserting them have yet to be
resolved. 5
The first judicial decision interpreting the requirements of the
Adoption Assistance Act came in the case of Lynch v. King, 6 in which
a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction directed to the
Massachusetts Department of Social Services. The case involved al-
leged violations of the federal constitutional and statutory rights of
children who were subject to the agency's protective intervention. 97
Specific allegations included the failure to investigate suspected abuse
90. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1981).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 627(b) (Supp. V 1981).
95. English, Litigating Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act in
FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS (M. Hardin ed. 1983).
96. 550 F. Supp. 325 (D. Mass. 1982).
97. 550 F. Supp. at 329.
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and neglect, the failure to provide appropriate services to prevent the
need for foster care placement or to reunify foster children with their
natural families, and the failure to establish and review case plans for
children and their families.98 Although Lynch v. King was filed before
the requirements of the Adoption Assistance Act became effective, and
although the injunction was entered based on violations of the old law,
the court based its prospective injunctive relief upon the new Act's con-
ditions for continued federal funds, and required the Massachusetts
agency to implement the case plan and case review system contained in
Title IV-E.99 The court also placed limitations on social worker
caseloads, and required, as of October 1, 1983, that reunification ser-
vices be provided.100 Although the defendants have appealed the deci-
sion, it stands as authority for the existence of a cause of action to
enforce both Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Adoption Assistance Act.
B. Florida's Response: Reform Efforts
At the same time that Wald, Mnookin and Areen were requesting
more realistic dependency laws and Congress was studying foster care
reform, various state efforts were also underway to deal with the place-
ment of children in foster care and the regular review of their status. In
the 1970s and 1980s, before the case review requirements of the Adop-
tion Assistance Act were enacted, foster care review statutes had al-
ready been legislated in many states because of the belief that regular
judicial review of children in foster care would address some systemic
weaknesses and facilitate more rapid return of children to their own
homes. One of the first states to pass such legislation was New York.101
A research project which investigated the effects of New York foster
care review hearings on the rate of return home confirmed that such
reviews had accomplished the desired result. The study found a positive
correlation between agency caseworker services provided to the natural
family and the child's eventual return home.102
Through section 409.168, Florida Statutes, Florida enacted its first
judicial review statute in 1977, requiring regular judicial review hear-
98. 550 F. Supp. at 331-36.
99. 550 F. Supp. at 335-36.
100. Id.
101. N.Y. SOCIAL SERVICEs LAW § 392 (McKinney 1983).
102. See Festinger, The New York Court Review of Children in Foster Care, 54
CHILD WELFARE 211 (1975) and Festinger, The Impact of New York Court Review of
Children in Foster Care: A Follow-up Report, 55 CHILD WELFARE 515 (1976).
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ings, reports to the court and mandatory dispositional alternatives. This
initial statute was passed because:
The Legislature finds that 7 out of 10 children placed in foster care
do not return to their biological families after the first year and
that permanent homes could be found for many of these children if
their status were reviewed periodically and they were found eligible
for adoption. It is the intent of the Legislature, therefore, to help
ensure a permanent home for children in foster care by requiring a
periodic review and report on their status.10 3
In 1980, a legislative study by the House Health and Rehabilitative
Services Committee of children in foster care found that, despite this
noble intent, Florida still had 7,800 children who would remain in fos-
ter care over thirty months, an increase of two months over the 1979
figures.10 4 The same study found that adequate foster care case plans
were essential to the judicial review process. The study commented,
"[t]he need for foster care case plans within a tight time frame is nec-
essary if foster care is, in fact, ever to become truly a 'temporary'
placement for children. The utilization of a contract approach to foster
care has proven to be very workable in some states." 10 5
The legislature subsequently revised section 409.168, Florida Stat-
utes, and added section 39.41(6)(b) in 1980. Section 409.168 requires
written performance agreements as well as judicial reviews. A perform-
ance agreement is a court-ordered document that is prepared by the
social service agency in conference with the natural parents. The agree-
ment delineates what is expected of all parties and what must be ac-
complished before a child can be returned to the parent. Performance
agreements are required for all children who remain in foster care
longer than thirty days. Section 39.41(6)(b) provides that substantial
compliance with the terms of a performance agreement must result in
the return of a child to the custody of the natural parent. The hoped
for effect of this new legislation, according to the Committee Report,
was the folldwing:
103. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(1) (1977). The Florida First District Court of Appeal
has held that the requirements of § 409.168(1) are mandatory. Williamson v. State,
369 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Pingrel v. Quaintance, 394 So. 2d 161
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
104. COMM. ON HEALTH & REHAB. SERV., FLA. HOUSE OF REP., H.R. 1648,
FOSTER CARE: IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS (1980).
105. Id. at 22.
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The proposed changes in both the permanent commitment sec-
tion of Chapter 39 and the report and judicial review section of
Chapter 409 attempt to bring greater focus on the timeliness of
preparing performance agreements to plan for the child entering
foster care and the need to have the agency, the natural parents,
and other involved parties to work together to help the family reu-
nite if at all possible or to move toward terminating parental rights
if feasible and moving toward placement of the child in a perma-
nent, stable family setting.
The changes also attempted to stress the importance of the judicial re-
view proceedings to the courts by removing the ability to waive the
hearing and by also requiring the agreements to be submitted to the
court.1 °'Florida's Juvenile Justice Act, Chapter 39, Florida Statutes
(1980), provides the statutory authority for the state to initially inter-
vene in family relationships and to place dependent children in the
homes of relatives or in foster care. In enacting this legislation, the
legislature expressly stated the purpose of the Chapter, indicating a
clear preference for maintaining and restoring the natural family.10 7 In
addition to Florida's Juvenile Justice Act, the legislature has mandated
that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) ad-
minister a program for dependent children and their families. The leg-
islature set forth the goals toward which the program was to be di-
rected and once again clearly indicated its preference for reunification
of the natural family.10 8 For some time, therefore, it has been the legis-
lative policy in Florida to recognize the importance of family reunifica-
tion and preservation as a goal. The concomitant search for realistic
standards has long been a legislative priority.
The issues raised by the foster care review legislation are begin-
ning to be addressed by Florida courts as the family reunification tools
begin to be enforced. Quaintance v. Pingree09 establishes the impor-
tance of having regular judicial reviews on a timely basis and interprets
the provisions of section 409.168 as mandatory. In re V.M.C.,110 hold-
ing that an out-of-state placement of a Florida foster child is not au-
thorized by statute, also establishes the principle that the dispositional
alternatives contained in section 409.168 are mandatory and exclusive.
106. Id. at 2.
107. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001-39.516 (1979).
108. FLA. STAT. § 409.145 (1978).
109. 394 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
110. 369 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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The first case to trace at length the legislative history of section
409.168 and the policy implications of the foster care scheme chosen by
Florida is In re A.B.." This decision makes clear that the Florida leg-
islature in enacting Chapter 39 and section 409.168 replaced any com-
mon law best interests of the child standard with a specific set of statu-
tory requirements designed for reconciliation of children with their
natural parents whenever possible and their permanent placement in
adoptive homes when that is not possible. The decision emphasizes that
the legislative goal for Florida's foster children is permanence. This
goal can only be achieved if HRS has fulfilled its affirmative obligation
to design and carry out a meaningful performance agreement.
IV. Family Preservation Issues and Proposed Legislation For
Florida
Although much has been accomplished through federal and state
laws to improve the dependency process, a great deal remains to be
done. During its 1983 session, Florida's legislature addressed many of
these open issues and will address these problems again in the 1984
session. This section identifies the crucial family preservation issues
currently at stake in Florida, and suggests some ways these issues can
be resolved.
A. Compliance with the Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act
In order for Florida to continue to receive federal foster care and
child welfare funds, Florida must meet the requirements of the federal
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act.'112 While not all of the
Act's requirements require legislative changes, Florida's dependency
statute must be examined in light of the federal requirements to deter-
mine where changes are needed. The Proposed Committee Bill 2 ad-
dresses many of these issues in a positive manner. Florida law presently
requires proof of abandonment, abuse, or neglect.""3 Neglect, as de-
fined, precludes an adjudication of dependency if the reason for the
child's deprivation is poverty or "financial inability."" 4 An amendment
111. 9 FLA. L.W. 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1983) (No. AQ-331).
112. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
113. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9) (1980).
114. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(26) (1980).
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contained in the proposed bill would modify the financial inability lan-
guage by permitting an adjudication of neglect in cases of financial
inability if "services were offered and rejected". This proposed change
is consistent with the goal of prevention and the requirements of the
Adoption Assistance Act that "reasonable efforts" be made to avoid
the need for placement in foster care." 5 In any event, a program of
preventive services may soon be required as a condition for receiving
additional funds under Title IV-B for the state of Florida. Earlier
drafts of Proposed Committee Bill 2 would have permitted an adjudica-
tion if services were offered and rejected and in the additional situation
when services for relief were merely unavailable. The unavailability
language, which is inconsistent with the goal of the federal law, has
been deleted from the proposed bill.
Federal law prohibits federal funding for a foster care placement,
absent a judicial finding as to "reasonable efforts" to prevent the place-
ment." 6 To bring Florida law into compliance, the Proposed Commit-
tee Bill 2 contains amendments which would insert the "reasonable ef-
forts" determination into the Florida statute, not only at the disposition
hearing when the placement is ordered, but also at earlier stages in the
proceeding. Thus, the judicial inquiry into preventive efforts would be-
gin at the detention stage, and if efforts have not been reasonable, the
court can order that services be provided to maintain the child in the
home. By inserting these requirements into the early stages of the pro-
ceedings, the proposed amendments adhere to the preventive goals of
the Adoption Assistance Act and are consistent with the constitutional
prohibition on separating children from fit parents.
The Title IV-E requirements for case plans and a case review sys-
tem are largely met by the judicial review and performance agreement
provisions of section 409.168, Florida Statutes. The performance agree-
ment should contain most of the substantive elements of a case plan.
Under current Florida law, the decision to return a foster child to his
home turns on improving the conditions which caused removal, as set
forth in the performance agreement." 7 The language in the Proposed
Committee Bill 2 uses the word "remediate" in establishing a standard.
This is consistent with the language of the federal statute which focuses
on "alleviating or mitigating" the problems causing foster care place-
115. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (1980).
116. Id.
117. FLA. STAT. 409.168(3)(a)b.a. (1980).
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ment at the review hearing. 118 Any legislative changes which would
amend Florida's standard by shifting the focus away from the correc-
tion of the problems which caused the placement and toward a "best
interests" standard, could jeopardize Florida's receipt of federal funds.
Another amendment contained in the proposed bill requires an eighteen
month judicial review hearing. This would satisfy the Adoption Assis-
tance Act's requirement for a "disposition hearing" within eighteen
months.119 Current Florida law provides for an equivalent of the federal
disposition hearing only after twenty four months in foster care.1 20
These and other proposed legislative changes address most of the
requirements of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act which
necessitate statutory change. Other requirements of the Act, while ca-
pable of being met by HRS, should be considered for future legislative
action. For example, the statewide information system and the reunifi-
cation and prevention services programs funded under Title IV-B could
be the subject of specific legislation. Not only would such legislation
assure Florida's compliance with the Act but it would also strengthen
Florida's response to the challenge of designing a realistic and consis-
tent system for dependent children.
B. The Criteria for Removal and Return
Legal and social work commentators and the United States Su-
preme Court have in their separate approaches identified the need to
connect the statutory criteria for removal of children from their homes
and placement in substitute care with the criteria for their return home
or for their permanent placement if they cannot go home. Prior to 1980
this problem represented a glaring flaw in Florida law because the cri-
teria for disposition of dependent children were unclear. The Florida
Supreme Court in 1958 broadly interpreted Florida's juvenile depen-
dency law in Pendarvis v. State.21 The court stated that once a child
has lawfully been declared a dependent child, he becomes a ward of the
state and broad discretion is vested in the juvenile court to do whatever
it believes is in the best interests of the child. 22 The problems with this
interpretation from a practical point of view have been described by
118. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(b) (1980).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c) (1980).
120. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(3)(b) (1980).
121. 104 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1958).
122. 104 So. 2d at 652.
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Mnookin. 23 The legal problems become evident by comparing the lan-
guage of Pendarvis to the constitutional limits imposed by Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,2 4 Bellotti v. Baird,1 24 Smith v. OFFER,"'6 and
Santosky v. Kramer.12 7
In 1980 the Florida legislature attempted to make the connection
between standards for removal and standards for reunification of fami-
lies by designing the performance agreement. The legislature provided
for the return of children if parents substantially complied with the
performance agreement and for permanent commitment if parents did
not."0 The performance agreement must contain a description of the
reasons for the placement of the child in foster care, the problems or
conditions of the natural home that necessitated removal and the
remediation which will determine the return of the child to the
home.1 29 It also must contain a statement of the specific actions to be
taken by the parents to eliminate or correct the identified problems or
conditions.130
While the statutory language appears clear on its face, there have
been serious problems in the implementation of this law. The lines have
been drawn between those forces committed to the concepts of family
reunification and permanence for children and those forces determined
to retreat to the vague best interest standard that allows a court to find
"better parents" for dependent children, the 1970s debate staged anew.
The Florida First District Court of Appeal in its comprehensive deci-
sion In re A.B.,"'1 has clarified the applicability of the simple best in-
terests test in state intervention cases. This decision establishes that the
goal of Florida's foster care system is not to search for a fuller life with
more desirable parents for a child.132 A passive system of relying upon
a judge's perception of the "best interest of the child' demands "more
wisdom than Solomon's and its discriminatory ramifications, penalizing
the poor by reparenting their children to more affluent candidates, are
123. See Mnookin, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
124. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
125. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
126. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
127. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). See supra note 66 and accompany-
ing text.
128. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(6)(b); 39.41(1)(f)l.d. (1980).
129. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(3)(a)6 (1980).
130. Id.
131. 9 FLA. L. W. 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1983) (No. AQ-331).
132. Id. at 44.
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distressingly evident. 13 3 Some of the debate and confusion, therefore,
has been laid to rest.
The Florida House of Representatives HRS Subcommittee on
Health, Economic and Social Services, furthermore, has addressed this
debate in Proposed Committee Bill 2 by defining more specifically the
concept of substantial compliance with the terms of a performance
agreement. The bill provides " '[s]ubstantial compliance' means that
the circumstances which caused the placement in foster care have been
remediated to the extent that the well being and safety of the child will
not be endangered upon the child being returned to the parent or
guardian." '134 The strength of this definition lies in the extent to which
it corrects the problems identified earlier in Parts II and III. It gives
certainty to social workers, courts, parents, and children. It deals with
serious harm to children and their endangerment. It adheres to consti-
tutional principles of family preservation and limitations on state inter-
vention in family life. It, finally, assures Florida's compliance with the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act for the purpose of receiv-
ing federal funds.
C. Poverty as a Standard for Dependency
The legal and social work commentators and the United States
Supreme Court have been sensitive about the extent to which the bur-
den of state intervention in family life falls disportionately upon the
poor and victims of discrimination. 35 In 1978 the Florida legislature
ameliorated this problem by defining "neglect" as requiring financial
ability136 and by defining abandonment as also requiring ability to sup-
port and communicate with a child.13 7 Difficult economic times and
cutbacks in federal funds have spurred the poverty debate again in
Florida. There is no financial assistance available in Florida for two-
parent families who have exhausted their financial resources. Yet some
trial courts persist in claiming the need to protect the children of the
unemployed and allege that children are better off in fostei care than
in these homes without means.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Proposed bill available from Fla.
H.R., HRS Subcommttee on Health, Eco. & Soc. Serv.
135. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982).
136. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(27) (1978).
137. Id.
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The Subcommittee on Health, Ecomonic and Social Services has
resolved this debate in Proposed Committee Bill 2 by broadening the
definition of neglect and abandonment and by modifying the require-
ments of financial ability and the ability to support and communicate.
The bill conditions an adjudication of neglect in cases of parental pov-
erty upon the offer and rejection of services to assist the family. The
more troublesome language of earlier drafts which refers only to the
offer of "available" services has been removed. This language evolved
after substantial debate and discussion. Lines were drawn between
those forces clearly committed to adjudications of dependency solely
for poverty reasons and those forces opposed to any such change in the
existing laws. Any effort to further weaken the statutory protection for
parents without financial ability would be subject to legal challenges.
In addition, such results would strike at the essence of a fundamentally
fair societal value system. Statutory provisions that make poverty a ba-
sis for state intervention between parent and child could violate the
equal protection and due process rights of the United States Constitu-
tion in their abrogation of the rights of family autonomy, family pri-
vacy, and family preservation.1 38 Such definitions would establish a cul-
tural value choice that poverty is per se unwholesome for children and
would establish the solution as removal of children from their homes
rather than providing financial subsistence for the families. The effects
on parents and children of "separation trauma" would be ignored and
social workers and resources are diverted from cases where children are
in grave danger. Cases of poverty are better solved elsewhere than in
the juvenile courts because there is no certain body of research that
children are fatally and inexorably harmed by growing up poor and the
proposed bull preserves this solution.
D. Right to Counsel for Parents in the Dependency Process
Perhaps the most pressing family preservation issue currently at
stake in Florida is that of the absolute right to counsel on an appointed
basis for indigent parents at every stage in the dependency process.
Currently each interest is represented in Florida dependency proceed-
ings except the accused parent. 39 Florida courts now use complex evi-
dence presented by child protection teams at adjudication. It is not un-
usual to see at least six professionals, including lawyers, HRS
138. Areen, supra note 4, at 930-32.
139. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.404(3), § 415.508 (1983).
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counselors, and psychologists marshalled against an unrepresented par-
ent standing alone. It should be recognized that the present proposed
revisions to Chapter 39 would make it easier to adjudicate neglect and
abandonment in the first instance because these definitions are ex-
panded. Thus an even greater death blow is dealt to the natural par-
ent's rights. At the very least, Proposed Committee Bill 2 makes the
dependency process even more complicated for the unsophisticated par-
ent to understand.
The Subcommittee on Health, Economic and Social Services has
recognized the importance of the right to counsel and has included pro-
visions for appointed counsel in its proposals. The reasons for support-
ing this provision are compelling. For example, on September 15, 1983,
the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an en bane
decision in Davis v. Page140 which has generated great confusion.
Twenty-four judges participated in the decision which concerned indi-
gent parents' due process rights to appointed counsel in state depen-
dency proceedings.1 41 Five judges held that the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services14 2
requires that the right to counsel in Florida dependency proceedings be
determined on a case-by-case basis. These five judges required the
court to apply the Matthews v. Eldridge1 43 three-pronged due process
test and determine in each case: 1) the parental issue at stake, includ-
ing the possiblity of the child remaining in his home or with relatives as
opposed to removal from the home and placement in foster care, 2) the
state's interest in an accurate and just decision, and 3) the risk that a
parent will be erroneously deprived of custody because the parent is not
represented by counsel. 44
One Fifth Circuit judge concurred with the above five but stated
that "due process will require counsel in most cases of this kind (unless
saved by a determination that the evidence was sufficiently great "that
the absence of counsel's guidance did not render the proceedings funda-
mentally unfair)."1 45 Eight judges ordered the entry of judgment for
the defendant judges, stating that the pleadings did not present a case
or controversy. No comment on the merits of right to counsel was made
140. 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1983).
141. 714 F.2d at 513.
142. 453 U.S. 927 (1981).
143. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
144. 714 F.2d at 516-17.
145. Id. at 522.
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by these judges. 146 Eleven judges joined in dissenting from the order of
judgment for the defendants.147 In addition to finding a case or contro-
versy these judges would require an absolute right to counsel. The rea-
sons given for this right included: 1) adjudications of dependency are
different in nature from permanent commitment hearings; 2) initial
separation of parent and child involves an intact family unit with con-
stitutional rights to family integrity that are of greater constitutional
significance than those of families whose bonds have been severed; 3)
adjudications of dependency in Florida deal a "death blow" to parental
rights and have a lasting chill on the exercise of these rights; 4) certain
legal rights are lost if not asserted at the adjudicatory stage in depen-
dency proceedings; 5) initial adjudications stigmatize or sever the pre-
sumption that a parent is fit, a showing that can never fully be regained
by subsequent evidence produced at later stages; 6) the state's parens
patriae interest in child protection favors preservation not severance of
natural family bonds; 7) Florida's dependency proceedings are formal
accusatory proceedings where: the state is always represented, the for-
mal rules of evidence are employed, a guardian ad litem represents the
child, and every interest but the parent's is represented by counsel. Psy-
chological, medical and sociological evidence is used; 8) issues adjudi-
cated in Florida's dependencies are speculative and far-reaching; 9) un-
represented parents lose custody of their children more often than
parents who are represented; and 10) proceedings entailing substantive
adjudications of fundamental liberty interests require counsel abso-
lutely, while proceedings involving placement on the basis of previous
substantive adjudications require counsel on a case by case basis.148The
mandate of the Fifth Circuit in Davis had been stayed pending a peti-
tion for review by writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. This petition was denied January 10, 1984.149
In examining other right to counsel cases in Florida, a similar con-
fusing array of decisions is evident. In In re D.B. and D.S.,150 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court required trial judges to appoint counsel for parents
whenever permanent termination of parental rights might result or
when the proceedings, by their nature, might lead to criminal child
146. Id. at 518-22.
147. Id. at 524.
148. Id. at 525-32.
149. Cert. den. sub nom Davis v. Gladstone, 52 U.S.L.W. 3503 (Jan. 10, 1984).
150. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
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abuse charges. 151 This result is compelled by the federal Constitu-
tion.152 In all other cases, trial judges are required to use all available
legal aid services and when these services are unavailable, to request
private counsel to provide the necessary services. 15 3
A case closely analogous to In re D.B. and D.S., is In re Hutch-
ins.154 The Florida Supreme Court in Hutchins considered the previous
"ungovernability" classification contained in Florida law. That statute
provided that a child who committed a second act of ungovernability
could be adjudicated delinquent."5 In re Gault"5' had long ago estab-
lished the child's right to counsel in a delinquency proceeding. The
Florida Supreme Court explained that the right to counsel was not
mandatory at the first hearing on ungovernability, because that first
hearing was not necessarily the first step in an adjudication of delin-
quency, depending upon the conduct of the child.157 But the court con-
cluded that it was impermissible to base an adjudication of un-
governability for the second time on a previously conducted hearing in
which the child was not represented by counsel. 58 It stated that the
first adjudicatory hearing is a "critical first step" in the delinquency
proceeding and the accused is entitled to all due process rights at each
step in the procedure. 59 De novo review at a subsequent hearing in
which all the. facts of the first ungovernability hearing were reheard
does not provide adequate constitutional safeguards since the first adju-
dication remains an essential element of delinquency.6 0
The Florida dependency scheme is similar to the former un-
governability scheme in that there are a series of "critical first steps,"
beginning with detention and ending with permanent commitment.''
151. Id. at 90.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 92. The Florida Attorney General has argued that because all adjudi-
cations of dependency threaten a parent with permanent termination of parental rights
and the possibility of criminal charges, State law already sweeps more broadly than
Lassiter (Brief in opposition ot Petition for Certiorari,Davis v. Gladstone, 52 U.S.L.W.
3503 (Jan. 10, 1984).
154. 345 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
155. Id. at 706.
156. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
157. 345 So. 2d at 706.
158. Id. at 707.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.401, 30.402, 39.404, 30.408, 39.41 (1980).
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The seriousness of this issue is illustrated by In re C.M.H.16 2 In this
case the Florida First District Court of Appeal held that the original
adjudication of abuse, neglect and abandonment was sufficient to form
the basis for subsequent permanent commitment without further
proof.16 3 While this decision may be constitutionally invalid under
Santosky v. Kramer,1 " and has been somewhat clarified by In re
A.B.,16 5 the original adjudication of dependency is still a critical stage
in any subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights.
In Hutchins terms, initial dependency proceedings are "critical
first steps" because they may result in permanent commitment at a
subsequent hearing. The issue of parental unfitness is substantively ad-
judicated in the initial adjudicatory hearing. As Judge Vance pointed
out in Davis, due process absolutely requires counsel in proceedings en-
tailing substantive adjudications of fundamental liberty interests. 66
Lower court decisions on the right to counsel in Florida include Alton
v. Conklin, which holds that parents have a right to counsel whenever
their child may be committed to an institution;167 In re R.W., which
holds that parents have a right to counsel at the time of a stipulation as
to an adjudication of dependency;"6 " and A.T.P. v. State, which holds
that parent and child have a right to counsel at detention hearings that
are akin to summary adjudications.1 69 A permanent commitment order
was overturned in In re R.W.H. when the record did not reveal the
mother's intelligent waiver of counsel.170
After considering these decisions, it appears that Florida trial
courts must pursue the following analysis at a minimum: 1) the paren-
tal interest at stake; 2) the state interest at stake; 3) the risk of an
erroneous decision; 4) the formality and complexity of the proceeding;
5) the likelihood of use of medical, psychological or sociological evi-
dence; 6) the likelihood that a child will remain at home or with rela-
tives as opposed to removal from the home; 7) the possibility of crimi-
nal child abuse charges; 8) the possibility of a subsequent permanent
commitment; 9) the presence of a stipulation; and 10) the possibility
162. 413 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
163. Id. at 427.
164. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
165. 9 FLA. L.W. 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1983) (No. AQ-331).
166. 714 F.2d at 533.
167. 421 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
168. 429 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
169. 427 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
170. 375 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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that the child may be committed to an institution.
The complexity of this formula leads to the conclusion that the
absolute right to counsel conferred by statute would avoid the expense
of judicial decision making on a case-by-case basis and its endless ap-
pellate litigation. The two state statutes reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court in Lassiter 17 and Santosky17 2 require court appointed
counsel at adjudication. In enacting right to counsel legislation, Florida
would join a host of sister states, such as New York and North Caro-
lina. The Supreme Court in Lassiter reminds us that wise public policy
and informed opinion holds that appointed counsel is necessary not only
in permanent commitment proceedings but in neglect and dependency
proceedings as well.'7 3 The proposed amendment will simplify judicial
decision making and will bring Florida in line with the national trend
towards an absolute right to counsel.
E. The Standard of Proof for Permanent Commitment
The final family preservation issue currently facing Florida is the
standard of proof required at permanent commitment hearings. Flor-
ida's statute has never specified a standard. Until recently, appellate
courts had consistently ruled that clear and convincing proof of 1) pa-
rental unfitness and 2) the manifest best interests of the child were
required at permanent commitment hearings. 174
Last year, however, the First District Court of Appeal interpreted
the existing Florida statute in In re C.M.H., holding that only the man-
ifest best interests of the child need to be demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence in order to terminate parental rights.1 75 The initial
adjudication of dependency (by a lower standard of proof than clear
and convincing), the court decided, made the issue of parental unfitness
res judicata in a subsequent proceeding to terminate parental rights.176
Because the appellate court's ruling in C.M.H. does not meet the stan-
dards of constitutional due process, set forth by the Supreme Court in
171. 453 U.S. 927 (1981).
172. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
173. Id.
174. See Carlson v. State, 378 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); In Re
D.A.H., 309 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
175. 413 So. 2d 418, 425 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
176. 413 So.2d at 425.
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Santosky,17 and because the current statute is silent as to this impor-
tant issue, this topic is currently ripe for legislative action.
Parental rights can be terminated upon a showing that the parent
has abandoned, abused, or neglected the child or has failed to substan-
tially comply with a performance agreement, and that permanent com-
mitment is manifestly in the best interests of the child.17 8 Dispositional
hearings are more relaxed than adjudicatory hearings. The present
statute is silent as to whether the formal rules of evidence are applied
at a permanent commitment hearing. Florida courts had repeatedly
held that a finding of permanent commitment must be based on clear
and convincing evidence both as to present parental unfitness and as to
the best interests of the child 179 until In re C.M.H. was decided.
"Clear and convincing" is a higher legal standard than the more-
likely-than-not standard of a "preponderance of the evidence" which
applies at dependency adjudications and in most civil actions. Clear
and convincing, however, is not as high a legal standard as the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" applicable in criminal proceedings. The United
States Supreme Court in Santosky ruled that proof of parental unfit-
ness by a mere preponderance of the evidence is unconstitutional.18 0
The Court stated that applying a standard of proof "no greater than
that necessary to award money damages in an ordinary civil action"
failed to meet the requirements of due process and to adequately pro-
tect the parent's fundamental constitutional interest in the future of his
family unit.8 ' In analyzing New York's termination statute, the Su-
preme Court said that the findings of permanent neglect may be made
only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. 82 At that stage
of the proceedings, the natural parents are pitted against the state and
the only issue is the unfitness of the parents. Because the consequences
of permanent commitment are so severe, and because, at this fact-find-
ing stage both parent and child share interest in avoiding the erroneous
termination of parental rights, only a clear and convincing evidence
standard can adequately allocate the risk between the family's interests
and the state's interests.1 83 The Supreme Court emphasized that at this
177. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
178. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(b) (1979).
179. See In re C.K.G., 365 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Carlson v.
State, 378 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
180. 455 U.S. at 749, 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
181. 455 U.S. at 752, 759.
182. 455 U.S. at 748-49.
183. Id.
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stage the question of whether it would be in the best interests of the
child to return home is not at issue.18 4 The Court noted that even if
permanent commitment is denied, the child's placement in foster care
can still be maintained.185
Santosky is not cited in the opinion of In re C.M.H., nor is the
constitutional due process issue analyzed. To date, no Florida court has
clearly addressed the requirements of Santosky, but it is evident that
the statutory interpretation arrived at in C.M.H. cannot withstand judi-
cial scrutiny in light of Santosky. In the process of substantially revis-
ing Florida's dependency statute, provisions relating to permanent com-
mitment should be amended to comply with the Supreme Court's
decision in Santosky v. Kramer. Revising the statute will ensure that
future permanent commitment proceedings will not be subject to a re-
versal on constitutional grounds, and will provide finality to the perma-
nent commitment process.
V. Conclusion
The current efforts of the Florida legislature to revise the state's
dependency laws offer tremendous opportunities for progress. Looking
back at previous efforts to forge realistic standards helps identify the
problems and pitfalls in the child welfare system and these laws' consti-
tutional foundations. Previous Florida efforts have provided an opportu-
nity to test and retest solutions. The federal Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act offers new solutions along with financial aid to the
state. In its effort to reform, Florida should, in caution, remember the
cherished American values of family autonomy and privacy and the
limitations of state intervention in family life. In the search for realistic
and consistent standards in the emotion-laden area of dependency law,
the only standard which has endured the test of time, social change,
and varying economic conditions is the standard of family preservation.
184. 455 U.S. at 754-56.
185. Id.
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Funding the Most Costly Alternative: A Legislative
Paradox
Wesley W. Jenkins*
I. Introduction
This article discusses the perhaps rather startling fact that legisla-
tors traditionally tend to allocate funds for more costly social services
rather than for the less expensive ones. Unfortunately, the more a ser-
vice costs, the fewer people it serves per dollar spent and the less reme-
dial impact it has. A reversal of this tendency is slowly evolving and
this article discusses some recent legislative changes showing this new
trend. Further, this article proposes that the legislature should provide
companion funding for preventive programs along with those funds
budgeted to alleviate the results of the social problem itself.
II. A Tradition of Legislative Neglect
It is virtually axiomatic in the broad field of social services that
the more costly a service, the more likely it is to receive funding. It is
equally axiomatic that the more costly a service the fewer people it will
serve for the dollars spent and the less overall remedial impact it will
have. This paradox occurs because legislators tend to wait until social
problems are very severe before providing funds to address them. By
this juncture "pathology" has become deeply entrenched requiring far
more expensive methods of treatment. The severity of the problem mili-
tates against substantial remediation and limits the "treatment" to rel-
atively few individuals. This traditional legislative neglect dates from
the early days of our Republic. It can be traced historically to even
earlier times in foreign countries.1
In the late 1700s a group of industrialists in Beverly, Massachu-
setts who supported the construction of a cotton mill argued that it
"would afford employment to a great number of women and children,
many of whom will be otherwise useless, if not burdensome to soci-
* B.A. Drury College, M.S.W., University of Missouri. The author is Executive
Director of Family Service Centers of Pinellas County (Fla.) Inc.
1. H. JAMES, THE LITTLE VICTIMS, 10 (1975).
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ety."2 In 1790 when the first American cotton mill opened in Rhode
Island, nine children from seven to twelve years of age were employed.
During the nineteenth century children also worked in coal mines, lum-
ber mills, shoe and glass factories and other forms of manufacturing.
Children as young as five and six worked twelve hours a day. Plant
owners starved them, whipped them, dunked them in tubs of cold water
when they dozed off and stunted their growth through overwork and
malnutrition. The census of 1900 shows 1,750,178 children between the
ages of two and fifteen at work in American industry.' By 1910 the
number had climbed another 200,000."
At the same time so-called "baby farms" were often paid lump
sums to house unwanted illegitimate children. Consequently the shorter
a child's life span the greater the profit margin for the "baby farm"
operators. Mill hands and factory workers frequently placed infants
into day care. These children received insufficient food along with
opiates and other drugs in an atmosphere of crowded rooms, bad air,
uncleanliness and willful neglect.5 It is a grim commentary that there
were laws on the statute books in this country to prevent cruelty to
animals long before there were similar laws to prevent cruelty to chil-
dren. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals similarly
antedates the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.
This persistent failure to address social problems at their origins
has resulted in the dilemma of having to provide for increasingly severe
problems at higher and higher cost. Institutional care is always more
expensive per person served than the same general level of care given
on an outpatient or non-institutional basis. In spite of this obvious fact,
huge institutions to house the mentally retarded have existed for many
years. Even more expensive hospitals for the mentally ill have ware-
housed thousands of patients under a single roof. Only in recent years
have concerted efforts been made to secure the release of these institu-
tionalized individuals to less costly community care. These community
based programs are far less expensive than the hospital care they have
replaced. They also have a better record for preventing the "revolving
door" phenomenon than their institutional counterparts.
Boley Manor in St. Petersburg, Florida, a halfway house for pa-
tients released from state mental hospitals, is one example of such a
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 12-13.
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community based program. This organization provided care for its cli-
ents at an average cost of $16,414 per yer in 1982-83.1 Care in the
state mental hospitals varies from one institution to another but for all
state mental hospitals combined the cost was $28,590 per patient dur-
ing the same period.7 At the same time the recidivism rate for Boley
Manor was thirty-one percent while recidivism for state hospital dis-
chargees into the community was over fifty-four percent.8 Arguably, a
hospital houses and treats the most seriously ill mental patients while a
halfway house receives only those who have improved because of costly
hospital treatment. This may not always be true, but even if it is, this
does not invalidate the basic premise that more costly services tend to
receive priority funding since the usual treatment cycle is from home to
hospital to halfway house. Assuming patients have all received maxi-
mum hospital benefits at discharge the recidivism rate should be com-
parable. Provision for a reverse cycle from home to halfway house to
hospital is a relatively new, emerging treatment modality. There is no
way to know if halfway houses can effectively prevent the progression
of symptoms obviating the need for hospitalization in the first place but
is a fitting topic for controlled research and there is considerable enthu-
siasm about its efficacy.
Foster care programs for children provide an additional example
of the concept of high cost and limited effectiveness. There is general
agreement among child welfare experts that the American system of
foster care has not met the needs of the vast majority of children enter-
ing the system.9 The government agencies responsible for administering
the majority of these foster care programs have typically done so with
insufficient staffs, largely untrained in child welfare practice. Programs
have been characterized by a very high rate of staff turnover. Foster
families, to their credit, have usually responded generously to the chil-
dren. They have done so with little pre-service or in-service training.
Their homes have frequently become overcrowded with foster children
because of the scarcity of homes available for these children. They have
always been sorely underpaid. As a result of all the above factors, chil-
dren have remained in foster care for inordinately long periods of time.
6. Telephone interview with Marilyn Dimas, Executive Director of Boley Manor,
in St. Petersburg, Fla. (Nov. 30, 1983).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Gill & Amadio, Social Work and Law in a Foster Care-Adoption Program,
LXII CHILD WELFARE 455, 455-57 (1983).
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While it is very difficult to secure accurate estimates of the number of
children in foster care, a national study estimates that 502,000 children
were in foster care in 1978.10 Nearly twenty-five percent of the children
in foster care had been there over six years and 2.5 years was the me-
dian length of time in care.'
This study reveals the injurious effects of a costly service that
leads to even greater future problems and expenses. It states that
"[tlwenty-two percent of the children in foster care have been with at
least three foster care families." 12 Since each child begins life in at
least the titular care of a biological parent, these children have had at
least four parent figures in their brief lives. The consequences of con-
stant disruptions of the child's family ties are lamented by commenta-
tors Kline and Overstreet who state, "should it be necessary to change
a child's foster placement there are disadvantages to the child, lesser
but serious disadvantages to the parent and erosion of resources."' 3
These thoughts are echoed by other authorities who indicate that every
child requires continuity of care, and an unbroken relationship with at
least one adult who is and wants to be directly responsible for his daily
needs. 1 4 They stress the importance of the psychological ties that de-
velop over time between a child and the adults who continually provide
for his day-to-day care. 15
Unfortunately our nation's foster children have not benefitted from
this needed continuity of care. They have been moved from home to
home, often precipitously, many times with no long-term plan for their
future. They have experienced "foster care drift."' 6 Not surprisingly,
these children feel rootless and angry. Many have great difficulty form-
ing meaningful or close relationships with other children or adults.
10. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. 80-30274, STATUS OF
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES 55 (1980) [hereinafter STATUS OF CHILDREN].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. D. KLINE & H. OVERSTREET, FOSTER CARE OF CHILDREN: NURTURE AND
TREATMENT, 15-16 (1972).
14. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD 40 (1979).
15. Id.
16. Jones, Stopping Foster Care Drift: A Review of Legislation and Special Pro-
grams, LVII CHILD WELFARE 571 (1978) ("foster care drift" describes the frequently
experienced situation in which a child is placed in the foster care program, no specific
plan is devised and he spends his entire childhood moving from one foster home to
another).
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Many of them are considered "hard to place" for adoption because
they are older, emotionally or physically handicapped, or constitute a
family group of several siblings.
There is ample documentation that a relatively small expenditure
of funds can effectively move many such children from foster care back
to biological family units or into adoption or other permanent place-
ments. 17 As early as 1972, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, demon-
strated that a county welfare department with no outside grant money
or legislative support could, within five years, reduce the number of
children in foster care by one-half through an aggressive adoption pro-
gram. 18 Other aspects of the five-year project are equally impressive. It
is estimated it cost less than $95,000 and saved $668,000 in foster care
costs exclusive of medical and dental care or administrative costs. With
the redistribution of caseloads, the agency was able to develop day care
and other services to children in their own homes. There was a reduc-
tion of turnover rates of foster care caseworkers and fewer foster case
placements per child."'
A different approach predating the Cumberland County effort has
had results which are equally significant. In 1971, the Juvenile Welfare
Board of Pinellas County, Florida entered into an agreement with
Family Service Centers of Pinellas County (then named Family and
Children's Service) to provide funds for that agency to intensify its ef-
forts to find adoptive homes for children who were considered hard to
place. The arrangement provided financial support for personnel and
for recruitment of homes. It also authorized limited financial subsidies
in special cases for low income families who would otherwise not have
been able to adopt children with special medical problems or who were
members of family groups. This program has continued with modifica-
tions to the present time. Several years after the initial funding the
Juvenile Welfare Board provided staff to the local district of the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitiative Services (HRS) to assist the
Department in securing the legal release of children in foster care, per-
mitting them to be placed for adoption. This coalition proved to be par-
ticularly effective. More than four hundred children with special needs
have been placed as a direct result of this funding.20 While there have
17. Boyd, They Can Go Home Again!, LVIII CHILD WELFARE 609 (1979).
18. Jones, supra note 16, at 577.
19. Id.
20. Records of Project CAN, Children with Adoptive Needs (1971-1983) (avail-
able from Family Service Centers of Pinellas County, (Fla.) Inc.).
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been subsequent changes in the adoption services delivered by HRS as
well as the Family Service Centers, the initial project provided the first
impetus for the concentration of adoptive efforts on these special chil-
dren. No estimate of cost savings has been made but it is obvious that
the adoptive placement of more than four hundred children has had
considerable fiscal impact on foster care expenditures. The more subtle
but perhaps more beneficial effect has been to give these children the
positive experience of permanence in their adoptive families and the
continuity of care that is so vitally important for a child's personality
and character development.
There is also impressive evidence that financial subsidy to families
adopting "hard to place" children results in more such adoptions.2 1
Studies also indicate that adoption with subsidy results in savings to
the state averaging thirty-seven percent as compared with keeping that
child in foster care.2 Unfortunately, even with the documented savings,
many states including Florida are reducing, or at least not increasing,
funds for adoption subsidy. As one commentator has said, "[c]utting
state adoption subsidy budgets will not save tax dollars, but actually
will increase tax spending in that same year and in the years to come.
Why? Every child who is not placed for adoption with subsidy will re-
main in costlier foster or institutional care (which can run four times as
high as foster care)." 23
III. Recent Views on Funding for Less Costly Services
Throughout professional literature and in the media there are con-
stant references to this nation's penchant for ignoring or neglecting less
costly alternatives for treating social problems. The Honorable Herbert
L. Fields, a juvenile court judge, relates his experience that utilization
of family-based services can reduce foster care placement from sixty to
seventy percent.24 Unfortunately, family-based services designed to pre-
vent foster care placement are totally unavailable in most jurisdictions.
In child welfare generally, the focus is on the care of children after
disaster has struck. Insufficient attention is given to the possibility of a
21. COLE, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, PERMANENCY REPORT 2
(1983).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Cole, Family-Focused Law: The Role of the Courts in Prevention in NA-
TIONAL RESOURCE CENTER ON FAMILY BASED SERVICES PREVENTION REPORT 2
(1983).
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child remaining in his own home. Efforts are concentrated on providing
quality child-care services in foster homes, in institutions or in group
homes. The question has been asked why we are building resources at
the bottom of the hill to catch children after they fall, instead of build-
ing fences at the top of the hill so that children will not fall at all.25
Some recent articles in the St. Petersburg Times approach the
problem from different perspectives but essentially make the same
point-we are sacrificing families, the well-being of children and soci-
ety at large by ignoring less costly and more effective methods. For
example, Sidney M. Goetz, adjunct professor at Stetson University
College of Law, advances persuasive arguments that mediation is a bet-
ter way to settle divorce disputes than our present adversarial system.26
He points out the murders by divorce litigants, the kidnappings of chil-
dren in custody disputes and the open court battles which air the most
lurid sexual accusations and which are reported in detail by the me-
dia. 27 He states that our adversarial system is a disaster in the settle-
ment of marital and custodial disputes and concludes by saying:
When push comes to shove, perhaps the bottom line in determing
whether mediation can replace litigation in divorce and custody
disputes will not be the savings in lost human lives and misery that
prevail under our present system, but the huge savings to be real-
ized from lower public costs for criminal prosecutions, imprison-
ment, hospitalization, mental and emotional breakdowns, social ser-
vice agencies, and other costs both publicly and privately endured
under our present system.28
Another recent article reporting on a conference concerning delin-
quent and dependent children cites several authorities elaborating on
the deficiencies in the current state systems for dealing with these chil-
dren.2 9 These authorities indicate that many of Florida's emotionally
disturbed children end up in state training schools, hospitals or on wait-
ing lists because the services they need are not available.30 Runaways
25. R. WRIGHT, OUR TROUBLED CHILDREN-OUR COMMUNITY'S CHALLENGE 92
(1967).
26. Goetz, Mediation is a Better Way to Settle Divorce Disputes, St. Petersburg
Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at A 10, col. 4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Huntley, Legislature to Look at Runaways, Other Children's Issues, St. Pe-
tersburg Times, Nov. 19, 1983, at B 7, col. 4.
30. Id.
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are sent to detention centers simply because judges don't have any
other place to send them.3' Inappropriate placement of children is one
of the major problems in state training schools. Inadequate salaries and
training for staff at these schools are other problems.32 A legitimate
question then is why cost-conscious legislators continue to fund the
more costly programs for institutions, foster care, juvenile detention
and training schools and at the same time are penurious with programs
providing family support or community-based care?
IV. Why the Funding Paradox Exists
The answers to that question are very complex and to some extent
obscure. Obviously lawmakers do not follow this pattern by deliberate
choice. Part of the rationale for this paradox is fairly obvious but other
aspects are far more difficult to decipher. In fairness to lawmakers at
all levels of government, they cannot be expected to have the degree of
knowledge necessary to vote from a thorough base of fact on the myr-
iad issues which confront them. Consequently they tend to be swayed
by the pressure groups seeking funding for a particular problem.
Pressure groups begin to form when a given problem reaches some
degree of intensity and universality. This intensification rallies those
who are touched by the problem into a creative nucleus demanding al-
leviation. Without planned intervention, it is inevitable that such a pro-
cess occurs. It is extremely difficult to secure funding to prevent a prob-
lem that cannot be demonstrated fairly conclusively. The more
universally the problem cuts across all income levels, the greater is the
power base and the easier it is to secure funding. Consider the relative
ease with which funds have been obtained for mental illness, drug
abuse and mental retardation once these conditions "come out of the
closet." These are afflictions that strike all economic categories and
every strata of society. Contrast this with the difficulty in securing ade-
quate funds for quality foster home care, prison reform and day care
services which tend to be disproportionately utilized by lower income
families and individuals.33
A second factor negatively affecting funding for less costly services
is the elusive nature of preventive efforts. It is extremely difficult to
prove that a given effort in social services has reduced the incidence of
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note 10, at 39, 65.
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the problem being addressed. The global nature of social problems and
the multitude of variables affecting any single symptom creates signifi-
cant difficulties in research design. The need for longitudinal studies
creates problems in obtaining ongoing funding. Social service research
has lagged so far behind other forms of research that few "thermome-
ters" have been developed to assist in charting progress. It is impossible
to determine, for example, if Florida's initiatives in child welfare ser-
vices including foster care review, adoption subsidy, purchase of adop-
tion services and similar programs are responsible for the steady de-
cline of children in foster care. The dramatic reduction from 8,653
children in foster. care in 1978 to 5,973 in 1983 may very well be due to
these initiatives.34
It is equally impossible to ascertain if community-based programs
are responsible for the reduced crime rates and arrests of juveniles cur-
rently being experienced in Florida. Since 1979, arrests for juvenile
crime have decreased by twenty-four percent but no one is quite sure
why this has happened.3 5 Authorities credit a number of possibilities
ranging from neighborhood crime watch programs to the state's "get
tough with juvenile crime" attitude which began in 1981. An increase
in community-based programs parallels the decline but there are no
specific research studies which have addressed this issue. Consequently
cause and effect relationships cannot be determined nor any firm con-
clusions drawn.
The decrease in juvenile crime in general is in stark contrast to the
rates for violent crimes (rape, homicide and attempted murder) which
have continued to rise among juveniles.37 The increase from the 1960s
to the 1980s has been labelled "dramatic" by one researcher. Dr. Kath-
leen M. Heide of the University of South Florida has been conducting
research on violent crime among incarcerated juveniles based upon in-
tensive three-hour interviews.3 8 The thirty juveniles interviewed have
been convicted of first degree or second degree murder or attempted
murder.3 1 She reports that eighty-eight percent had prior arrests, some
34. FLA. HRS, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES IN FLORIDA, 27 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as HRS].
35. Huntley, Youth Crime is Declining but No One Knows Exactly Why, St.
Petersburg Times, Nov. 20, 1983, at B 21, col. 1.
36. Id.
37. St. Petersburg Times, Dec. 4, 1983, at B 11, col. 1.
38. Id.
39. Id. at B 11, col. 2.
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as many as sixteen.40 Fifty percent had prior arrests for violent crime."
Forty-three percent felt no responsibility and many denied having deep
feelings about things or deep emotional involvements.42 While the rest
seemed to know their crime was morally wrong, few displayed remorse
or empathy for the victim or survivors.' 3 Dr. Heide's research raises
many more questions than it answers. Is it possible that a failure to
have continuity of care during infancy and early childhood does more
than make it difficult for that child to form meaningful relationships?
Does it perhaps create a situation in which such children become disso-
ciated from society to the extent that violent crimes carry no emotional
impact for them? Are they able to engage in violent crime because the
victims become objects without feelings-like themselves? Are they
able to kill a fellow human being in the same way that most kill a fly or
mosquito? Much more research will be needed before we can begin to
answer these questions and, unfortunately, research funds are difficult
to find.
When research funds are allocated for social services, they are
largely limited to pilot projects or demonstrations. More emphasis is
placed on the alleviation of symptoms of social distress than on a solu-
tion to the problem itself. Any program designed as a research vehicle
is in fiscal jeopardy unless it addresses a specific symptom or syndrome.
Pure research or even service programs designed primarily for research
are rare in the social service arena. In this respect there is an interest-
ing contrast between the fields of medicine and social services. In
medicine, huge amounts of money are made available for research. So
much money is available for researching the more popular diseases, it
is rumored, that more funds are available than the research facilities
can prudently spend. Many of these research efforts lead to dead ends,
and are, in effect, failures. No stigma attaches to the researchers in
these instances. In fact, more failures are expected than successes. That
is the essential nature of pure research. Unfortunately, it does not ap-
pear that social services will receive the same research treatment en-
joyed by medicine in the foreseeable future.
While we continue to pursue funds for research and preventive ef-
forts, we need to ponder the ultimate costs of this protracted delay.
This is exemplified by the comments of noted psychiatrist Dr. Lee Salk,
40. Id. at B 11, col. 1.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
340 [Vol. 8
117
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
A Legislative Paradox
"[c]learly, if adult personality is markedly influenced by an individual's
earliest experiences, we should concentrate preventive efforts on the
very young. While most professionals in the mental health field recog-
nize this, relatively little effort is directed toward assisting those who
are primarily responsible for the personality development of infants and
young children-their parents."" This benign neglect of parents and
their children along with other grave social problems indicates that our
economy may be engulfed by social ills which will cause it to implode if
we do not soon begin to deal with them. Although these are unpopular
topics which arouse emotions and biases and which are surrounded by
stereotypical thinking and prejudice, the implications are ominous if
these problems are not addressed.
A 1979 study by the United States Department of Health and
Human Services revealed that minority children are in correctional fa-
cilities at a rate four hundred percent higher than whites but are found
in medical and special educational facilities at a, rate only twenty per-
cent higher than whites.4 5 Unless one subscribes to the erroneous the-
ory that white children are somehow inherently mentally healthier and
more law abiding, these figures raise critical questions about social atti-
tudes toward methods of handling "problem behavior" among different
cultural and social groups. The apparent differential treatment afforded
whites as compared to minorities leads to another aspect of the para-
dox; that is, the expending of increasingly greater amounts on ineffec-
tive correctional facilities while neglecting adequate educational and
medical modalities. It masks and circumvents a less expensive approach
over the long run. This approach is to address the root causes of behav-
ior and circumstances which lead to the necessity for correctional facil-
ities, remedial educational facilities and institutions and services by the
socially, physically and mentally impaired. Such in-depth investigation
would necessitate attention to more mundane areas including slum
housing, poor nutrition and lack of educational and job opportunities. It
would also include an examination of the unavailability of medical care
for the poor, federal programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children which militate against keeping families intact, and the higher
birthrate among minorities. In the aggregate these condtions help to
insiduously create the very climate in which crime flourishes and in
which the seeds of mental illness are sown.
44. H. JAMES, supra note 1, at 64.
45. STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note 10, at 65. The author presumes that the
term educational facilities used in the cited source denotes special education facilities.
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Mental retardation was also identified as a problem of the poor in
this Department of Health and Human Services study. It pointed out
that about 100,000 children each year are identified as retarded."6
About ninety percent of these are considered "mildly" retarded-an
I.Q. between fifty and seventy.47 A significant amount of "mild" retar-
dation is believed to be the result of deprived social environment often
associated with poverty. One likely cause is improper nutrition. 48 Ma-
ternal nutrition during pregnancy and lactation is critical for child
health. Pregnant women lacking proper nutrition have a greater chance
of bearing a low birthweight or stillborn infant.49 Low birthweight is
correlated with mental retardation and other serious developmental de-
fects. There are few programs that rival nutritional programs in repay-
ment to society for a given financial outlay. These nutition services are
critical for low income women and young children. Most people are
aware of the federally supported school lunches, but there have also
been the federal Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, In-
fants and Children (WIC) providing nutritional supplements for low
income women, infants and young children and school breakfast
programs.
School lunches at reduced rates or completely free for low income
children are generally well known and noncontroversial. At the same
time the WIC program and school breakfasts are largely unknown.
Both these efforts may very well be more beneficial than the lunches if
we accept the nutritional admonition that a good breakfast is a neces-
sity to enhance learning capabilities for all children to say nothing of
low income children who may go to bed without an adequate evening
meal. Further, since the WIC program would begin affecting children
in utero via better nutrition for their mothers and would provide benefi-
cial results for infants and young children before they reach school age,
thereby being more preventive, it seems these programs should receive
wider support and acclaim. Unfortunately we seem bent on waiting un-
til the situation reaches a greater degree of severity at school age
before we are willing to commit significant resources.
A final comment on the problems confronting legislators in fund-
ing such efforts is in order. It is apparent that preventive efforts require
either additional expenditures or diversion of some funds that would
46. Id. at 45.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 32.
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otherwise be spent on the more costly programs. In view of the uncer-
tainties of preventive efforts it is understandable why legislators are re-
luctant to underwrite such programs either by increased expenditures
or by utilizing funds that are vitally needed in existing services. There
are, however, some encouraging indications that the tendency to fund
more costly alternatives is undergoing a gradual evolution in Florida.
V. Evolutionary Developments in Funding Preventive
Programs
There have been a number of developments within the past several
years that are noteworthy. They touch, however, only a very small seg-
ment of the total needs of Florida's children. Except for one very recent
example in prison reform, 50 the areas of abuse, neglect and dependency
are the focal points of the new developments discussed in this article.
With that caveat there are a number of new programs for which Flor-
ida's legislators and its Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices (HRS) deserve commendation. In at least one broad area, Florida
has become one of the nation's leaders. It is one of only five states
presently carrying out a full-service statewide preplacement prevention
program to avoid foster care of children. 51
These efforts began in 1971 with a statewide child abuse registry
and child protective services programs. In 1975 status offenses were
decriminalized to provide that children committing status offenses such
as running away, being truant or beyond parental control, are treated
as dependent rather than delinquent children.52 Programs providing
shelters for runaway children and the guardian ad litem project were
important innovations. The guardian ad litem program was established
through the state courts administrator's office in 1980, and provides for
the appointment of an advocate who represents the best interests of the
child in abuse and neglect preceedings before the court. Interspersed
with these efforts to prevent placement were equally important endeav-
ors to move children out of foster care into adoption or return them to
their biological parents. In 1976, the state instituted a system of judi-
cial review of children in foster care. 3 This required a study and report
50. See iAfra note 60 and accompanying text.
51. Sudia, Impressions of State Preplacement Prevention Programs- 1983, NA-
TIONAL RESOURCE CENTER ON FAMILY BASED SERVICES PREVENTION REPORT (1983).
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10)(h) & (i), (ii) (1975).
53. FLA. STAT. § 409.168 (1976) (Judicial Review of Foster Care Act).
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of each child's status to the circuit court.54 That same year Florida
began providing adoption subsidies to children with special needs in
order to increase the placement of children whose cost of care inhibited
their prospects for adoption. In 1978, HRS received a three hundred
percent increase in adoption staff and began purchasing adoption ser-
vices for children with special needs from private adoption agencies.55
One child protection team was funded as a pilot project in that year.
These have since been expanded to fourteen primary teams and seven
satellite teams in fifteen metropolitan areas.56 The teams are designed
to offer a multidisciplinary approach to the problems of children at risk
and now serve all sixty-seven of Florida's counties. 5
Two additional child welfare initiatives during the period 1981-83
have enormous potential and deserve special recognition. The first of
these is Florida Statutes section 827.075, known popularly as the
"Mills Bill."58 This act allocates funds to each HRS district to prevent
child abuse and neglect. Through an advisory council concept, each
HRS district can develop a tailor-made plan consistent with its self-
determined needs.59 Consequently, a wide variety of preventive services
is emerging. There is still some concern that with the volume of needed
services and the minimal amount of funding, it is virtually impossible
to evaluate the efficacy of the various approaches. Nevertheless it is
anticipated that HRS will be tracking the various projects statewide
and sharing information among districts. It is highly desirable that the
funding continue in an amount sufficient to incorporate results-oriented
research into the projects. If sufficient allocations continue for the pe-
riod of time necessary to do longitudinal studies of child abuse preven-
tion, the framework is in place to begin impacting child abuse on a
large scale.
The second recent allocation that deserves highlighting is that for
the Intensive Crisis Counseling Program (ICCP), designed to prevent
removal of children from their families into foster care. The cost effec-
tiveness of this type of program has been mentioned earlier. The long-
term positive effects on the families and children involved are incalcu-
54. Id.
55. HRS, supra note 34, at 3.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. FLA. STAT. § 827.075 (1982) (An Act Relating to the Prevention of Child
Abuse & Neglect).
59. Id.
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labe. The ultimate benefit to society is equally difficult to measure but
is of enormous significance. Unfortunately, these programs are mini-
mally supported. Pinellas County with nearly 750,000 residents has an
annualized allocation of $60,000.0 Since the service is targeted to fam-
ilies in immediate danger of having their children removed, the
caseworkers must be available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. The limited funds available provide only a skeletal program. The
encouraging aspect, however, is that families are eligible only before
their children are removed. This not only avoids the more costly alter-
native of foster care but provides an evaluating mechanism. By track-
ing the success rate of the project in preventing placement over a pre-
determined period of time, a true research dimension will be put into
place.
Presuming successful intervention, the programs can begin not
from the point at whch children are in imminent danger of removal but
at earlier periods in the parent-child life cycle. Effective intervention at
earlier stages significantly reduces the trauma that accrues to children
and to parents who reach the point of imminent removal. It is this posi-
tive process of moving to even earlier points of intervention that will
enable us to move from alleviation of symptoms to tertiary, secondary
and finally primary prevention of the problem. Each succeeding step
backward will utilize our resources to serve ever increasing numbers at
less cost while having more positive impact on ultimate causes.
One final program should be mentioned. While not directly related
to children, it demonstrates how creativity can indirectly relate to chil-
dren's needs by preserving the family unit. It also indicates the univer-
sality of the concept of funding more costly alternatives and the back
door methods which finally and belatedly have begun breaking the pat-
tern. The program in question is one providing house arrest for con-
victed felons.6 It is designed for those offenders who would not be good
probation material and most likely would be sentenced to prison for
short terms of twelve to thirty months. They typically are nonviolent
property offenders. They can be sentenced to house arrest for periods
up to two years. There are rigid regulations and close supervision to
enforce the rules. While difficult for the "prisoners" to endure, the new
program is ideal for offenders with families since it does not deprive
60. Pinellas County Family Service Centers, ICCP funding, effective Oct. 18,
1983.
61. Richardson, House Arrest, St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at B 1, col.
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children of their parents or innocent spouses of their partners. Offend-
ers in the project can continue to work and leave home occasionally for
other approved purposes. It is estimated by state prison officials that
the new program will save the taxpayers $34,000,000 in its first year. 2
As commendable as the experiment is, it is regrettable it did not
emerge from the state's concern for families and children. Rather it
was devised as a partial answer to the overcrowding of state prisons.
While its raison d'etre may be less family oriented than one might
wish, it nevertheless serves these ends and deserves enthusiastic
support.
As laudable as the efforts made in Florida are, they still constitute
bits and pieces of "the system." The system has often been described a
difficult to see and even more difficult to understand. The system is
made up of many subsystems. To understand it, one must begin with
our methods of mating, which do not necessarily bring together people
who are well-suited and trained to be parents. This can result in ne-
glected, battered, and disturbed children. There are problems of con-
traception, abortion, prenatal care and the parenting system or systems.
There are alternative systems for children whose parents are killed, for
victims of divorce, abuse, neglect, for unwanted children, for those born
to parents who live in poverty or born to parents who cannot care for a
handicapped child or those born out of wedlock. The list includes the
school system, welfare system and the mental health system. In addi-
tion we have the juvenile justice system, the day care system, the reli-
gious system, the special education system, the system for retarded,
parks and recreation systems, those designed to meet the needs of
blind, deaf or crippled children, the health-care system and others. If
these systems were properly designed, they would function in harmony
like an orchestra. But the system dealing with children is not an
orchestra. Each subsystem from the family to the prison, fiddles with
its own tune paying no attention either to harmony or rhythm. This
results in discord and damaged children, crime, mental illness and
much pain. 3
This may be too harsh an indictment of the infrastructure of peo-
ple, services and institutions which has evolved to serve our children
and families. Nevertheless it comes too close to the truth to be ignored.
A great deal needs to be done to create a logical sequence of services to
meet social problems. This is a massive undertaking and runs afoul of
62. Id.
63. H. JAMES, supra note 1, at 40-42.
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pressure groups, vested interests, cronyism, fraud, graft, incompetence,
philosophical differences and religious convictions to name just a few.
While we may never create a perfect system, we must not abandon
efforts to improve the ones we have.
VI. Conclusion
It is evident that legislators are under intense pressure to address
those problems in society that are creating the most dramatic statistics.
Faced with finite resources and infinite need, it becomes extremely dif-
ficult to finance unproven or even proven preventive efforts or those
designed for early intervention. However, the failure to do so almost
certainly assures a continuation of ever more severe problems necessi-
tating larger and larger fiscal outlays. It has been predicted that some
future generation will stand incredulous at the barbarity of their twen-
tieth century ancestors who dealt with the needs of children by creating
more jails and prisons, more mental hospitals and mental health cen-
ters, and institutions for retarded and handicapped children. 4 They
will be startled to find that we ignored the child-production and child-
rearing systems and invested in guns, police cars and policemen, more
social and mental health workers and handed out more and larger doles
of money to so-called welfare riothers who produced more and more
unwanted children."' This is a cynical prediction with a ring of denigra-
tion of those who find themselves caught up in the vicious cycle of pov-
erty. As cynical and demeaning as these comments may be, they merit
consideration. It is imperative that we begin trying to build a fence
around the hill to keep our children from falling off.
If we are genuinely concerned about the quality of family life and
the welfare of children, we must support our legislators in appropriat-
ing funds for various levels of research and prevention. If every alloca-
tion of funds to treat the results of familial or societal breakdown had a
companion allocation to investigate and prevent the problem, we would
soon begin making major advances in treatment. The movement in
Florida toward this goal is encouraging. The initiatives need to be ex-
panded as results oriented research continues to demonstrate its cost-
effectiveness. Unless this movement continues, we appear destined to
perpetuate in large measure the expensive and unrewarding process of
funding the most costly and least preventive alternative.
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id. at 65.
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Accreditation of Florida's Child Welfare Services: An
Idea Whose Time has Come
Monsignor Bryan 0. Walsh*
One has only to look in the yellow pages of any metropolitan area
telephone book under "social services" to be faced with a bewildering
selection of agencies, public and voluntary, non-profit and proprietary.
Information and referral has, as a result, become a standard service of
United Way and other public and voluntary agencies. Americans are a
generous people. They respond instinctively to the cry of a hurting fel-
low human being, a newspaper story of a stranded family, or an aban-
doned child. Americans are a pragmatic people. When they see a prob-
lem, they have an urge to do something about it, to come together and
find a solution. It is a cultural characteristic which is a relic of pioneer
days when survival often depended on neighbors and even strangers
getting together in mutual aid. Alexis de Tocqueville noted this in his
classic commentary on American life, Democracy in America.
Consumers of social services, contributors and funding sources all
face the same problem of identifying agencies that meet some recog-
nized standards for quality services. Stories of fraudulent charities are
commonplace in the media. Occasionally there are stories of neglect
and child abuse even in social service agencies. Less sensational, but
nonetheless real, are the inadequate or inappropriate interventions in
the lives of children and families. Private industry developed quality
control methods to assure that the goods and services produced meet
accepted standards. In the area of human services, a peculiarly Ameri-
can solution has evolved to protect those who receive services and those
who pay for them. It is called accreditation. In other countries and
cultures, government fulfills this role by laying down strict regulations
which govern every aspect of the service delivery system. Americans,
with their healthy suspicion of too much government intervention in the
fields of education and health, have developed an accreditation method-
ology. The several regional accreditation associations in education and
the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals have for a long
* B.A. St. Mary's University; M.A. University of Miami. The author is executive
director of Catholic Community Services for the Archdiocese of Miami.
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time been the recognized instruments of quality control in their fields
of human services.
Accreditation is defined as a methodology which assures:
that the organizational providers of service, whether in education,
health care or social service, meet the recognized standards of their
domain and its professionals. The accreditation of the agency prov-
iders is part of a larger system of quality control that includes ac-
creditation of training programs and institutions and the certifica-
tion and licensing of individual professionals.1
The specific purpose of accreditation is to assure that services are
delivered in effective and efficient ways which are consistent with the
canons of good practice and organizational operation. The core of any
accreditation system is the norm against which a program is judged.
However, to be effective, the system has to be accepted by its constitu-
ency and have recognition in the community and in society at large.
Accreditation is, thus, a living process which expands to cover new ser-
vices as they are developed in the field. Accreditation as a process has
to win acceptance and achieve credibility, not only among the agencies
it seeks to evaluate, but also among consumers and funding sources.
Armed with the seal of accreditation, a provider of human services
demonstrates to the world that it:
has established policies and procedures for its effective manage-
ment, is financially sound, manages its financial affairs prudently
and is committed to the principle of public disclosure, shapes its
programs of services to meet community needs and concerns, con-
tinually evaluates its services and operation, respects and protects
the clients it serves, is staffed by qualified personnel who work
under conditions that promote effective performance, has the facili-
ties and equipment suited to the delivery of quality services. 2
Accreditation, as it has developed in the United States, is essen-
tially a voluntary effort as opposed to governmentally imposed regula-
tions. "It began in the field of education in answer to the need educa-
tional institutions had to have some objective method of evaluating
1. PROVISIONS FOR ACCREDITATION OF AGENCIES SERVING FAMILIES AND CHIL-
DREN v. (Council on Accreditation of Services for Families ahd Children 1982).
2. COUNCIL ON ACCREDITATION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, INC., WE ARE
ACCREDITED BY COA AND YOU SHOULD KNOW (1982).
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education transfer credits and diplomas issued by schools in the ab-
sence of any nationwide governmental standards." 3 Accreditation has
worked in the field of education "[d]espite certain limitations and the
thorny problems inherent in the establishing of criteria and procedures,
educational accreditation has greatly contributed to raising academic
standards on both secondary and higher educational levels.4
The second field of human services to look at accreditation as a
means of assuring quality care was medicine. In 1918, the American
College of Surgeons began its hospital standardization program. More
than any other movement in North American medicine, it is credited
with substantial influence in improving hospital care. In 1953, this re-
sponsibility was turned over to a special body known as the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). The Commission is
sponsored by four medical organizations; the American Medical Asso-
ciation, the American College of Physicians, the American Hospital
Association, and the American College of Surgeons. Today, JCAH ac-
creditation is the recognized standard-setter for the field.
Authorities in the field of social services have long recognized the
need for standard-setting in this rapidly expanding field. The Child
Welfare League of America (CWLA) was founded in 1920 for the
purpose of improving services for children away from their own homes.
This was the era of big orphanages which often were little more than
warehouses for dependent children. By the mid 1920s, graduates of the
new schools of social work began to influence the field and to work for
change. Similar forces were at work in other national organizations,
such as the Family Service Association (FSA), founded in 1911, and
the National Conference of Catholic Charities, founded in 1910.
In 1954, the Child Welfare League established a membership-
linked accreditation system and the Family Service Association fol-
lowed suit. The efforts of these two standard-setting organizations in-
troduced the concept of accreditation to the field of child and family
services. By 1976, between them, these two groups had 580 accredited
agencies on their rosters. However, the fact that accreditation was
linked to membership tended to limit widespread acceptance of the sys-
tem by the field. The boards of CWLA and FSA saw the need for a
national accreditation system that was open to all public and voluntary
agencies without regard to membership in any organization. Member-
ship in a national organization is costly and many agencies which de-
3. 1 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 82 (1966).
4. Id. at 83
1984]
127
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
sired accreditation by a nationally recognized agency such as CWLA,
were faced with paying a second set of national dues in addition to
their own national affiliation. In 1976, of the 545 agencies in the Na-
tional Conference of Catholic Charities, only twelve, including the
Catholic Community Services of Miami were accredited by the Child
Welfare League of America.
In 1976, the boards of CWLA and FSA decided to initiate a joint
project, the Council on Accreditation of Services for Families and Chil-
dren (COA). The COA was to be an independent agency with its own
governing board. It would be sponsored by the two national organiza-
tions. It was expected that other national organizations would join
them, but membership in a national orgnaization would not be a re-
quirement for accreditation, thus removing a possible conflict of inter-
est. Funding for the project was received from the U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, the Ittleson Foundation, the Benjamin
Rosenthal Foundation, and the W.R. Grace Corporation. The prelimi-
nary work was done by staff from the national offices of the original
sponsors, directed by a joint committee of both boards.
The Council was legally incorporated in August 1977 and hired its
first executive director a month later. In June 1978, the first full board
took office. It consisted of individuals with broad backgrounds and ex-
perience in the family and children's field. Major national organiza-
tions assisted in the selection of the first board: the American Federa-
tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, American
Association for Mirriage and Family Therapy, Association of Jewish
Famly and Children's Agencies, National Association of Black Social
Workers, National Conference of Catholic Charities, and the National
Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA.
In July 1978, the Council took over accreditation functions from
its two sponsors. One of its first acts was to change the existing accredi-
tation cycle from five years to four. This compares with a ten year cy-
cle for education and a three year cycle in the medical field. The new
organization had a formidable task, since it took over an ongoing pro-
cess, with fifty-nine CWLA and FSA agencies up for accreditation in
the first year. Each of these agencies had to be re-educated to a new
method of operation. One of the first changes noted was a change in
terminology. What had formerly been referred to as standards for ac-
creditation now became provisions. The reason for the change was ex-
pressed by the new executive director in these words:
The Council term for its accreditation requirements is provi-
[Vol. 8
128
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss2/13
Accreditation
sion, as distinguished from the goal standards which have tradition-
ally been developed by its national sponsor organizations. The
sponsors of COA continue to be the source of the criteria upon
which we base our provisions. Provisions are rigorous, but realistic
operational requirements we distill from the sponsors' standards
and their positions on critical issues. Provisions describe the quality
practice of the present; goal standards could be said to lead the
field into the future.5
The first edition of the Provisions for Accreditation was published
in September 1978 and was widely distributed to local agencies, na-
tional organizations, public agencies and officials, libraries, and inter-
ested persons in the field. It was the product of two years' work which
involved not only the national staffs and boards of CWLA and FSAA,
but input from hundreds of persons representing local service agencies,
national professional, advocacy and service organizations.
In 1980, the board of the Council took another step forward. It
adopted a peer review methodology. Previously site visits had been
made by the professional staffs of the two sponsors. In this regard the
Council had chosen to follow the education rather than the hospital
accreditation model. In February 1980, a new sponsor joined the fold,
the National Conference of Catholic Charities (NCCC), with its 545
diocesan and branch agencies and 200 member institutions. It brought
a new element into the movement towards widespread acceptance of
the accreditation system. NCCC is a voluntary membership organiza-
tion of Catholic charities agencies. By July 1980, the Council could
report that in its first three years:
It had published the first comprehensive accreditation provi-
sions for family and children's agencies, developed accreditation in-
struments and the policies and procedures governing the accredita-
tion process, established a decisionmaking structure, trained staff
and peer accreditors, published a directory of accreditated agen-
cies, conducted agency accreditations and reaccreditations, insti-
tuted evaluation systems, expanded its national support, and begun
recognition efforts at several levels.'
5. Interview with Jeffrey Hantover, Executive Director of the Council on Accred-
itation of Services for Families and Children, in New York, New York (Nov. 15,
1983).
6. The Council on Accreditation: A Brief History (an unpublished fact shet
avaiaqlble from the Council on Accreditation of Services for Families and Children, 67
Irving Place, New York, New York 10003).
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The Council was also able to report that it had received an addi-
tional two-year grant from the Ittleson Foundation and a three-year
grant from the Administration for Children, Youth and Families. With
these grants, the Council was able to add a small division for evalua-
tion and development. The purpose is to develop provisions for the ac-
creditation of services not previously covered as well as the modification
of the rating system and evaluation instruments. During the next two
years, provisions for mental health, residential treatment, substance
abuse, refugee resettlement, home health aide service, volunteer ser-
vices, and non-residential elderly services were developed. Work has be-
gun on provisions for the accreditation of programs for runaway youth,
under a new grant from the Youth Development Bureau. Under a
grant from the Kellogg Foundation, the Council is adding volunteer
friendship services, such as Big Brother organizations and social devel-
opment groups, such as scouting and boys' clubs. These accreditation
provisions will be in effect by January 1985, and, by 1987, provisions
for the accreditation of several other services such as information and
referral, credit-counseling and employee assistance will likely be availa-
ble in a truly comprehensive system.
Accreditation seeks to accomplish several goals. It helps consumers
as they decide on their choice of service providers. It tells the commu-
nity that the agency and the service it provides has met accepted stan-
dards of performance. It helps private and public funding sources to
identify which agencies are worthy of financial support. It helps a com-
munity to plan its referral networks with confidence in the services ren-
dered. Accreditation therefore is a valuable tool for the community in
bringing help to its hurting members. Accreditation also helps the
agency in several different ways. It provides the governing board and
its chief executive officer with an outside independent evaluation of its
operation. It thus complements the work of the external financial audi-
tor. Like the financial audit, it establishes specific goals for agency im-
provement. On the opposite side, it helps to protect the agency against
pressures to lower its standards.
The Council for the Accreditation of Services for Families and
Children was conceived, designed and established to accomplish these
goals. It is structured to provide a careful balance between broad com-
munity interests and professional expertise. Its structure provides for
the "participation of all elements in the field from the line professional
to the national professional organization, from the consumer of service
[Vol. 8354
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to national service and advocacy groups."7
The basic elements of any legitimate accreditation process are: 1)
provisions or standards against which an agency's organization and ser-
vice or services can be judged and 2) a systematic process for examin-
ing an agency in an objective review.
The provisions are the basis for the accreditation. They cover the
entire range of agency operation, from governance by its board to con-
tacts between staff and client, including the agency structure, policies,
procedures and personnel. Provisions must reflect the best practice in
the field, the state of the art. Thus, they must be constantly reviewed,
modified and expanded as advances in research and practice are made.
In undertaking this project, the Council built on the standards devel-
oped over the years by its two founding sponsors, the CWLA and the
FSA. They are the product of a long cooperative process which must go
on as long as accredition exists and there are services and agencies to
be accredited. Provisions should be distinguished from the licensing re-
quirements of governmental agencies, which usually set only minimum
standards involving life safety and quantitative measurements such as
child-adult rations. Provisions are intended to represent the best prac-
tice in the field. They are specific objectives to be attained. They serve
to set the sights of agencies as they look to their futures.
The systematic process for applying these principles developed by
the Council includes the following steps:
1. a self study completed by the agency;
2. on-site evaluation by the accreditation team;
3. an accreditation report on the agency's compliance with the
provisions;
4. agency opportunity to review and comment on the report;
5. objective evaluation of the report by a group of individuals ex-
perienced and knowledgeable in the realities of agency operation;
6. appeals process for agencies denied accreditation;
7. public identification of accredited agencies; and
8. monitoring of agencies to ensure continued compliance.8
The Council's provisions are divided into generic and service categories.
The Council describes them as:
7. PROVISIONS FOR ACCREDITATION OF AGENCIES SERVING FAMILIES AND CHIL-
DREN supra note 1, at vii.
8. Id. at vii.
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The generic provisions encompass those aspects that apply to
all agencies regardless of the service provided. Whether an agency
offers adoption, foster care or substance abuse services, there are
policies and practices of administration, fiscal management, person-
nel management, or evaluation that must be met. For example, all
agencies must prepare annual budgets; not all agencies are re-
quired to utilize volunteers, but those who do should meet the pro-
visions (for volunteers), whether these volunteers contribute to ad-
vocacy or day care services for children.9
The service provisions provide the requirements specific to each service
offered by the agency. If the Council has provisions for a given service,
an agency that offers that service to the public must submit for review
and meet at least the mandatory requirements for that service or lose
accreditation as an agency.
The Council has established service councils for different areas of
the country. It is the responsibility of the service council to review the
report of the accreditation team and recommend one of four actions to
the board of trustees: accreditation for four years; denial; deferment up
to one year to allow the agency to bring itself into compliance with
specific provisions; and deferment for additional information.
In October 1983, the Council had 458 accredited agencies. The
number in Florida was only ten, yet there are some 700 child service
agencies licensed by the state. Clearly, accreditation has a long way to
go in Florida. Florida legislators and child advocates can encourage
quality control in child welfare agencies by considering accreditation
status when reviewing funding requests, and otherwise lending support
to programs. On the national scene, the idea continues to gain more
acceptance. The Council now numbers among its sponsors the Associa-
tion of Jewish Family and Children's Agencies and the Lutheran Social
Service System.
For accreditation to be truly effective it must have widespread rec-
ognition. The seal of Good Housekeeping and the stamp of Underwrit-
ers' Laboratories serve a double purpose in the manufacturing industry.
They give the buying public assurances of quality and they also help
the manufacturer sell products. Thus both consumer and provider bene-
fit. This occurs when the stamp of approval is widely recognized in the
community. The same is true for the seal of accreditation. The medical
and educational accreditation associations have won widespread accept-
9. Id. at viii.
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ance not only in their own specific fields, but in the community at
large. No service provider in these fields can hope to survive very long
without the associations' approval. Funding sources demand it and the
consumer expects it. The Council has recognized this from the begin-
ning and has worked to cultivate such recognition. The following are
some examples of progress toward formal recognition:
1. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Michigan requires COA accreditation
for participation in its outpatient psychiatric program.
2. The California United Way Bay Area Group Insurance Trust
Fund covers outpatient services for mental and nervous disorders only
if the provider is COA accredited.
3. Nationally, Xerox and IBM Employee Assistance Contracts with
FSA require COA accreditation.
4. The Association of Mental Health Administrators, the National
Association of State Mental Health Program Directors and the Na-
tional Mental Health Association recommend COA accreditation as
one way of assuring that out-patient psychiatric services eligible for in-
surance reimbursement meet accepted standards of quality.
It is only with the formal recognition of accredited child welfare
services that effective quality control can take place. As the Council on
Accreditation has stated, "[a]ccreditation as a form of private, volun-
tary quality control is carried out in the spirit of helping agencies. Ac-
creditation is part of the process of agency education and improvement
that will serve the interests of the agency, client, and the community as
a whole. Quality control is a natural and necessary part of a responsi-
ble and accountable system of service delivery." 10
10. Id.
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HRS and The Health and Welfare of Florida's
Children
William W. Ausbon, M.D.*
I. Introduction
Recent information concerning children and families arising from
1980 census data and several national reports reveals certain situations
and trends which will have far-reaching consequences for Florida and
the nation. Section II of this article presents some highlights from those
reports and certain information which focuses on the status of children.
Included are economic, social, emotional and health factors, areas of
particular concern to Florida's legislators. Section III is devoted to
brief sketches of some of the public programs in Florida administered
by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) which
are intended to improve the lives of children and families, particularly
those serving the low-income sector of our society.
II. The Status of the Nation's Children
A. The Changing Composition of Families
The composition and size of the nation's families is changing. Dur-
ing the 1970s, there was a decline in the percentage of families that
included children, as well as in the number of children in the nation's
population. Although one might conclude that fewer children in each
family and in society as a whole make it possible to devote greater care
to those children we have, there is a danger that families with children
will become increasingly isolated and that the nation may devote
less-not more--of its attention and resources to children.1 The types
of families in which children grow up today have also changed. The
* B.S., Emory University; M.D., University of Alabama; Professor of Pediatrics,
University of South Florida; Program Staff Director of Children's Medical Services,
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
1. 1 SELECT PANEL FOR THE PROMOTION OF CHILD HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN: A NAT'L STRAT-
EGY 54 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN].
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percentage of children living with just one parent rose by 1978 to
nineteen percent.2 It is estimated that by 1990 twenty-five percent of
all children will be living with just one parent.' These percentages are
much higher for black families. In 1978, forty-five percent of black
children were living in single parent families.' Another trend with ma-
jor implications for society is the proportion of mothers who work
outside the home. In 1979, 54.5 percent of all mothers of children
under eighteen and 45.5 percent of all mothers of children under six
were in the labor force.'
B. The Economic Status of Children
As noted earlier, in 1978 approximately one-fifth of the nation's
children were living in single-parent families.6 Those children are at a
serious economic disadvantage compared to children living in two-par-
ent homes. This is particularly true when the single parent is female.
The median income of families headed by women in 1981 was $8,653.1
This compares with a median income of $25,636 in husband-wife fami-
lies in that same year.8 When all the nation's children under eighteen
are considered, whatever the composition of their family, 19.5 percent
were living below the poverty level in 1981. 9 The plight of black chil-
dren and those of Hispanic origin was particularly severe; 44.9 percent
of black children and 35.4 percent Hispanics lived below the poverty
level in that same year.10
C. Infants at Risk
The infant mortality rate in the United States has fallen dramati-
cally since the 1950s when it stood at 29.2 per 1,000 live births."' It
2. Id.
3. Id. at 54 and 56.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 56.
6. Id. at 54 & 56.
7. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES, 98th CONG., IST SESS.,
U.S. CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND RECENT TRENDS 15
(Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.S. CHILDREN].
8. Id.
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 31.
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was recorded as 12.5 in 1980.12 Most infant deaths occur in the first
month after birth. Those infants who are of low birth weight (2,500
grams or less) are at particular risk. They are twenty times as likely as
heavier infants to die in the first year.13 The chances that an infant will
be of low birth weight and at greater risk for developmental problems
or death are increased when early, regular prenatal care has not been
provided.14 The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology has
suggested that nine prenatal visits are the minimal level of obstetrical
care.1 5 In 1977, twenty-four percent of white women and forty-seven
percent of black women did not have this minimal level of care.16 Teen-
aged mothers accounted for 17.2 percent of all infants born in 1977.1
These infants had a low infant birth weight incidence of about 1.5
times the national average.' In addition, statistics reveal that thirty-
four percent of expectant mothers under age fifteen who gave birth in
1980 received no care during the first three months of their pregnancy,
a particularly critical period of fetal development.1"
D. Children's Health
Overall, the health of the present generation of America's children
is good in comparison to the past. Relatively few children suffer from
chronic health problems or from serious limitation of activity. Yet, we
must continue to focus attention on those who suffer from physical or
mental handicaps, however small their numbers, lest we forfeit the re-
cent gains made through medical, educational and rehabilitative pro-
grams which offer promise of the realization of these children's poten-
tial and a better quality of life. Additionally, there are major problems
when we focus on children in low-income families. They are in poorer
12. Id. at 31.
13. J. Richmond & B. Filner, Infant and Child Health: Needs and Strategies,
HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON GEN'S REP. ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE
PREVENTION, PUB. No. 79-55071 A, BACKGROUND PAPERS 308 (1979).
14. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE, PUB. No. 79-55071, HEALTHY PEOPLE, THE SURGEON GEN'S REP. ON HEALTH
PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION 86 [hereinafter cited as HEALTHY PEOPLE].
15. J. Richmond & B. Filner, supra note 13, at 309.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. U.S. CHILDREN, supra note 7, at 28.
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health and are more likely to have health-related limitations.2" Poverty
is the single biggest predictor of poor health in this country.2"
An area of major concern when considering the health of children
is accidents. Accidents are the leading cause of death and disability
among children and adolescents. Motor vehicle accidents account for
one-fifth of all accidents among children each year.22 Although other
accidental deaths and injuries result from drownings, burns, falls, and
various forms of substance abuse,23 the fact remains that death rates
among children and youth under age eighteen would be reduced by
twenty percent if no child died in an automobile accident.
24
E. The Health and Behavior of Adolescents
The period of adolescence is regarded in our society as a separate
life stage. The magnitude of change and growth that are typical of this
period are second in intensity only to those of infancy. 25 The physiologi-
cal, emotional and social changes that occur during adolescence make
this a period of special vulnerability. Adolescence is a life stage when
experimentation is necessary, and to be encouraged. It is also a time
when young people sample adulthood by trying out behaviors which are
risky. Driving conduct and sexual behaviors are formed, either wisely
or poorly, during this phase of development.26 It is apparent from the
data on accidents which was previously presented that the major causes
of death and disability among teenagers are related to behavior and the
social environment. They usually involve temporary misjudgment, an-
ger, or depression, combined with access to automobiles and guns. In-
appropriate use of alcohol and drugs often interacts with these factors
to appreciably increase the risk. Violence and accidents account for
about seventy percent of the deaths of adolescents between the ages of
twelve and seventeen.
Many of the behaviors that are a threat to the health and life of
20. 3 BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 41.
21. 1 BETrER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 56 & 58.
22. Id. at 29.
23. Id.
24. 3 BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 42.
25. S. Brown, Health Needs of Adolescents, HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON
GEN'S REP. ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION, PUB. No. 79-55071 A,
335-6 (1979).
26. 1 BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 117.
27. S. Brown, supra note 25, at 341.
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adolescents are deeply embedded in our society's adult culture. Promi-
nent examples are the use of alcohol, tobacco and mood-altering drugs,
especially marijuana. These behaviors are perceived by teenagers as de-
sirable symbols of independence, maturity and sophistication.28 Addi-
tionally, society's expectations for adolescents are not clear. In some
ways the adolescent is treated as a child, in others as an adult. Conse-
quently, adolescents are often confused about their social duties and
responsibilities, just as they are unclear about their rights and
privileges.29
F. Child Care
With nearly one-half of mothers of children under six currently in
the work force, the need for child care has increased. Additionally, a
trend toward child care outside the home is apparent, particularly if
the mother is employed full time. While in 1958, 56.6 percent of care
for children under age six was provided in the child's own home, that
figure dropped to 28.6 percent by 1977.30 In that year, 47.4 percent of
these children received care in another home and 14.6 percent in a
group child care center.31 In the past, there has been concern about the
possible negative consequences of day care on the child's psychological
development. However, existing research indicates that children of
working mothers develop as well on the average as those whose mothers
remain at home and show no difference in the rate of psychological
disorders.3 2
Longitudinal studies can provide an accurate measure of the ad-
vantages or disadvantages of preschool child care programs on later
school performance. Such an analysis of fourteen preschool programs
has documented the benefits which can be afforded by appropriate day
care programs. Academic performance, measured by a decrease in the
likelihood of a child being retained in grade or being placed in special
education classes, was improved for children in preschool programs as
compared to those not participating in these programs.33 A number of
professional organizations have recognized the significance of preschool
28. 1 BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 341.
29. M. ROSENBERG, SOCIETY AND THE ADOLESCENT SELF-IMAGE 4 (1965).
30. U.S. CHILDREN, supra note 7, at 14.
31. Id.
32. 1 BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 58-9.
33. J. Richmond & B. Filner, supra note 13, at 321.
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and day care settings for providing early opportunities for health and
parent education and identifying health problems in children. These or-
ganizations include the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Ameri-
can Dental Association and the American Nurses Association.-
G. Mental Health
Opportunities for promoting positive mental health among our
country's population present themselves in infancy and continue
throughout the child's various periods of growth. During the early
years a child is not only vulnerable to infection and injury, but also to
behavioral and emotional problems arising from social and interper-
sonal situations. If special risks such as poor nutrition, child abuse or
neglect, or insufficient fostering of intellectual and psychological devel-
opment are not identified and dealt with early, the child may be pro-
foundly affected.3 5 Neglect and abuse of children is a particularly criti-
cal problem in society today. Without preventive measures to
strengthen parents' coping skills and improve family functioning, abuse
and neglect can lead to family disintegration as well as delinquency by
the child and distorted values concerning the role of parents.
Many of the psychosocial problems of children are identified when
they begin school. 6 Problems include withdrawal, learning disabilities,
truancy, aggression and delinquency. Boys are found to have higher
rates of behavior problems than girls.3 Behavior that leads to low
achievement, falling behind grade level, or dropping out of school is of
major concern. More than one-fourth of boys and one-sixth of girls still
in school during their mid-teens have dropped below grade level.38 The
rates are much higher among minority students, forty percent for boys
and thirty percent for girls. 9
From the perspective of the most serious forms of mental illness,
adolescents constitute the fastest growing admissions category in psy-
chiatric hospitals.40 Suicide and homicide rates among both children
and adolescents are increasing.41 In addition, growing numbers of
34. 1 BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 110.
35. HEALTHY PEOPLE, supra note 14, at 36.
36. 1 BETTER HEALTH FOR OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 47.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 47-8.
40. Id. at 300.
41. Id.
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young people display problems with drug and alcohol abuse. In seeking
remedies for these problems it is apparent that they are inextricably
bound up with the most basic problems of living and can not be
"treated" apart from the family, neighborhood, school and community
which make up the normal socializing influences of society.42
III. Programs For Children and Families
Florida is fortunate to have a state human services agency that
combines health, social and rehabilitative services under one umbrella
structure. Virtually all of the public programs which focus on the
health and welfare of Florida's children and families are operated by
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). This
agency was created by the Florida Legislature through the Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1975."' HRS program offices include: Alcohol, Drug Abuse
and Mental Health; Children's Medical Services; Children, Youth and
Families; Developmental Services; Economic Services; Health; Medi-
caid; and Vocational Rehabilitation. 4 This section contains brief de-
scriptions of some of these HRS programs which deal primarily with
infants, children and familes.
A. Aid To Families With Dependent Children
Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) provides
financial assistance to families who lack the support of one or both par-
ents. Among other qualifications for AFDC, children must be under
eighteen, unmarried, Florida residents and live in the home of a parent
or close relative. Those sixteen and older must register for the Work
Incentive Program (WIN) if they are not in school. Assets of the fam-
ily must be less than $1,000."' Family net income cannot exceed the
AFDC payment amount which, in October, 1983 was $231 for a family
of three.46 There were 285,806 AFDC recipients in Florida in October,
1983 .4 Of these recipients, 197,207 were children, representing sixty-
42. Id. at 300-1.
43. 1980-81 FLA. DEPT. HRS ANN. REP. 1.
44. Id.
45. FLA. HRS, A.F.D.C. INFORMATION SHEET (Oct. 1981).
46. Office of Economic Serv., HRS, Data Analysis and Forecasting (Oct. 1983)
(Computer Printout).
47. Id. (Sept. 1983).
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nine percent of the total.48 The average grant per person was $74.49
More than seventy-seven percent of Florida's AFDC caseload is com-
posed of families made up of three persons or less.50 Families of five or
more persons represent less than ten percent of the total caseload.5
B. Child Day Care
HRS receives federal funds through a Social Services block grant
to contract for child day care services for certain low-income families.52
The state and local communities are also required to participate in the
cost of services. 53 Those eligible for services include: 1) recipients of
AFDC and Supplementary Security Income (SSI); 2) families whose
income is at or below a specific maximum for family size; 3) children
at risk of abuse or neglect; and 4) children of migrant workers. " In
order to qualify for the program, day care services must be necessary:
1) to enable the adult(s) responsible for the child to accept or continue
employment or participate in training leading to employment; 2) be-
cause the responsible adult is incapacitated; or 3) because the child has
been abused, neglected or exploited by one or both parents and services
will help to remedy the situation.55
As of October 1, 1983, the estimated number of day care units
contracted by HRS for infants was 4,100 and those for preschool chil-
dren was 11,538, making a total of 15,638 units. 56 The number of eligi-
ble children on waiting lists was 13,495 7 This included school-age
children but no separate statistics for infants and preschool children
were available. 58 Fifteen of Florida's sixty-seven counties have no fed-
eral-state funded child day care program. 59 The requirement of local
48. Id.
49. Id. (Oct. 1983).
50. Id. (Sept. 1983).
51. Id.
52. FLA. HRS, CHILD DAY CARE PURCHASE OF SERVICE MANUAL 1-2 (Oct.
1983).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1-3.
56. OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, FLA. HRS, CHILD DAY CARE
PURCHASE OF SERVICE ELIGIBILITY-TASK FORCE INFORMATION (Oct. 1983).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Personal Communication, Office of Children, Youth and Families, Support
Services Section (Oct. 26, 1983).
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participation in the cost of the services may account for the lack of
public day care programs in these counties.
C. Medicaid
Florida's Medicaid Program provides reimbursement for medical
services to categorically eligible persons, including recipients of AFDC
and SSI.0 In September, 1983, 490,631 persons were on the Florida
Medicaid rolls.6 Of that number, 214,365 were children under age
eighteen. 62 However, of all Medicaid expenditures, the proportion rep-
resented by medical services for children is small. In 1982, children
represented forty-eight percent of all Medicaid recipients in the nation,
yet their proportion of total Medicaid expenditures was only thirteen
percent.6 3 In Florida, hospital inpatient services, nursing home services
and services to clients in intermediate care facilities for the mentally
retarded accounted for more than sixty percent of Medicaid expendi-
tures during 1982-83.14
D. Food Programs
Three major food programs affecting children and youth are
funded wholly, or in part, by the United States Department of Agricul-
ture. They are the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women,
Infants, and Children (WIC), the School Lunch Program and the Food
Stamp Program.
The Food Stamp Program began in Florida in 1969, with all sixty-
seven counties participating by May, 1972. "It is intended to provide
an adequate diet to members of low-income households by extending
their food purchasing power through regular retail channels. Food
stamps cannot be used to purchase such items as alcoholic beverages,
tobacco products, household supplies, paper products, medicines, ready-
to-eat foods, or pet supplies.6 5 The food stamp program income limit
for most households is 130 percent of the Poverty Index, or a maximum
60. FLA. HRS ANN. REP., supra note 43, at 24.
61. Personal Communication, Fla. HRS, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Medicaid, Fiscal Planning and Program Section (Oct. 26, 1983).
62. Id.
63. U.S. CHILDREN, supra note 7, at 53.
64. FLA. HRS ANN. REP., supra note 43, at 25.
65. ECONOMIC SERVICES PROGRAM, FOOD STAMP OFFICE, FLA. HRS, FooD
STAMP PROGRAM 2 (July 1983).
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gross income of $1,073 per month for a household of four.66 Eligible
households are provided food stamps based on the number of persons in
the household and adjusted net income67. Thirty-eight percent of the
food stamp caseload is composed of one-person households, one-half of
whom are over fifty years of age."' Twenty-one percent of the caseload
is made up of two-person households.69 Since the basis of food stamp
eligibility is income, the food stamp program differs from other food
and welfare programs where dependency or health status are additional
criteria. Approximately sixty percent of households receiving food
stamps do not receive public assistance or social security income
assistance.7 0
The National School Lunch Program was initiated in 1946 to offer
nutritious food for school children while providing an outlet for the
country's agricultural surplus.7 1 In 1983, 2,122 sites in Florida partici-
pated in the school lunch program7 2 One thousand of these also offered
a school breakfast.73 For the month of April, 1983, the average daily
number of lunches served throughout Florida was 911,358.71 Forty-four
percent of the students paid for the school lunch; forty-eight percent
met the income critieria to receive a free lunch; seven percent received
a reduced price lunch.7 5 The National School Lunch Program
designates the food groups and portion sizes for students and subsidizes
the cost of school lunches to the state.76 Of all the federal funds coming
to the Florida Department of Education, the school lunch program is
the largest single entity.77 The Child Nutrition Act of 1966 also is the
basis for the other food programs, including the Supplemental Milk
66. Id. at 7.
67. Id.
68. Id. at xiv.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. FLA. DEPT. OF EDUC., DEV. OF SCHOOL FOOD SINCE 1970, 4 (March 1983)
[hereinafter cited as SCHOOL FOOD].
72. FLA. DEPT. OF EDUC., FOOD AND NUTRITION MANAGEMENT, Cumulative
School Lunch and Breakfast in ANN. REP. OF SCHOOL NUTRITION PROGRAMS ii
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Cumulative School Lunch].
73. FLA. DEPT. OF EDUC., USDA FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICES REP. OF
SCHOOL PROGRAMS 1 (1983).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Nat'l School Lunch Program, 70 C.F.R. § 210.10 (1982).
77. FLA. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, LEGIS. BUDGET REQUEST 1983-85 30 (1983).
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Program, Summer Feeding Program, and Summer Camp Program.7 8
The school lunch program requires a state to match funds and to earn
reimbursement based on complex formula.7 1 In 1983, Florida was reim-
bursed over $126 million for school lunch and school breakfast
sponsorship. 80
The Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and
Children (WIC) was authorized by Congress through the Child Nutri-
tion Act of 1966, as amended in 1972.81 It is totally federally funded.
Florida's WIC Program began in 1974.82 Thirty-seven local projects,
primarily based in county health departments, provide WIC checks to
eligible pregnant women or nursing mothers and children under age
five.83 These checks are redeemable at specific vendors for the purchase
of certain foods of high nutritional value, including juice, eggs, dairy
products, infant formula and iron fortified cereals.84 Participants also
are offered nutrition education, a mandatory provision of WIC regula-
tions.85 Eligibility is based on both income and medical-nutritional risk.
Local WIC programs are permitted to set income limits between 100-
185 percent of the poverty index.86 Medical or nutritional risk is based
on a health screening. The most common reason low-income children
are eligible for WIC is because of the risk of iron deficiency anemia.
During 1983 approximately 70,000 WIC checks were issued per
month. 87 In Florida the total number served by this program in 1981
was 152,000 women, infants, and children. 88
78. Natl School Lunch Program, 70 C.F.R. § 210.10 (1982).
79. Id.
80. See Cumulative School Lunch, supra note 72.
81. Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children, 7
C.F.R. § 246 (1983).
82. FLA. HRS, HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, FLA. STATE PLAN OF PROGRAM OP-
ERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION FOR FY 1983 Intro. (1983) [hereinafter cited as PLAN
OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION].
83. FLA. HRS, Special Supplemental Food Program For Women, Infants and
Children in HRS MANUAL 3-1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Special Supplemental
Food Program].
84. Id. at 4-31-2.
85. Id. at 3-2.
86. Id. at 3-3.
87. Special Supplemental Food Program, supra note 83, at 3-3.
88. Assoc. OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS REPORTING SYSTEM,
PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES 1981, 102 (Apr. 1983).
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E. Programs for Mothers and Infants
Florida has recognized that maternity care is an effective preven-
tion strategy benefitting the health of infants. The state's Improved
Pregnancy Outcome Program (IPO) offers maternity care for low in-
come women. Emphasis is on-screening to identify those at risk and
initiate proper therapy or referral. Florida's Regional Perinatal Inten-
sive Care Centers Program (RPICC) offers specialized health care to
women with high-risk pregnancies, and to sick or premature newborns.
To be eligible for this program patients must meet medical as well as
financial eligiblity requirements.89
1. Improved Pregnancy Outcome Program
Florida was one of fourteen states awarded federal grant funds in
1977 to improve pregnancy otitcomes.90 In 1982, federal support was
terminated and general state revenues were appropriated for an ex-
panded Improved Pregnancy Outcome Program (IPO). The purpose of
the program is to reduce infant and maternal mortality and morbidity
by providing medical services where access to maternity care is limited
by either the women's ability to pay or the number of physicians avail-
able for such care.9 Eligibility is based on income, and limited to cer-
tain geographical areas.92
2. Regional Perinatal Intensive Care Centers Program
The need for a regionalized medical care program that could im-
pact on Florida's infant mortality was recognized by the legislature in
1974. In that year, general revenue funds were appropriated to estab-
lish five regional centers specializing in the care of low birth weight
and sick infants." In 1977 the program was expanded to include the
89. FLA. HRS, CHILDREN'S MEDICAL SERVICES FY 1981-82 ANN. REP. RE-
GIONAL PERINATAL INTENSIVE CARE CENTERS Intro. (1982) [hereinafter cited as PER-
INATAL REP.].
90. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, HEALTH PROGRAM OF-
FICE, FY 1982-83 ANN. SUMMARY: FLA. IMPROVED PREGNANCY OUTCOME PROGRAM 1
(1983).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Ausbon, Children's Medical Services: Total Health Care, 70 J. FLA. MED.
A. 708 (1983).
370 [Vol. 8
145
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Health and Welfare
provision of obstetrical services and the addition of three new centers.9"
The program currently includes ten Regional Perinatal Intensive Care
Centers and five affiliated step-down centers for infants who no longer
require intensive care.'5 Periodic evaluation of the development of in-
fants who received care in the RPICCs is an important component of
the program. Other* components include transportation of newborns to
the centers, a twenty-four hour toll-free communication and referral
line (CARE) and an on-line computerized data system.s In 1981-82,
the RPICC Program served 4,414 newborns and 2,112 women.97
IV. Conclusion
Infants and children are powerless to exert influence on the politi-
cal decisions of the state and nation in which they live. Rather, they
must depend on the advocacy and initiatives of communities, groups
and individuals. An approach to the needs of children which draws
upon the interest, knowledge and strengths inherent in the professional
and business sectors of Florida can be a vital force in fostering a better
quality of life for each of our children. All of Florida's citizens would
benefit from such an approach. Although children may represent less
than one-third of our population, they surely are one hundred percent
of our future.
94. See ANN. REP., supra note 89, at Intro.
95. See Ausbon, supra note 93.
96. See PEINATAL REP., supra note 89, at 2.
97. Id. at 4.
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The Use of Videotape in Child Abuse Cases
Dennis A. Haas*
Child abuse investigations typically involve a myriad of social and
criminal justice agencies, each on an independent fact-gathering mis-
sion." All too often the child abuse victim is forced to repeatedly re-
count the details of the abuse and as a result, further traumatization is
risked. A collective interview of the child abuse victim would alleviate
some of these concerns. The most possible advantages are likely to be
realized if the collective interview is preserved on videotape. The intent
of this article is to provide basic guidelines and a systematic approach
for the utilization of videotapes in child abuse investigations.
I. The Benefits and Disadvantages of the Videotaped
Interview
The product of a videotaped interview, in appropriate cases, may
be viewed by the alleged perpetrator and his attorney. This may moti-
vate plea negotiation if there is a related criminal case. Likewise, if
there is a pending dependency proceeding, the alleged abuser may be
more likely to stipulate to an adjudication of dependency. 2 The video-
tape of an investigatory interview is probably subject to discovery in
dependency3 and criminal cases.' Moreover, these videotaped inter-
views would fall within the limited confidentiality exemptions of section
415.51, Florida Statutes, allowing disclosure to parents who are alleged
to be the abusers.5 Accordingly, consideration should be given to
* J.D., Nova University Law Center; attorney with Schwartz and Nash, P.A.,
counsel to Child Protection Team of Broward County.
1. For example, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS),
police agencies, guardians ad litem, child protection teams, mental health evaluators,
etc.
2. See, Short, Florence & Marsh, An Assessment of Video Tape in the Criminal
Courts, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 430-37 (1975).
3. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070.
4. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220.
5. FLA. STAT. § 415.51 (1983) providing that all records concerning child abuse
and neglect and all records generated as a result of such reports are confidential and
exempt from the provisions of FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1) (1983) and shall only be dis-
closed as specifically authorized by FLA. STAT. § 415.51 (1983).
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whether videotaping the investigatory interview would increase the
ability of opposing counsel to impeach the child abuse victim in the
resulting dependency or criminal proceeding.
Videotaping collective investigatory interviews of child abuse vic-
tims would enhance the ability of multi-disciplinary child protection
teams 6 to evaluate and formulate recommendations in individual cases.
Child protection teams consist of pediatricians, psychologists, psychia-
trists, lawyers, and case coordinators with nursing and social work
backgrounds, each with child abuse expertise within their respective
fields. The teams act as consultants and make recommendations to the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services7 (HRS) counselors
in child abuse cases, as well as providing various other services. When a
case is referred to a child protection team, it is assigned to a case coor-
dinator who is responsible for obtaining information from all parties
involved, such as law enforcement agencies, the guardian ad litem,
HRS, and the school system. Case staffings are held where members of
the child protection teams and representatives from the agencies in-
volved in the particular case exchange information, verify facts with
one another, and arrive at recommendations as to what course of action
should be taken. The availability of the videotaped investigatory inter-
view for viewing at child protection team staffings would provide par-
ticipants with an enhanced sense of the facts and circumstances
involved.
Guardians ad litem must be appointed in all child abuse cases, to
protect the child abuse victim's interests.8 As a practical matter, guard-
ians ad litem are appointed at various stages of dependency proceed-
ings, and very often must become familiar with the facts involved
within a short period of time. The ability to view the videotaped collec-
tive investigatory interview would greatly facilitate this process. The
same logic applies to attorneys who are often appointed by the court to
represent child abuse victims.
Due to the many agencies involved in the investigation of child
abuse cases it is common for the person assigned to a particular case
6. FLA. STAT. § 415.51(1)(c) (1983) (authorizes HRS to develop and coordinate
one or more multi-disciplinary child protection teams in each of its various districts.
This provision also provides that HRS may convene these teams when necessary to
assist in its diagnostic, assessment, service, and coordination responsibilities).
7. HRS is primarily responsible for conducting social investigations of allegations
of child neglect and abuse. FLA. STAT. § 415.51 (1983).
8. FLA. STAT. § 415.51 (1983) (requiring that a guardian ad litem be appointed
by the court to represent the child in any child abuse or neglect judicial proceeding).
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within a given agency to change. Accordingly, it is not unusual for a
newly assigned case worker or detective to become involved in a case
which is well underway. Moreover, as a child abuse case proceeds, re-
sponsibility may be transferred among the many units of HRS such as
crisis, intake, foster care, protective services, and adoption. As a result
of budget reductions these case workers are typically overloaded and
hard pressed to find time to meticulously review the multitude of
paperwork inherited with a particular case file. The ability to view
videotaped collective interviews of the child abuse victim would signifi-
cantly contribute to a clearer understanding of such newly assigned
cases.
Similarly, the legal management of child abuse cases would be en-
hanced by the ability to view the videotaped collective investigatory in-
terview. In dependency proceedings, attorneys participating in the adju-
dicatory phase of the case are often not the same attorneys providing
representation at review hearings.' Videotaped collective interviews
would assist in providing continuity in legal management of these par-
ticular cases as well as impressing upon the newly assigned attorney the
severity of the abuse originally perpetrated. This should minimize the
scenario which occurs all too often in which the state is successful in a
hotly contested adjudicatory proceeding but loses much of the protec-
tions obtained at a later review hearing. This is partially due to the fact
that the case workers change, the lawyers change, and few of their
replacements fully realize tie severity of the original abuse from the
mounds of papers and records they inherit. Additionally, prosecutors
may view the videotaped collective interview of the child abuse victim
to assist them in determining whether a particular case should be pros-
ecuted, or in determining an appropriate plea to offer an alleged perpe-
trator. This would also assist the state attorney in determining whether
to bring a case to the grand jury.
Child abuse cases typically involve psychiatric or psychological
evaluation and treatment of child abuse victims. Counselors, therapists,
psychologists, psychiatrists and the like should have access to the video-
taped interview of the child abuse victim for purposes of assisting in
9. Legal representation in dependency cases is provided to the state under vari-
ous arrangements depending on the particular district of HRS throughout the state of
Florida. In some districts the state attorney's office provides representation at contested
adjudicatory hearings only, and HRS contracts with its own attorney for representation
at contested review hearings. In some instances, HRS provides its own attorneys in
both phases.
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their evaluations and treatment plans. Training and educational uses of
videotaped collective investigatory interviews would also be beneficial in
teaching techniques for interviewing child abuse victims although use
for this purpose would be limited by confidentiality restrictions.10
II. The Mechanics of the Videotaped Interview
All involved agencies should be consulted and agreement sought as
to the uniform procedures to be used in videotaping collective investiga-
tory interviews of child abuse victims. Additionally, agreement should
be sought so that wherever possible repeated individual interviews of
the child abuse victim will be minimized and participation in a collec-
tive investigatory interview will be encouraged. This typically will occur
after a child has been removed to shelter care. This collective investiga-
tory interview, however, is not intended to eliminate or replace the ini-
tial crisis interview. 11
Physically, the room for such a collective investigatory interview
should be conveniently accessible for all involved and decorated to cre-
ate a comfortable non-threatening atmosphere for young children. Ana-
tomically correct dolls should be available as well as other accepted
interviewing aids. The decor should be that of a child's playroom. Cam-
eras and microphones should not be visible or identifiable by the child.
A one-way mirror should be provided so that the child does not observe
any activity other than that within the video room. Immediately in
front of the one-way mirror outside the video room, a desk or table-like
area should be constructed for comfortable note-taking by observers
and participants. A loudspeaker and microphones should be located
nearby this table area.
A neutral non-threatening person with whom the child is most
likely to feel at ease should be designated to pose questions to the child
directly. This neutral person may be the child's therapist, guardian ad
litem or some similar individual. When possible, questions should be
written in advance and provided to the neutral questioner. As the neu-
tral questioner poses questions, involved parties should have the oppor-
tunity to ask additional and follow-up questions. This is accomplished
by communicating with the neutral questioner through headphones au-
10. FLA. STAT. § 415.51(1)(a) (1983).
11. FLA. STAT. § 415.505(a)(a) (1983) (requiring HRS to commence a child
protective investigation within 24 hours of receipt of a report of child abuse or neglect).
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dible only to the neutral questioner.12 It is recommended that there be
two exit doors to avoid the child seeing the great number of people
participating in the interview.
Special care must be given to the skill of the camera operator, the
quality of the camera, the film itself, and appropriate lighting. Consid-
eration must also be given whether to videotape in color or black and
white, and with one camera or several so as to be able to project all
images at once to the viewer, using a split screen technique. 13 The im-
portant concern, of course, is whether the tape ultimately gives an ac-
curate representation of what actually occurs at the interview.' 4
Sites which should be considered for such a videotape room in-
clude a local sexual assault treatment center, child protection team of-
fices, state attorney's offices, the local courthouse, a court reporter's of-
fice, HRS offices and local law enforcement offices. In order to truly
realize the benefit of videotaping collective investigatory interviews of
child abuse victims, it is imperative that participants have the ability to
view the videotaped product as conveniently as possible. Accordingly,
videotape viewing facilities should be provided by all agencies involved
in child abuse investigations. Moreover, it may be necessary to make
several copies of the videotaped collective interview to maximize its use.
It should be emphasized that videotaped investigatory interviews
will, in all likelihood, not be admissible evidence at the criminal trial of
the perpetrator and probably not at the adjudicatory stage of a depen-
dency proceeding because they would be subject to a hearsay objec-
tion.' The videotape of the collective investigatory interview may, how-
12. In the case of U.S. v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979), the defendant
was excluded from the room while a deposition took place. However, he was able to
observe the proceedings on a monitor and halt the questioning by sounding a buzzer at
which time the deposition would be interrupted and his counsel would leave the room to
confer with the defendant. In that particular case the court held that the scheme was
constitutionally infirm considering the purpose for which the deposition was utilized.
Id.
13. See Dee, Videotape as a Tool in the Florida Legal Process, 5 NOVA L.J
243, 246 (1981) (citing Vermont Chapel, Crockett, Jacoubovitch, & McGuire, Juror
Responses to Pre-recorded Videotape Trial Presentations in California and Ohio, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 975, 984 (1975)).
14. The accepted test today regarding the type of equipment acceptable by the
court is whether the tape gives an accurate representation of what actually occurred.
Paramore v. Florida, 229 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1969).
15. Video tapes of collective or investigatory interviews as suggested in this arti-
cle would be subject to hearsay objection under FLA. STAT. §§ 90.801-02 (1983).
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ever, be used for the purposes discussed in Part I of this article.1 6 When
utilized as such there is no requirement that the alleged perpetrator be
present or even notified that a collective investigatory interview is being
undertaken or videotaped. In this sense the child abuse victim is merely
a witness, albeit with special needs. The collective investigatory inter-
view is akin to taking a statement of a witness under oath. Accordingly,
there are no constitutional barriers at this phase of the process such as
the accused perpetrator's right to confrontation .'
III. Procedural Hurdles in the Use of Videotaped Interviews
The use of videotapes in child abuse cases can be expanded beyond
those discussed in this article. Use of videotape as evidence in the court
room is not new to Florida. However with such expanded use of video-
tape as evidence in these cases comes additional procedural hurdles. In
dependency cases, a discovery deposition of a child abuse victim is per-
mitted and all parties of record in the proceeding must be duly noticed
and permitted to attend.18 If the alleged abuser is a natural parent or
legal guardian of the child abuse victim and therefore a party in inter-
est in the dependency case, the issue arises as to whether the alleged
abuser must have the opportunity to be present and cross-examine the
child abuse victim at a discovery deposition in a dependency case. Al-
though there are no specific Florida cases addressing the right of the
alleged perpetrator-parent or legal guardian to be present at a discov-
ery deposition related to a dependency case, it has been held that the
alleged abuser need not be present at a discovery deposition in a child
abuse criminal case so long as the child will be available for trial.1 9
Defendant's counsel however, should have the opportunity to attend the
deposition and cross-examine the child abuse victim. In any event, duly
noticed discovery depositions in dependency cases are available for use
16. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6. There is no statutory, constitutional
or case law prohibition against the collective investigatory interview being conducted as
suggested herein, assuming it is used for the specific purposes described.
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right. . .to be confronted with witnesses against him. .. ."
18. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(d)(2)(i): "The party taking the deposition shall give
written notice to each other party. The notice shall state the time and place the deposi-
tion is to be taken and the name of each person to be examined." Id.
19. State v. Dolen, 390 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); See FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.220
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at trial for purposes of impeaching the child abuse victim.2"
Additionally, in dependency cases, a discovery deposition may be
utilized in limited circumstances at trial in lieu of live testimony.21 The
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide in pertinent part the
following:
(3) Any deposition taken pursuant hereto may be used at
any hearing covered by these rules by a party for the following
purposes;...
(ii) In dependency proceedings for testimonial evidence
when the deponent, whether or not a party, is unavailable to testify
because: ...
(d) He is unable to attend or testify because of his
age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment.
(e) It has been shown on application and noticp
that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in
the interest of justice, and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court to allow
the deposition to be used.22
The argument can be made that pursuant to Rule 8.070(d)(3)(ii)(d),
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, a child abuse victim is unable to
attend or testify at a dependency proceeding because of his or her age.
Neither the rule nor the committee note specifies whether old age or
youth is intended as the basis for the inability to attend or testify.
Thus, this rule could be intepreted as including a child abuse victim
being unable to testify because of his young age. The court would then
be required to make a specific finding that the child is unable to attend
or testify.
Further, pursuant to Rule 8.070(d)(3)(ii)(e), Florida Rules of Ju-
venile Procedure, it can be argued "exceptional circumstances exist as
to make it desirable in the interest of justice"2 to present the testimony
of a child abuse victim by videotape deposition. The alleged perpetra-
tor, assuming he or she is the parent or natural guardian of the child
abuse victim, would have to be given the opportunity to be present at
20. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(d)(3)(i): "Any deposition taken pursuant hereto may
be used at any hearing covered by these rules by any party for the following purposes:
(1) For the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a wit-
ness .... ." Id.
21. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(d)(3).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id.
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such a deposition face-to-face with the child victim with the opportu-
nity to cross examine, since the child would not be available at trial.2 4
In criminal cases, depositions of child abuse victims for the most part
are treated and entitled to be used as other depositions in criminal
cases. Moreover, the defendant is entitled to be present, face-to-face
with the witness, and to have an opportunity to cross-examine. 25
Recognizing the unique sensitivity of the child abuse victim wit-
ness, the Florida Legislature has attempted to balance the needs of
such children for special protection against the rights of defendants.26
Florida law currently permits the use of videotaped testimony of child
abuse victims in lieu of the child's live testimony in open court in the
prosecution of sexual battery and aggravated child abuse cases.27 The
statute provides that, upon application to the court and reasonable no-
tice to the defendant, the state may apply for an order to videotape, out
of open court, the testimony of certain children who have been the vic-
tims of sexual batteries or aggravated child abuse.28 The court is re-
quired to make certain findings, including that the child is eleven years
of age or younger and that there is a substantial likelihood that the
child will suffer severe emotional or' mental strain if required to testify
24. State v. Dolen, 390 So. 2d at 407.
25. U.S. v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979); FLA. R. CRIM. PR. 3.180;
Simmons v. State, 344 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
26. FLA. STAT. § 918.17 (1983), provides the following:
(1) Upon application to the court and reasonable notice to defendant, the
state may apply for an order to videotape out of open court The testimony
of a child eleven (11) years of age or younger who has been the victim of a
sexual battery under § 794.011, or to videotape the testimony of a child 11
years of age or under, who has been the victim of aggravated child abuse
under § 827.03 or child abuse under § 827.04. The court may grant an
order to videotape testimony as provided here only if it finds that:
(a) The victim of the offense is a child eleven (11) years of age or
younger; and
(b) There is a substantial likelihood that such child will suffer severe
emotional or mental strain if required to testify in open court.
(2) The trial judge shall preside at such proceeding and shall rule on all
questions as if at trial.
(3) The application referred to in Subsection (1) shall be made prior to
trial, and the videotaping of the testimony shall be made only after the
trial has commenced. The videotaped testimony shall be admissible as evi-
dence in the trial of the cause.
Id.
27. FLA. STAT. § 918.17(1) (1983).
28. Id.
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in open court.29 Moreover, the application by the state to videotape the
child's testimony must be made prior to trial, but the actual videotap-
ing of the testimony is not permitted to take place until after the trial
has commenced.30 The trial judge must preside at the videotaping pro-
ceeding and rule on all questions as if at trial.3 ' As a practical matter it
is recommended that a videotape filming room be available in close
proximity to the judge's chambers so as to facilitate full utilization of
this statute.
There is no legal obstacle to videotaping collective investigatory
interviews in child abuse cases and to do so has a great many beneficial
uses. The use of videotaped depositions for discovery purposes and in
lieu of live testimony at trial, however, requires much closer procedural
scrutiny in order to assure that it will pass constitutional muster.
29. FLA. STAT. § 918.17(1)(2)(b) (1983).
30. FLA. STAT. § 918.17(3) (1983).
31. FLA. STAT. § 918.17(2) (1983).
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The Governor's Constituency For Children: Concerned
Adults Unite in Lobbying Efforts
Margaret Kempel*
In the political lexicon of the 1980s, a "constituency" has come to
mean a special interest group coalesced around a single issue. These
single-issue constituencies, or special interest lobbies, range from right
wing to left wing, from neighborhood associations to well-organized po-
litical action committees, from environmental causes to tax-slashing
referenda. Although "special interest" is a phrase now given a pejora-
tive connotation, the political climate of America has made single-is-
sue, special interest groups an efficient means for participation in the
process of government. In an era of decline in party influence and as-
cendancy of media campaigns, a sixty-second message must be concise
and simple. Similarly, the special interest groups' message to politicians
is concise and simple: this is our issue and we measure good govern-
ment by its adherence to our point of view. Whether a candidate cam-
paigns with the help of special interest money or gets media exposure
by railing against special interest money, the special interests have
taken center stage. More to the point, they have been given it.
Business interests, senior citizen voting blocs, minority rights
groups, right-to-life organizations, animal protection and similar socie-
ties exist, after all, because the right to speak out is an American tradi-
tion. Whether we adore or abhor the phenomenon of this caucus or that
caucus influencing our public priorities, single-issue constituencies are
the building blocks of power. As varied as these single-issue constituen-
cies are, they share two common characteristics: first, they are com-
posed of adults, and second, their members know enough to manipulate
the system to, if not respond to their demands, at least acknowledge the
existence of their cause.
Children have no such advantage. Yet children, who constitute a
substantial minority, can neither comprehend nor articulate their own
needs. Most assuredly, no one will say he is against children. However,
the reality is that when budgets have to be cut, children cannot lobby
* In collaboration with the Honorable William E. Gladstone, Judge, Eleventh Ju-
dicial Circuit, Miami, Florida.
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to save the programs that help them and children cannot vote the peo-
ple out of office who cut those programs. Adults must therefore coa-
lesce around the needs of all children and not leave their welfare at the
door of the schoolhouse, the steps of the social service office, or the
threshold of government. Those who are able to speak for the needs of
children must take their message into the corporate boardrooms and
government meeting halls and make it the focus of growth manage-
ment, taxation, and public policy.
Although there are groups in Florida which address the needs of
children on an issue-by-issue basis-education, child abuse, juvenile
justice-a mechanism to unite all the efforts on behalf of children has
been lacking. The recent creation of a Constituency for Children by
Governor Bob Graham and the Florida Legislature signals an end to
earlier fragmented efforts. It is a call for action and involvement by all
segments of the adult population who realize that they are ignoring
their future at their own peril. As Governor Graham stated, "the more
children we can help to grow up physically healthy, intellectually curi-
ous and free from crime, the fewer we will have to arrest, prosecute,
adjudicate and incarcerate."
The Governor's Constituency for Children is a blueprint for creat-
ing new relationships: first, between government and voluntary agencies
and traditional special interest groups, especially business; and second,
between this Constituency and all children. The Constituency for Chil-
dren concept, and its success, hinges on two factors not previously in-
corporated in efforts on behalf of children: the inclusion of concerned
individuals, business and community leaders and the pairing of those
leaders with social work case managers in representative case studies.
Community and business leaders have the proven ability to get things
done. Witness the very successful Dade County Citizens Against
Crime, as an example. Business and government teamed up and fo-
cused on an issue which was plaguing the community. It was the persis-
tence of this leadership structure that brought resources old and new to
bear on resolving the problem. An equally representative Constituency
for Children can expect similar efficacy on behalf of children. When
the Constituency in turn selects one or more representative cases and
resolves life problems for one child a pattern for assisting thousands
will be at hand. And when the Constituency sees, by its active involve-
ment, that current resources are stretched as far as they can go or
there is a gap in the system it will know how to effect changes. In
addition to assuring that adequate resources are available to serve chil-
dren and families in need, one of the Constituency's primary functions
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will be to improve the coordination of public programs already in place.
To put it bluntly, adults need to utilize the clout of the leadership
structure to keep the cause of children in the forefront of policy
decisions.
The Constituency, then, is a coalition of any and all adults and
children starting with school superintendents, Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) leaders, civic organizations, busi-
ness groups, professional and religious organizations, court systems and
social service representatives, all joined by their interest in children.
Only the power structure can provide opportunity to a child who re-
quires psychological treatment, job training, a job, basic necessities,
counseling, and self-esteem. The Constituency will improve and perpet-
uate the quality of life in Florida communities by focusing energies on
a single issue: our children.
If, as has been observed, all politics are local, then by extension all
worthwhile political efforts are similarly local. The Constituency is es-
sentially a local mandate. It needs to be organized with the strength of
the grass roots and the clout of leadership at the community level, with
problems to be resolved at that level whenever possible. Local constitu-
encies will need to organize and fund themselves, but will have the
technical assistance of the state level Constituency whenever necessary.
As Governor Graham has stated, "[t]he Constituency for Children will
organize county by county. It will solve local needs at a local level
whenever possible. It will point out shortfalls that require state action
when local efforts are not enough."
The Florida Legislature authorized the creation of the Governor's
Constituency for Children at the close of the 1983 session. As a matter
of design and necessity, the only expenditure of state funds will be for
the executive director and essential staff at the state level. The state
council of the constituency will be structured with permanent and ro-
tating members. The Governor is the chairman, and will appoint some-
one outside of government to be the vice chairman. The permanent
members of the state council, all heads of the departments whose pro-
grams and agencies affect children, are Education Commissioner Ralph
Turlington, Attorney General Jim Smith, HRS Secretary David Pin-
gree, Labor Secretary Wally Orr, Community Affairs Secretary John
DeGrove and Administration Secretary Nevin Smith, in whose depart-
ment the program is housed. The remaining sixteen members of the
state council will be either elected by local councils or appointed by the
governor. In the formative stages of this program the governor has ap-
pointed an organizational committee, the members of which are: Judge
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Theodore Bruno, Escambia County; Harold Henderson, Gadsden
County; Helene Coleman, Duval County; Dr. Gerald Schiebler,
Alachua County; Jack Eckerd, Pinellas County; Robin Gibson, Polk
County; Joan Nabors, Brevard County; Judge Hugh Glickstein, Brow-
ard County; Berta Bleck, Dade County; Judge William E. Gladstone,
Dade County; Ellen Hoffenberg, Leon County; Margaret Kempel,
Dade County; and Coleen Bevis, Hillsborough County. The executive
director of the governor's Constituency for Children is Samuel
"Buddy" Streit, who assumed his duties in the Department of Adminis-
tration on November 10, 1983.
The Constituency for Children is you. It is everyone who has pre-
pared an article for this special edition of the Nova Law Journal, ev-
eryone who is taking the time to read this special edition, Judge Hugh
Glickstein and the members of the Florida Bar Board of Governors'
Special Committee for the Needs of Children, all task force members,
committee members, in short, all knowledgeable and concerned people.
Many details must evolve as the program grows and develops. The le-
gal community can be very helpful by assisting local communities in
setting up the non-profit mechanisms for making the constituency work
in all areas of the state. The task involves a serious commitment of
time and energy.
While Florida may be the third largest state in the union by the
turn of the century, it risks not being the third in quality of life or
abundant opportunity unless its best resource, its children, are the fo-
cus of planning efforts. The two major state agencies which most di-
rectly address the needs of children, the Department of Education and
HRS, face the constant threat of reduced funding. Efforts to maintain
and improve services in some instances, have amounted to little more
than running in place. Your involvement in the Constituency for Chil-
dren is of vital and immediate importance because the 1984 Florida
legislative session will be a critical one for the children of Florida. The
speaker-designate, Representative James Harold Thompson, is the
chairman of the Select Committee on Family and Youth which is com-
posed of the chairs of all the substantive committees dealing with these
issues in the Florida House of Representatives. The select committee
was designated during the 1983 session, but did not have the time or
the resources to accomplish its goals. In this session the committee will
have a staff director and it is hoped that the work of this committee
will have significant impact on other programs and agencies. The Con-
stituency for Children should play a pivotal role in facilitating the work
of this committee and helping to ensure that its goals of meeting the
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needs of Florida children are met. As Governor Bob Graham has de-
clared, "[t]he Constituency for Children is. . .a noble experiment to
knit together the strands of state and local policy affecting a vital part
of Florida's future--our children."**
** During the 1983 legislative session a very detailed concept paper for the Con-
stituency was prepared. A copy of this, and any other information, is available from
Mr. Streit at 904-488-4116. His mailing address is Governor's Constituency for Chil-
dren, Department of Administration, 435 Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida
32301. If this article and the others in this'issue have convinced you of the many needs
of children in this state, please contact Mr. Streit as soon as possible so that the Con-
stituency in your community may share your expertise, talents, and special interest.
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I. Introduction
Even with the onset of the health-conscious '80s, approximately
thirty-eight percent of adult males and thirty percent of adult females
actively smoke tobacco products." Although these figures are down
from their 1965 counterparts of fifty-two and thirty-four percent,2 ac-
tive smokers make up a substantial minority of the population. More
than thirty million Americans have quit smoking,$ and millions more
are trying. The major catalyst for this decline was the 1964 Surgeon
General's report which revealed the dangers of tobacco smoking to the
public for the first time. This information eventually led the federal
government to require warning labels on cigarette packs and abolish
cigarette television commercials.5 Unfortunate discoveries about to-
bacco smoke continued, with the possibility of harm to nonsmokers first
suggested in the 1972 Surgeon General's Report.6 The 1979 Surgeon
General's report 7 and many scientific and medical studies confirmed
that suspicion.8
As a result of these findings, nonsmokers, previously willing to en-
dure the annoyance caused them by the smell and irritation of tobacco
smoke, realized that they were smoking tobacco products involuntarily,
simply by being exposed to tobacco smoke.' A proliferation of legal
1. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE 367 (1st
ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 REPORT].
2. Id.
3. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH vii (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT].
4. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH (1964). "On the basis of prolonged study and evalu-
ation of many lines of converging evidence, the Committee makes the following judg-
ment: Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United
States to warrant appropriate remedial action." Id. at 33
5. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, THE SMOKING DIGEST 34 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SMOKING DIGEST].
6. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 121-31 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as 1972 REPORT].
7. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-5-35.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 11-70.
9. Actually the terms nonsmoker and smoker are inaccurate since everyone in-
hales tobacco smoke and is, therefore a smoker. Involuntary smoker and voluntary
smoker are more accurate terms. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-5. To avoid
confusion this note refers to the involuntary smoker as the nonsmoker.
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actions began when nonsmokers learned of the many harmful effects of
secondary smoke they are forced to inhale.10 Nonsmokers' efforts to
obtain relief through the courts and their legislatures have met with
inconsistent results.
This note discusses the major issues of nonsmokers' rights, as de-
veloped through the courts and legislatures, and explores the possible
emerging issue of the relationship between parental smoking and the
negligent treatment of children. As a primary objective, this note fo-
cuses upon the current rights of nonsmokers in Florida and advocates
the enactment of a Florida Clean Indoor Air Act.
II. The Underlying Premise: Injury to the Nonsmoker
Regardless of which legal forum the nonsmoker elects to seek re-
lief, essential to his argument is the premise that unavoidable contact
with secondary tobacco smoke is harmful to his health, significantly
enough to warrant government intervention. Perhaps because smoking
is still a legitimate social activity and perhaps because the tobacco in-
dustry's power and influence through advertising keeps it legitimate,
the general public remains very much unaware of the extent to which
tobacco smoke is believed harmful to the nonsmoker. Although an in-
depth study of the medical and scientific evidence is better suited for a
medical journal, a basic understanding of the nonsmoker's underlying
premise is so crucial to his argument that a brief overview of the evi-
dence is necessary.
A. Tobacco Smoke Pollution
The United States Surgeon General's 1975 report asserts that to-
bacco smoke is a major cause of indoor air pollution.11 In fact, indoor
smoke pollution is potentially more harmful than outdoor pollution,
even on air-pollution emergency days.12 Scientists have discovered over
4,000 substances in tobacco smoke.13 Many of these substances are
very toxic. "Upwards of 90% of cigarette smoke is composed largely of
a dozen gases that are hazardous to health, and the remainder is par-
10. See SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 77-91.
11. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 108 (1975).
12. See SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 26, and Repace & Lowrey, Indoor
Air Pollution, Tobacco Smoke, and Public Health, 208 SCIENCE 464 (1980).
13. 1983 REPORT, supra note 1, at 209, 232.
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ticulate matter. ... "4 Some of the hazardous chemicals in tobacco
smoke include "tar, nicotine, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, am-
monia, benzene, formaldehyde, and hydrogen sulphide." 15 Hydrogen
cyanide, polonium, hydrocyanic acid, and aldehydes are other toxic
substances found in tobacco smoke.16
Tobacco smoke permeates the air from two sources: sidestream
smoke and mainstream smoke.17 Sidestream smoke invades the air di-
rectly from the burning end of the tobacco product. Mainstream smoke
is first inhaled by the smoker, then enters the atmosphere when ex-
haled. Today's common knowledge that mainstream cigarette smoking
is harmful is no great wonder. Yet "[e]ighty to ninety percent of the
volatile and particulate agents and 50% of the carbon monoxide are
filtered out of inhaled smoke before reaching the smoker's lungs. Thus,
the sidestream smoke has twice the toxic material, or more, than the
inhaled or mainstream smoke."""
Most of the tobacco smoke pollution comes from sidestream
smoke. "Even when a smoker inhales into the lung, two-thirds of the
smoke from the burning cigarette goes directly into the environment.
The ratio of pollution from cigar and pipe smoke is even
greater. ... 9 Usually a smoker inhales each cigarette "8-9
times. . . .for a total of 24 seconds, but the cigarette burns for 12 min-
utes and pollutes the air continuously .... -20 Both smokers and non-
smokers inhale this unfiltered smoke. "Inhalation of atmospheric pollu-
tants from the smoke of tobacco products is referred to as passive
(involuntary, secondhand) smoking." 211
14. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 17.
15 Epstein, The Effects of Tobacco Smoke Pollution on the Eyes of the Allergic
Non-Smoker, 2 SMOKING AND HEALTH, 337, 338 (1975).
16. Tate, The Effects of Tobacco Smoke on the Non-Smoking Cardio-Pulmo-
nary Public, 2 SMOKING AND HEALTH 329, 332 (1975).
17. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-5.
18. Tate, supra note 16, at 332. See 1983 REPORT, supra note 1, at 211, for a
chart comparing toxic levels of sidestream and mainstream smoke.
Arguably the major cause of harm to the smoker is sidestream smoke. Studies
conclude that smoking is harmful, but the apportionment of that harm between main-
stream smoke and sidestream smoke is not known. Perhaps if smokers could inhale only
the filtered mainstream smoke, the harm would not be as great. Smokers, however, are
unavoidably exposed to high concentrations of sidestream smoke from the burning ends
of cigarettes.
19. Epstein, supra note 15, at 338.
20. Id.
21. Lefcoe, Ashley, Pederson & Keays, The Health Risks of Passive Smoking:
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B. Known and Suspected Risks of Passive Smoking
Cancer is widely believed to be the primary risk of tobacco smoke.
Probably nothing is further from the truth. Although cancer is a
known, serious risk of tobacco smoke, a multitude of other harms exist
which are more common, and some are just as deadly. Research is un-
folding the sad news that these harms are adversely affecting the non-
smoker as well as the smoker. Considering the physical nature of to-
bacco smoke described, one should not be surprised. In heavily smoke-
filled rooms "in a relatively short time a non-smoker can inhale the
equivalent of 5-6 cigarettes. 22
1. Carbon Monoxide Poisoning
One known risk to the nonsmoker from passive smoking is his ex-
posure to higher levels of carbon monoxide. Carbon monoxide averages
"5 volumes percent in mainstream and 10 to 15 volumes percent by
weight in side-stream smoke.' 23 "Safe limits for levels in working areas
have been set at 8.7 ppm [parts per million] for 8 hours, or 35 ppm for
1 hour. .. - Yet the "concentration in inhaled tobacco smoke is 400
ppm."'25 Enclosed areas with heavy smoke concentrations often reach
levels of 50 ppm to 100 ppm.26 A nonsmoker who works five eight-hour
days in a room with smokers cannot avoid inhaling a great amount of
tobacco smoke, and thus high levels of carbon monoxide. Inhaling car-
bon monoxide raises the level of venous-blood carboxyhemoglobin
(COHb) in the blood.27 The normal level of COHb in nonsmokers is
The Growing Case for Control Measures in Enclosed Environments, 84 CHEST 90
(July 1, 1983).
22. Tate, supra note 16, at 332.
23. Lefcoe, supra note 21, at 90.
Carbon monoxide is a common industrial pollutant generated by
any burning process. It is odorless and tasteless and gives no warn-
ing of its presence in most circumstances, thus allowing for chronic
exposure over extended periods of time. The early symptoms of car-
bon monoxide poisoning often resemble those of a variety of dis-
eases; thus tissue hypoxia might occur in healthy persons without
forewarning. ...
1983 REPORT, supra note 1, at 244 (footnote ommitted).
24. Tate, supra note 16, at 331.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-15-24; SMOKING DIGEST, supra note
5, at 17. "Atherosclerosis is a multifactorial disorder in which cigarette smoking and
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between .5% and 2.0%.28 Smokers' normal levels range between 2.0%
and 15% depending on the average number of cigarettes smoked.29
These levels change when passive smoking begins. One study
placed nine smokers and twelve nonsmokers in a room. The subjects
remained in the room for about one hour, and during that time the
ambient carbon monoxide concentration from the smokers' tobacco
smoke reached 38 ppm.30 "The mean COHb of the twelve non-smokers
increased from 1.6% to 2.6%, while the six cigarette smokers . . . in-
crease[d] from a mean of 5.9% to 9.6 %."1
The effect of even low levels of COHb can be very hazardous to
one's health.32 Because of the lack of oxygen that results from higher
levels of COHb, everyone may be more susceptible to cardiovascular
disease. This threat is even greater for individuals with a pre-existing
cardiovascular problem.33 One study of ten angina patients exposed to
the sidestream smoke of only fifteen cigarettes over two hours in a well-
ventilated room still showed an increase in "resting heart rate, systolic
and diastolic blood pressure, and venous carboxyhemoglobin and de-
creased their heart rate and systolic blood pressure at angina."" "The
duration of exercise until angina was decreased 22 percent. . . ."35 Of
course, even larger increases and decreases occurred in an unventilated
room with a 38% decrease in the exercise duration.3 6 The study con-
cluded that "[p]assive smoking aggravates angina pectoris. ' 3
Tobacco smoke may be a direct cause of many auto accidents.38
Evidence shows that reaction time and other sensory abilities necessary
carboxyhemoglobin levels may exert varying effects, depending upon the other risk fac-
tors present. Carbon monoxide is believed to be a contributing factor to the accelera-
tion of the disease process." 1983 REPORT, supra note 1, at 225.
28. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 17.
29. Id.
30. Russell, Cole & Brown, Absorption by Non-Smokers of Carbon Monoxide
from Room Air Polluted by Tobacco Smoke, 1 THE LANCET 576 (1973).
31. Id.
32. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-29; 1983 REPORT supra note 1, at
221-26.
33. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-29.
34. Aronow, Effect of Passive Smoking on Angina Pectoris, 299 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 21 (1978).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-28-29; Tate, supra note 16, at 331.
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for driving are impaired when COHb levels reach 2.0% to 3.0%.39 Con-
sidering the carbon monoxide levels several smokers in a car can create,
one may reasonably hypothesize that even a nonsmoking driver's
COHb level may reach well above 2.0%.
In addition, doctors at the University of South Florida College of
Medicine observed acute Raynaud's phenomenon 40 in both the former
and current nonsmoking wives of a heavy smoker.4 1 The first wife's
symptoms disappeared after divorce; the second wife's symptoms sub-
sided after the husband began smoking in a separate room. 2
2. Respiratory Disease
Many of the toxic substances permeating the air in tobacco smoke
are known to be damaging to the lungs. Hydrogen cyanide, for exam-
ple, is a poison which destroys cells of the lining of the respiratory sys-
tems.43 It is believed that exposure to only 10 ppm of hydrogen cyanide
over a long period causes this damage, and tobacco smoke may contain
as much as 1600 ppm.44 Nitrogen dioxide (250 ppm in tobacco smoke)
is linked to emphysema.' 5 Cadmium, another toxic substance found in
tobacco smoke, possibly "damages the air sacs in the lungs and causes
emphysema. Once cadmium gets into the lungs it remains there. ' 46
A study correlated a relationship between damage to the small air-
ways in the lungs and passive smoking of nonsmokers .' The research-
ers examined 2,100 subjects and found that "nonsmokers chronically
exposed to tobbacco smoke had a lower forced mid-expiratory flow
rate. . .than nonsmokers not exposed. . .. -4' The study "conclude[s]
39. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-28; 1972 REPORT, supra note 6 at 127;
Russell, supra note 30, at 579.
40. "Raynaud's phenomenon is described as intermittent attacks of pallor and
cyanosis of the hand and fingers due to spasmodically diminished blood flow and even-
tually reddening during the recovery stage." GRAY, 3b ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF
MEDICINE (MB) 1 100.70 (1983).
41. Boganegra & Espinoza, Raynaud's Phenomenon In Passive Smokers, 303
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1419 (1980) (letter to editor).
42. Id.
43. Tate, supra note 16, at 332; SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 18.
44. Tate, supra note 16, at 332.
45. Id.
46. Epstein, supra note 15, at 338.
47. White & Froeb, Small-Airways Dysfunction in Nonsmokers Chronically
Exposed to Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 720 (1980).
48. Id.
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that chronic exposure to tobacco smoke in the work environment is del-
eterious to the nonsmoker and significantly reduces small-airways
function. 49
3. Cancer
Studies of nonsmoking women, some married to smokers and
others married to nonsmokers, suggest a real risk of cancer from pas-
sive smoking.50 One prospective fourteen-year study found that non-
smoking wives of husbands who smoked less than one pack a day had
one and one half times the risk of lung cancer than nonsmoking wives
of nonsmoking husbands.51 When the husbands smoked more than one
pack per day, the risk was twice as great.52 A subsequent similar study
"[e]stimates. . .the relative risk. . . associated with having a husband
who smokes were 2.4 for a smoker of less than one pack and 3.4
for. . .husbands smok[ing] more than one pack of cigarettes per
day."53
4. General Illness
In addition to the effects mentioned, evidence suggests tobacco
smoke exposure "significantly lower[s] the level of antibody production
to influenza virus A2 . . ."," suppresses the lymphocytes function in
the immune process, 55 and "affects the body's ability to utilize Vitamin
C."' 56 The obvious result is an increased risk of common illness. Indeed,
a 1965 study "estimate[s]. . .that smoking-related illness or disease
each year costs the United States 77 million workdays lost, 88 million
days spent ill in bed, and 306 million days of restricted activity. '5 An-
other estimate suggests "that more than 10% of all hospital and medi-
49. Id.
50. See Lefcoe, supra note 21, at 92; Repace, The Problem of Passive Smoking 2
(1981) (unpublished paper presented at the Symposium on Health Aspects of Indoor
Air Pollution, The New York Academy of Medicine, May 28-29, 1981).
51. Repace, supra note 50, at 23 (citing Hirayame, Nonsmoking Wives of Heavy
Smokers Have a Higher Risk of Lung Cancer: A Study from Japan, 282 BRITISH
MED. J. 183 (1981)).
52. Repace, supra note 50, at 2.
53. Trichopoulos, Lung Cancer and Passive Smoking, 27 INT. J. CANCER 1
(1981).
54. See Tate, supra note 16, at 333.
55. Id.
56. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 22.
57. Id. at 23.
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cal expenses in the United States are tobacco-related. This raises the
overall cost of health insurance and taxpayer-supported health pro-
grams." 8 Logic suggests that long-term passive smoking at home or at
work not only reduces a nonsmoker's ability to stay healthy, but also
costs him money.
5. Allergies
Tobacco smoke is extremely aggravating to those who suffer from
allergies, and many of these people may not be aware that tobacco
smoke is the source of their aggravation.5 9 "The American Medical As-
sociation estimates that at least 34 million Americans are sensitive in
one way or another to cigarette smoke."60 For these people, passive
smoking "can precipitate acute attacks of asthma requiring an
emergency fisit to a physician's office or hospital emergency
room .. ."I" "Tobacco smoke from any source is like salt rubbed into
a raw sore." 62 Certainly thirty-four million Americans is a large
enough minority to receive protection.
6. Special Hazards to Children
Although an adult has a choice whether to live in a home fraught
with tobacco smoke, the fetus, infant and minor child do not. Children
respirate more than adults, and therefore, inhale more secondary
smoke.63 Young children of smoking parents also probably spend more
time in smoke-filled environments than nonsmoking adults who have a
choice. "It has already been conclusively proven that in homes where
smoking occurs, children are seriously affected. '6 4
Some of the research concludes as follows: Children who grow up
in households with at least one heavy smoker have 46% more restricted
days and 43% more bedridden days than children who grow up in
smoke-free homes.6 5 "Babies born to women who smoke during preg-
nancy are, on the average, 200 grams lighter than babies born to com-
58. Id.
59. See Tate, supra note 16, at 329-30.
60. Epstein, supra note 15, at 337.
61. Tate, supra note 16, at 329.
62. Id. at 330.
63. 1979 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-31.
64. Tate, supra note 16, at 334.
65. Repace, supra note 50, at 4 (citing Bonham & Wilson, Children's Health in
Families with Cigarette Smokers, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 290 (1981)).
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parable women who do not smoke."66 "The infants of mothers who
smoke [have]. . .significantly more [hospital] admissions for bronchitis
or pneumonia .... *"67 Mothers who smoke have a higher "risk of hav-
ing stillborn children. . ., and their infants have higher neonatal death
rates."6 8 Research suggests that fetuses and children who do survive
are damaged by the lower levels of Vitamin C. 9
Even more distressing is the evidence that passive smoking by chil-
dren has long-term, permanent effects.70 For example, smokers' chil-
dren show "measurable deficiencies in physical growth, intellectual and
emotional development, and behavior. '7 1 "Children whose mothers
smoked 10 or more cigarettes a day during pregnancy were on the av-
erage 1.0 centimeter shorter [ages 7 and 11 years] and 3 to 5 months
retarded in reading, mathematics, and general ability as compared with
the offspring of nonsmokers. 7 2
More studies of the ill effects of passive smoking on children exist.
Typical is the latest suggestion "that passive exposure to maternal ciga-
rette smoke may have important effects on the development of pulmo-
nary function in children. 73 The study states:
The data. . ., which suggest that after five years, the lungs of non-
smoking children with mothers who smoke grow at only 93 per cent
of the rate of growth in nonsmoking children with mothers who do
not smoke, are certainly plausible in terms of the magnitude of the
effect that one might predict for an environmental pollutant such
as cigarette smoke. The size of the effect is consistent with that
hypothesized to be sufficient as an underlying risk predictor for ob-
structive airways disease in adult life. 4
66. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
vicES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING FOR WOMEN 191 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1980 REPORT].
67. Harlap & Davies, Infant Admissions to Hospital and Maternal Smoking, I
THE LANCET 529 (1974).
68. Smoking Digest, supra note 5, at 26; See also 1980 REPORT, supra note 66,
at 191.
69. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 5, at 26.
70. 1980 REPORT, supra note 65, at 196-225.
71. Id. at 196.
72. Id. at 199.
73. Tager, Weiss, Munoz, Rosner & Speizer, Longitudinal Study of the Effects
of Maternal Smoking on Pulmonary Function in Children,, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED.
699 (1983).
74. Id. at 702.
[Vol. 8
170
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss2/13
Nonsmokers' Rights
Recent evidence reveals that significant levels of thiocyanate
(SCN), a biproduct of tobacco smoke, appear in the fetuses of non-
smoking mothers who are exposed to passive smoking.75 A logical con-
clusion is that even mothers who have quit smoking or have never
smoked subject their unborn to these harms if they live or work in
smoke-filled environments.
Most studies demonstrate that although the risks of harm from
tobacco smoke are still greater to the smoker, risks to the nonsmoker
are real and significant. As concluded in a recent cardiopulmonary
journal, "[tihere is still much research to be done into the health ef-
fects of passive moking; however, the need for such research should
not be used as an excuse of inaction. ' 7 At the very least, the present
scientific evidence supports an overwhelming likelihood that passive
smoking causes a substantial and irreparable harm to nonsmokers. This
familiar legal standard of harm7 7 has created legal conflicts between
smokers and nonsmokers.
III. Nonsmokers' Attempts to Gain Judicial Relief
A. Federal Courts Decline to Recognize Fundamental Right
Despite the medical evidence, nonsmokers have been unsuccessful
in establishing rights based on the United States Constitution. For ex-
ample, the nonsmoking plaintiffs in Gaspar v. Lousisiana Stadium and
Exposition District8 sought a smoking ban in the Louisiana
Superdome. Plaintiffs asserted that secondary tobacco smoke causes
physical harm and discomfort; interferes with the enjoyment of events;
and, therefore, violates the rights guaranteed under the first, fifth,
ninth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution.7 9 Essentially,
Gaspar nonsmokers attempted to shade themselves under the penum-
75. Bottoms, Kuhnert, Kuhnert & Reese, Maternal Passive Smoking and Fetal
Serum Thiocyanate Levels, 144 Am. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 787 (1982).
76. Lefcoe, supra note 21, at 94.
77. Nonsmokers usually seek an injunction as a remedy to prevent the use of
tobacco products. To receive an injunction in Florida, as in most jurisdictions, one must
demonstrate a reasonable probability of irreparable harm. Davis v. Wilson, 139 Fla.
698 700, 190 So. 716, 719 (1939); Paul's Drugs Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
175 So. 2d 203, 206 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
78. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
79. Id. at 717.
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bral privacy rights first surfacing in Griswold v. State of Connecticut.80
Declining to extend that right to the tobacco smoking controversy, the
district court stated: "To hold that the First, Fifth, Ninth or Four-
teenth Amendments recognize as fundamental the right to be free from
cigaret smoke would be to mock the lofty purposes of such amendments
and broaden their penumbral protections to unheard-of boundaries. "81
A group of nonsmoking federal employees attempting to have
smoking in federal buildings restricted to designated areas met with
rejection of their constitutional argument in Federal Employees for
Nonsmokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States."2 FENSR plaintiffs
alleged two constitutional violations: 1) by failing to provide a safe,
smoke-free environment the government has impaired plaintiffs' first
amendment right to petition and receive redress for their grievances,83
and 2) through the same failure, the government has "discriminated
against them and denied them their life, liberty and property without
due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment." 4 Relying on
and quoting extensively from Gaspar, the FENSR district court
granted the government's motion to dismiss the constitutional claims.85
In part, the FENSR and Gaspar courts based their conclusions on pre-
vious decisions holding that no claim to any clean environment is con-
stitutionally grounded.86
Unfortunately, both opinions express some of the common miscon-
ceptions clouding the issue. For example, Gaspar relies on and FENSR
repeats the hackneyed comparison between alcohol and cigarettes sug-
gesting that the allowance of smoking is no different than the allow-
ance of drinking beer, and, therefore, no more a violation of constitu-
tional rights."' However, the comparison of an individual's right to
drink alcohol in public and his right to smoke tobacco does not address
80. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Justice Douglas' analysis of penumbral rights in
Griswold opened the door for the fundamental right to privacy litigation. See Gaspar,
418 F. Supp. at 721.
81. Gaspar, 418 F. Supp. at 721.
82. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), a.f'd, 598 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
83. Id. at 183-84.
84. Id. at 184.
85. Id. at 184-85.
86. Id. at 184 (relying on Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971));
Gaspar, 418 F. Supp. at 720 (relying on Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp.
532, 536-37 (S.D. Tex. 1972)).
87. Gaspar, 418 F. Supp. at 718; FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 184.
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the essential complaint of nonsmokers. The distinction is simple and
basic. When an individual exercises his right to drink alcohol, any ill
effects directly caused by the dangers of alcohol are hazardous only to
that individual. The risks that individual takes are self-contained. The
same is not true with tobacco. When an individual exercises the deci-
sion to smoke tobacco he inescapably subjects other individuals who
breathe the air in his vicinity to the hazards of tobacco smoke. His
choice to injure himself entails a concomitant injury to others. The is-
sue is not whether an individual has the right to subject himself to the
known hazard; the issue is whether in the process of doing so he has the
right to subject others to the same known hazard. An individual may
legally drink alcohol only to the degree he does not harm others. To
apply the analogue of this principle is the goal of nonsmokers. Any
comparison of smoking to other social activities which do not contain
this necessary similarity is misleading. 8
Whether Gaspar and FENSR have closed the door on non-
smokers' chances of prevailing on a constitutional basis is not certain.
Any future recognition of a constitutional right to be free from ciga-
rette smoke will depend on more than relevant comparisons. Non-
smokers must surmount the initial problem of establishing smoking as a
form of "state action" since constitutional protections against a private
interference do not exist.89 Perhaps the taxing of tobacco products
makes public smoking an act authorized by the government.90 Assum-
88. UCLA Associate Dean, economist and Tobacco Institute consultant, Lewis
Solmon, was recently quoted as saying: .'It scares me if a president of a company
implements a [no smoking] policy that takes away your individual rights
[;]... [w]hat's next, limiting the consumption of red meat in the company cafeteria?"'
Brophy, A Burning Issue: Smokers Say It's Their Right as More Employers Snuff It
Out, USA Today, Jan. 13, 1984, at 3B, col. 3. This typical, misleading statement fails
to recognize that no matter how close one sits to an individual who chooses to eat red
meat, any potential hazard from its consumption will not harm the bystander who
chooses not to eat red meat.
89. See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-22
(1961) (fourteenth amendment inhibits only state actions, not individual actions). Gas-
par raised the issue of state action but declined to address it since the court found that
there would be no constitutional violation in any event. 418 F. Supp. at 717, 722. In
FENSR, state action was not an issue.
90. See Sapolsky, The Political Obstacles to the Control of Cigarette Smoking
in the United States, 5 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND LAw 277 (1980). The federal
government receives over two billion dollars a year in excise taxes alone from cigarette
sales. Id. at 285. In Burton, a private restaurant operator's practice of racial discrimi-
nation was found to be state action because public funds supported the building and
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ing state action was judicially acknowledged, nonsmokers would then
have to convince the courts to re-evaluate present-day scientific and
medical evidence and find the harm great enough to warrant placing
nonsmokers' interests within the penumbral protections of the Constitu-
tion. Although Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,91
demonstrates the Supreme Court's willingness to adapt prior decisions
to fit "present medical knowledge,"9 2 the Court has been unwilling to
extend the penumbral fundamental rights concept beyond the areas of
family relationships and abortions. Smoking falls into neither category;
consequently, it is unlikely that recognition of a constitutional right to
be free of involuntary smoking will be forthcoming.
B. Footholds Gained in State Court Actions
1. Common-law Theories Lead to Success for Workers
Although no constitutional right to a smoke-free environment pres-
ently exists, some nonsmokers have achieved a smoke-free workplace
through the common law applied in their state courts. The syllogism is
simple: All employers have a common-law duty to provide employees
with a safe place to work. Tobacco smoke in the workplace creates an
unsafe condition. Therefore, an employer must provide employees with
a smoke-free workplace.
Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.93 is the landmark case
which established this syllogism. Through standard grievance proce-
dures, Donna Shimp, a secretary for the telephone company, had com-
plained of tobacco smoke in her work area. In response, her employer
grounds he leased. 365 U.S. 715. A number of years later, however, the Supreme Court
held that a state's granting of a liquor license to a private club was insufficient to make
that club's discrimination practices a state action. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972). Subsequent decisions signal a retreat from the liberal interpretation of state
action in Burton, suggesting that failure to enact and enforce smoking regulations in
private facilities would not be found to be state action giving nonsmokers a remedy
under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (private school's fiscal dependence on government insufficient to make discharge
of teachers a state action).
91. - U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). Because of new and safer procedures,
Akron expanded a woman's right to receive an abortion at an outpatient facility during
the second trimester even though the state's interest in the fetus at that time is "com-
pelling." Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
92. Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 2496.
93. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
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installed an exhaust fan, but for various reasons the remedy failed."'
Unhappy and ill from involuntarily breathing her co-workers' second-
ary smoke, Ms. Shimp brought suit against the telephone company.
She alleged that the company's permitting employees to smoke at their
workstations created an unsafe condition, "deleterious to her health,"95
and that the company, therefore, breached its common-law duty to pro-
vide her a safe place to work.96
After recognizing an employer's "affirmative duty to provide a
work area that is free from unsafe conditions," 97 the Shimp court took
"judicial notice of the toxic nature of cigarette smoke and its well-
known association with emphysema, lung cancer and heart disease.""
Relying on the various Surgeon General's reports, and the affidavits of
various experts,"9 the court further stated that "mere presence of ciga-
rette smoke in the air pollutes it, changing carbon monoxide levels and
effectively making involuntary smokers of all who breathe the air."100
"[It] also. . .adds tar, nicotine and the oxides of nitrogen to the availa-
ble air supply." ' The court concluded:
The evidence is clear and overwhelming. Cigarette smoke contami-
nates and pollutes the air, creating a health hazard not merely to
the smoker but to all those around her who must rely upon the
same air supply. The right of an individual to risk his or her own
health does not include the right to jeopardize the health of those
who must remain around him or her in order to properly perform
the duties of their jobs.102
The first progeny of the Shimp decision is a Missouri case, Smith
v. Western Electric Co."'3 At the time of suit, Paul Smith had been
employed by Western Electric for more than thirty years. Since 1975,
however, Mr. Smith had suffered severe physical reactions when ex-
posed to secondary tobacco smoke. After various complaints and sev-
eral unsuccessful attempts to alleviate the conditions, Smith's employer
94. Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
95. Id. at 520, 368 A.2d at 410.
96. Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 527, 368 A.2d at 414.
99. Id. at 528, 368 A.2d at 414.
100. Id. at 527, 368 A.2d at 414.
101. Id. at 528, 368 A.2d at 414.
102. Id. at 530-31, 368 A.2d at 415.
103. 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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instructed him not to submit any more complaints, for none would be
processed.104 Rather than prohibiting smoking in the work area, West-
ern Electric responded by offering Smith the alternative of wearing a
respirator or transferring to the computer room at a $500 per month
pay cut.10 5 Unimpressed with the alternatives, Smith filed suit to enjoin
Western Electric from breaking its common-law "duty to provide a
safe place in which to work." 10 6 The trial court granted Western Elec-
tric's motion to dismiss for failure "to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted."'1 07
After recognizing Missouri's acceptance of the employer's duty
and reciting the Shimp syllogism,108 the court of appeals focused on
whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy for breach of that
duty. 109 The standard for determining the appropriateness of injunctive
relief is whether "irreparable harm is otherwise likely to result. . .and
[the] plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law."1 10 The Smith court
held that one may reasonably infer that cigarette smoke is causing the
plaintiff irreparable harm, and when a harm's full effect takes many
years to be realized, money damages are inadequate compensation.1
The plaintiff had stated a cause of action, and his case was remanded
for determination on the merits.
In California, Hentzel v. Singer Co." 2 extended the possible
causes of action for smoking in the workplace beyond the employer's
common-law duty. Paul Hentzel, a former attorney for the Singer
Company, alleged he had been fired because of his repeated complaints
and demands for a smoke-free workplace."1 3 Although he relied tangen-
tially upon Shimp,114 Hentzel based his case on wrongful termination,
breach of contract, and, most interestingly, on intentional infliction of
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id. Ironically, Western Electric offered Smith the computer room position
because smoke is harmful to computers and, therefore, banned only in the computer
ioom. Id.
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 12, 13.
109. Id. at 13.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
113. Id. at 294, 188 Cal Rptr. at 160.
114. Id. at 296 n.2, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 162 n.2.
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emotional distress.115
On the count of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Hentzel
alleged that his employer, knowing of Hentzel's desire for a reasonably
smoke-free environment, .. .place[d] him in a working area with a
heavier concentration of smoke. . .failed to segregate conference rooms
into smoking and non-smoking areas, and failed to prevent other em-
ployees from 'directly antagonizing, him in various ways. . . ."I" The
trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the California
Workers Compensation Act preempted the cause. 117 However, the
court of appeals reversed, stating that intentional infliction of emotional
distress was neither contemplated by, nor included in, the workers'
compensation law."" As long as the recovery sought is beyond the
scope of compensation covered by workers' compensation law, a suit
may be maintained. Therefore, Hentzel's complaint had stated a cause
of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 119
Of course, not every complaining nonsmoker has achieved success.
The recent case of Gordon v. Raven Systems and Research, Inc.320
from the District of Columbia is the Shimp antithesis. Like the plain-
tiffs in Shimp, Smith, and Hentzel, Adel Gordon informed her em-
ployer of her sensitivity to tobacco smoke and her desire to be free
from such smoke during working hours. Her employer's attempts to
accommodate her fell short of preventing smoking in the workplace
and, therefore, failed to assuage Ms. Gordon.12 ' Because Ms. Gordon
refused to return to her assigned workgroup, continuing instead to work
in a secluded area, her employer fired her for insubordination.1 2 Ms.
Gordon brought suit for wrongful termination and breach of an em-
ployer's duty to provide a safe place to work12 3
The court's reasoning in Gordon is widely disparate from that in
Shimp. The Gordon court began with the same major premise of the
employer's duty to provide a safe workplace, but added that this duty
does not require an employer "to adapt his workplace to the particular
115. Id. at 294, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
116. Id. at 294, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
117. Id. at 306, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
121. Id. at 11, 12.
122. Id. at 12.
123. Id. at 11.
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sensitivities of an individual employee .. ."I" The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of defendant Raven
Systems by stating, "[w]ithout such duty, appellant can complain of no
wrong. 125 Of course, the implied minor premise of the Gordon syllo-
gism appears to be that tobacco smoke is unsafe only to those with
particular sensitivities.1 26
The Gordon opinion does not completely ignore Shimp. The court
acknowledged that Shimp had taken judicial notice of the hazards of
tobacco smoke to everyone, based on expert testimony and scientific
studies. 127 Nevertheless, the Gordon court distinguished its facts from
Shimp because the plaintiff Gordon had not produced her own medical
evidence of the dangers of tobacco smoke, and because she had pleaded
only that the duty was owed to her due to her particular sensitivities. 12
It seems anomalous that the court would deny Gordon relief because
tobacco smoke affected her even more adversely than the average per-
son. Perhaps the court would have granted relief had her injury been
less dramatic.
Whether the court would have granted Ms. Gordon relief even had
she offered scientific and medical evidence that tobacco smoke harms
everyone is doubtful. Because she failed to plead these general claims,
the court stated, "we need not pass on [Shimp's]. . .suitability as sub-
stantive law."' 29 This language may be a subtle indication of an unwill-
ingness to have found Shimp persuasive had the court felt compelled to
analyze its substance.
An even stronger indication of Ms. Gordon's doubtful chances for
success is the court's dictum prefacing its discussion. The court first
noted: "The issue of nonsmokers' rights is a relatively new one in
American jurisprudence."' 130 The court cited Gaspar and other cases
denying nonsmokers a constitutional right, and then stated that "the
issue of nonsmokers' rights is one better left to the legislature[;]...
appellant encourages us to act where the legislature has not, [and] [w] e
124. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Gordon ignores that 34 million Americans are
hypersensitive to tobacco smoke. See supra text accompanying note 59-62.
125. Id. at 15.
126. But see supra text accompanying notes 11-77 (tobacco smoke pollution is
harmful to everyone).
127. Gordon, 462 A.2d at 15.
128. Id,
129. Id.
130. Id. at 14.
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decline .... "131
The Gordon decision is troubling for several reasons. The fact that
a legislature has not acted on an issue well suited for it is irrelevant
when a common-law remedy already exists. Furthermore, even when a
legislature does act, the statutory remedy in these situations is usually
cumulative to the common-law remedy unless the statute clearly indi-
cates otherwise. 132 Leaving aside its very narrow reading of the plain-
tiff's complaint, Gordon seems to suggest that an existing common-law
right can be destroyed by legislative inaction. Certainly the court would
not intentionally advocate such a doctrine without support.
2. OSHA: Support without Remedy
Contrary to the Gordon court's belief in legislative inaction, an
argument exists that Congress has codified the common-law duty by
enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). 31
Pursuant to its power to control interstate commerce, Congress recog-
nized that "illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial
burden upon, and. . . [are] a hindrance to, interstate commerce. ' ' xs
The purpose of OSHA is "to assure so far as possible. . .safe and
healthful working conditions .. ."I" The Act defines "occupational
safety and health standard" as a condition requiring the adoption of
"practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably neces-
sary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places
of employment." 36 This Act, which applies to a wide array of work-
places, provides in section 654(a)(1) that "[e]ach employer shall fur-
nish. . .his employees. . .a place. . .free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm. . "137
In determining what constitutes a "recognized hazard" under sec-
tion 654(a)(1), courts have looked at many factors, including condi-
131. Id.
132. E.g., Isbrindtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952). "Statutes which in-
vade the common law. . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of
long-established and familiar principles except when a statutory purpose to the con-
trary is evident." Id. at 783.
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
134. Id. § 651(a).
135. Id. § 651(b).
136. Id. § 652(8) (emphasis added).
137. Id. § 651(a)(1).
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tions detectable by human senses or through the aid of instrumentation,
and employers' constructive knowledge."1381 American Smelting and
Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n"9
holds that section 654(a)(1) encompasses "a health standard recog-
nized nationally for many years. ' '1 40 American Smelting, similar to the
nonsmoking cases, involved levels of lead in the air which were higher
than the nationally-recognized safe level. The court found these levels
to be within the meaning of "recognized hazard" even though the levels
could be detected only through measuring air quality, not through
sense detection.1 41
Most offices and workplaces which permit smoking probably con-
tain toxic air levels many times higher than any safe standard, 42 but
the Secretary of Labor has not, as yet, promulgated any standard for
tobacco smoke.' 43 Considering the scientific and medical evidence, the
Secretary could reasonably conclude: 1) that the absence of cigarette
smoke in the workplace would reduce illness, thus easing the burden on
interstate commerce; 2) that this absence could be achieved by adopt-
ing reasonable bans on smoking; and 3) that the result would free em-
ployees from a recognized hazard.
Although FENSR, Shimp, Smith, and Hentzel all discussed
OSHA,14 1 none could be decided based on OSHA since it is well estab-
lished that OSHA does not provide a private cause of action.145 How-
ever, in construing the California OSHA, modeled after the federal
Act, Hentzel held that OSHA is cumulative rather than exclusive of
138. See, e.g., Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.
1977) (hazardous condition detectable through observation and common sense); Ameri-
can Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 501
F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974) (hazardous condition detectable only through instrumenta-
tion); Otis Elevator Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 581 F.2d
1056 (2d Cir. 1978) (hazardous condition satisfied if employer should have known).
139. 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974).
140. Id. at 512.
141. Id. at 510-11.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 655 (1976) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to set standards
based upon a national consensus. But see Smith, 643 S.W.2d at 14 (no standard has
been set).
144. FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 183; Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 522, 368 A.2d at
410; Smith 643 S.W.2d at 14; Hentzel, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 300-301, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
166.
145. See Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
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the common law.14 6 Indeed, section 653(4) of the federal OSHA makes
very clear that OSHA shall neither "supersede . . . [n]or affect. . .the
common law ..14
The Occupational Health and Safety Act itself, even without a
private right of action, is persuasive evidence that Congress accepted
the major premise on which the nonsmoking plaintiffs have relied.
Therefore, the legislative action the Gordon court sought for authority
to grant relief may exist in OSHA, demonstrating Congress' desire to
provide everyone a safe place to work.
3. Relief for the Hypersensitive Nonsmoker
Other nonsmokers who suffer from extreme physical reactions to
secondary tobacco smoke have sought relief as handicapped or disabled
persons. For example, in Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 148 the plaintiff
Vickers, very sensitive to tobacco smoke, worked in a crowded room
with several heavy smokers.14 9 Vickers alleged that his sensitivity to
tobacco smoke qualified him as a handicapped person under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973,150 and the district court agreed with this classifi-
cation. 15 1 Vickers further alleged that his superiors' animosity toward
him and Veterans Administration's failure to provide him a smoke-free
workplace constituted discrimination against a handicapped in violation
of 29 U.S.C. § 794.152 The district court disagreed, stating that evi-
dence showed Vickers received promotions, work assignments, and in-
centives as any other employee,153 and that Vickers "failed to cite any
authority from the decided cases to the effect that the Veterans Admin-
istration was under a duty to make 'reasonable accommodations" to
plaintiffs' sensitivity to tobacco smoke. ' 154 This language resembles the
Gordon court language, but can be distinguished since the duty under
146. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 301, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 653(4); See also Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 522, 368 A.2d at
410.
148. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
149. Id. at 88-89.
150. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
151. 549 F. Supp. at 86-87 (relying on language of 29 U.S.C. § 707(7)(B)); but
cf. GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (N.C. Ct. App.
1979) (nonsmokers are not handicapped).
152. Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 87 (29 U.S.C. § 794 prevents discrimination
against those qualifying under the Act as handicapped persons).
153. Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 87.
154. Id.
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inquiry is the duty to the handicapped, not the duty to all employees to
provide a safe work place. The Vickers court deliberately states: "This
is not an action to determine whether all government employees have a
right to work in offices which are free from tobacco smoke. It is an
action solely to determine whether this one plaintiff has the right to
work in an environment wholly free from tobacco smoke." '155
In Parodi v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd.,' 56 another hypersensitive
nonsmoker sought disability retirement benefits. Under the applicable
law at that time "a person [was] totally disabled if unable to perform
'useful and efficient service in grade or class of position last occu-
pied. . .because of. . .injury not due to vicious habits, intemperance,
or willful misconduct on his part within five years before becoming dis-
abled.' ,,'15 Both the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit
Systems Protection Board determined Parodi was not disabled. The
Ninth Circuit, however, reversed both administrations' determina-
tions 158 stating Parodi is disabled because "[s]he cannot perform her
job, not due to choice or bad habits .. -159 The court remanded the
case to determine whether a smoke-free work environment is available
for her 160
Several courts have denied nonsmokers' requests for unemploy-
ment compensation after the nonsmokers quit work, refusing to work in
smoke-filled environments.' 6 ' In Alexander v. Unemployment Ins. Ap-
155. Id. at 86 (emphasis original).
156. 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982).
157. Id. at 737 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8331(6), which was subsequently replaced
with new language in Act of Dec. 5, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, Title IV, § 403(b), 94
Stat. 2606 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) 1981)).
158. 690 F.2d at 732-33.
159. Id. at 738.
160. Id. at 740.
161. See Rotenburg v. Industrial Comm'n., 42 Colo. App. 161, 590 P.2d 521
(Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 150 Neb. 792, 36 N.W.2d
233 (1949); Ruckstuhl v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Re-
view, 57 Pa. Commw. 302, 426 A.2d 719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). These cases do not
preclude compensation as a matter of law, thereby leaving open the possibility of future
success. For example, the Ruckstuhl court stated:
Although it is now generally accepted that cigarette smoke may be
harmful to smokers and non-smokers alike, we cannot presume for unem-
ployment compensation purposes that anyone exposed to cigarette smoke
in one's work environment is so physically harmed that a voluntary termi-
nation of employment will be automatically justified and unemployment
benefits granted. Thus, we must treat this case as any other that involves a
voluntary termination for health reasons.
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peals Bd.,16 2 a nonsmoking X-ray technologist quit work because her
employer failed to enforce its policy against smoking. 63 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's mandate to pay her unemployment
compensation.1 6 4 The court stated that a nonsmoker "has good cause
for rejecting work where cigarette smoke is present because such work
is not 'suitable employment' since it would be injurious to her
health."16 5
Although Vickers, Parodi, and Alexander provide encouragement
for the hypersensitive nonsmoker, these cases did not ban or limit
smoking in the workplace. None addressed the Shimp issue of the em-
ployer's common-law duty to all employees.
4. Florida Common Law Supports Judicial Activism
Although no nonsmoking employee cases have yet been reported,
the Shimp syllogism should work well in Florida. A line of Florida
cases recognizes the legal premise, i.e., the employer's duty.16 6 The
Florida Supreme Court held that the common-law doctrine gives an
employer "a positive duty to provide his servant with reasonably
safe. . .places to work. '16 7 Whether a Florida employer has breached
this duty is determined by weighing the risk of injury against the utility
of the condition.168 Whatever utility exists, if any exists at all, in al-
lowing high levels of tobacco smoke to permeate the workplace could
not possibly outweigh the risk of harm to all employees, including those
who smoke.6 9
57 Pa. Commw. at 302, 426 A.2d at 721 (emphasis added). Without this presumption,
a plaintiff has the burden of proving a sufficient health detriment exists justifying ter-
mination. Id. Because the claimant in Ruckstuhl had produced only her doctor's state-
ment that she is allergic to tobacco smoke, the court ruled that she had not met her
burden. Id. Arguably, a similarly situated plaintiff could prevail under the Pennsylva-
nia law by providing the existing medical evidence demonstrating serious physical
harm. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
162. 104 Cal. App. 3d 97, 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980).
163. Id. at 99-100, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 100, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
166. See Camp v. Hall 39 Fla. 535, 22 So. 792 (1897); Stearns & Culver Lum-
ber Co. v. Fowler, 58 Fla. 362, 50 So. 680 (1909); McGee v. Ed De Brauwere & Co.,
117 Fla. 859, 162 So. 510 (1935) Richards Co. v. Harrison, 262 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1972).
167. Hicks v. Kemp, 79 So. 2d 696, 699 (Fla. 1955).
168. Bartholf v. Baker, 71 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1954).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 11-77 (reviewing many of the risks of
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One may suggest that the utility involves respecting the rights of
workers to smoke. On the issue of a safe workplace, however, recogniz-
ing smokers' rights may be inappropriate. Even though an employer
may wish to respect an individual's desire to assume the risks of to-
bacco smoking, an argument still exists that the employer has the duty
to provide even the smoker with a safe place to work by protecting that
individual from tobacco smoke during working hours. This is analogous
to an individual who chooses not to wear a seat belt while driving his
private car. The employer of this individual still has a positive duty to
require that individual to wear a seat belt while operating a dangerous
instrumentality on the job. Therefore, the issue is not the rights of
smokers versus the rights of nonsmokers in the workplace. The issue is
whether the presence of tobacco smoke in the workplace creates an un-
safe environment for all workers regardless of anyone's desire to as-
sume the risks of the condition.
A Florida plaintiff has another potential basis for recovery. In ad-
dition to the available medical and scientific evidence he can use to
establish the harm to any person exposed to tobacco smoke, a com-
plaining party may refer to the preamble of Florida Statutes section
255.27,170 regulating smoking in state.buildings. The preamble states in
part: "[E]ven low levels of tobacco smoke in stagnant room air consti-
tutes a substantial health hazard. . ., and. . .[the nonsmoker's] right
to be free of annoying and possibly harmful tobacco smoke. . .should
be protected. ... "171 Even though the plaintiff may not be invoking
Florida Statutes section 255.27, the preamble is still useful as persua-
sive authority. Preambles demonstrate, at the very least, the legisla-
ture's concern, intent, and purpose in enacting legislation.172
To avoid the particular sensitivity basis for rejection of Ms.
Gordon's complaint, 73 the Florida plaintiff must plead the harm of to-
bacco smoke to everyone exposed to it, and produce scientific affidavits.
In addition, he should refer to the third paragraph of the section
255.27 preamble which states, "persons with allergies, respiratory ail-
ments, and other related infirmities are adversely affected by tobacco
harm).
170. FLA. STAT. § 255.27 (1983).
171. 1977 Fla. Laws 73, ch.77-52 (emphasis added).
172. For a discussion of the various effects and uses of preambles, see Note, Le-
gal Effect of Preables--Statutes, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 134 (1955).
173. See supra text accompanying note 124. Pleading particular sensitivity was
Ms. Gordon's nemesis.
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smoke which results in the state and private industry incurring each
year substantial losses in productivity due to days lost by personnel, not
to mention the personal suffering and inconvenience of those af-
fected .. ."71 Perhaps this language provides the nexus and author-
ity the Gordon court believed it lacked to extend the common-law duty
to include those with particular sensitivities.
IV. Florida's Need for a Clean Indoor Air Act
Both Gordon v. Raven Systems and Research, Inc.,175 and Federal
Employees for Nonsmokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States 76 sug-
gest that the issue of defining nonsmokers' rights should be determined
by a legislative body rather than a court.'" While the more accurate
view is that a court has the power to recognize the rights of nonsmokers
under existing laws and should not hesitate to do so when called upon,
the legislature is undoubtedly the better forum to define those rights.
Before 1974 no state had ever enacted comprehensive smoking regula-
tions designed to assure air quality or protect the health of those who
do not smoke.' 78 What regulations did exist were usually designed for
fire or explosion prevention or for the protection of minors.' 79 Only af-
ter publication of the 1972 Surgeon General's report and subsequent
medical studies did legislatures have reason to begin recognizing rights
of nonsmokers. Since then, however, the movement towards legislative
recognition of these rights gained rapid momentum. Between 1974 and
1980 twenty-five states enacted comprehensive anti-smoking statutes
designed to protect nonsmokers from involuntary exposure to harmful
tobacco smoke, 80 three states enacted piecemeal groups of anti-smok-
174. 1977 Fla. Laws 73, ch. 77-52.
175. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
176. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
177. Gordon, 462 A.2d at 14; FENSR, 446 F. Supp. at 185.
178. See Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers and Nonsmokers: The
Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REV. 444, 452 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Legal Conflict].
179. Id. at 453.
180. Id. at 451, 452.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.35.300, .310, .320, .330, .340 (Cum. Supp.
1979); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (1974); ARK STAT. ANN. §§
82-3701 TO -3703 (Cum. Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-14-101 to
-105 (Cum. Supp. 1978); (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.. §§ 1-21b
(West Cum. Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN § 26-9910 (1977); HAWAII
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ing statutes,181 and seven states enacted laws protecting nonsmokers'
rights in very limited areas.18 2 Thirteen other states still had restric-
tions for traditional reasons,' 83 and three states had no restrictions.'84
REV. STAT. §§321-201 to -206 (1976); IOWA CODE §§ 98A.1-.6 (Supp.
1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4008 (Cum. Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 270, §21 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
144.411-.417 (West Supp. 1980); 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 368; NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 71-5701 to -5713 (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 202.2490-
.2492 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155.42 (Supp. 1979); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2C:33-13 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1399-o to -q
(McKinney Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-12-09 to -11 (1978);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 379.031 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1247 (West Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-56-1, -2 (CUMM.
Supp. 1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-36-1, -2 (1979); TEX. PE-
NAL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-10-101 to -110 (Cum. Supp. 1975); 248 WAC 152 (1975) (Wash-
ington state regulations).
Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 450 n.57.
181. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 452.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 38A, § 23 (1957) (fireworks), art. 43, § 54-I (1957)
(physicians' offices, nursing homes, hospitals), art. 43, § 200 (1957) (food
canning), art. 78, § 35A (Supp. 1979) (buses), art. 89, § 64 (1957) (eleva-
tors); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.21333 (1980) (homes for the aged),
333.21531 (1980) (hospitals), 333.21733 (1980) (nursing homes), 408.820
(Supp. 1980) (elevators), 289.707a (Supp. 1980) (retail food establish-
ments), 333.12905 (1980) (restaurants), 289.129 (1967) (canneries); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 243.345, .350 (1979) (state offices), 192.710 (1979) (public
meetings), 441.815 (1979) (hospitals), 479.015 (1979) (elevators).
Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 451 n.57.
182. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 452
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25940, 25940.5, 25941 to 25947 (West
Supp. 1980) (certain areas in publicly owned buildings); CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE § 561 (West Supp. 1980) (public transportation) (California's Clean
Indoor Air Act, ch.10.7, was rejected at the general election held Nov. 7,
1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1326 (1979) (buses); D.C. CODE ANN. §
44-216 (Supp. 1978) (public transportation); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-5904 to -
5906 (1979) (public meetings); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-1(4), (7) (1972)
(buses); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 361 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (hospitals);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3702 (Purdon 1972) (retail stores); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 1225 (Purdon 1977) (theatres, public assemblies); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 47.56.730 (Supp. 1980) (ferries).
Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 451 n.57.
183. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 452
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 , § 2105 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (mines); ILL. ANN.
STAT.RECOVERY CH.127 , § 109 (SMITH-HURD CUM. SUPP. 1976) (FIRE-
WORKS); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-22-21, 16-6-4-23 (BURNS 1973) (FOOD
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Not surprisingly, states in or near the tobacco belt generally fall into
the latter two categories.
A. Smokers' and Nonsmokers' Rights Distinguished
As discussed in section three of this note, apparently the funda-
mental rights afforded under the United States Constitution do not in-
clude the right to a smoke-free environment.1 85 Likewise, of course,
there is no fundamental right to smoke tobacco. In other words, neither
the smoker nor the nonsmoker can rely directly on the Constitution to
resolve the conflict. The state and local governments may, however, use
their police power to define and regulate the rights of smokers and non-
smokers. Nothing is more vital to a state than the health, safety and
welfare of its citizens.
A suggestion made earlier is that when applying the common-law
doctrine of the employer's duty, comparing nonsmokers' and smokers'
rights may be improper since the hazardous condition rather than com-
peting rights is at issue.186 In legislating, however, comparing the rights
of smokers and nonsmokers is a proper consideration since the compet-
ing rights are as issue.
Freedom is a basic presumption of our society. Generally, individ-
PROCESSED OR STORED); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352.170(3) (Baldwin
1977) (mines); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 438.050 (Baldwin Cum. Supp.
1978) (school premises); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416(a) (West Supp.
1980) (school premises); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2433 (1964)
(mills, buses, factories, shipyards; fire prevention in mind); RSMo §
320.130 (1978) (fireworks); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 63-7-2, -3, 63-14-17
(1974) (mines); S.C. CODE §§ 23-35-90, -100 (1976) (fireworks); S.C.
CODE § 59-67-150 (1976) (school bus); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3011
(1977) (fireworks); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-6-103(B), 09(J), -510(A), -7-
106 (1980) (MINES); TENN. CODE ANN, §§ 59-7-108(h) (1980) (maga-
zine); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2752 (1968) (building with sign posted;
fire prevention measure); V.A. CODE §3.1-379 (1973) (food processing);
V.A. CODE § 45.1-39 (1974) (MAGAZINES); V.A. CODE § 45.1-98 (1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1979) (mines); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-8 (1978) (factories, mer-
cantile establishments); W. VA. CODE § 16-9-7 (1979) (schools); W. VA.
CODE § 22-2-57(b) (1978) (mines); W. VA. CODE § 22-2-53 (1978) (mine
surface); Wyo. STAT. § 30-6-107 (1977) (mines).
Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 451 n.57.
184. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 452. "Alabama, North Carolina, and
Wisconsin." Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 451 n.57.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 78-92.
186. See supra text following note 169.
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uals have the right to engage in lawful activities and to use their own
free will and discretion in determining the extent of that engagement.
This right includes the right to take risks. Nevertheless, the right of
personal autonomy is not absolute.1 7 Not only may a state regulate,
restrict or even prevent an otherwise lawful activity if the regulation
bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest; 88 a state
may also impinge a fundamental right if the restriction is necessary to
further a compelling state interest. 89 Presently the smoking of tobacco
products is a lawful activity, but probably not a fundamental right.
Therefore, a state may restrict or prevent the right to smoke if the
prevention or restriction is rationally related to furthering a legitimate
state interest. The health, safety, and well-being of citizens is at the
very least a legitimate state interest. 190
Once a legislature recognizes the scientific and medical evidence
that secondary smoke is a health hazard, the question is not whether
smoking should be restricted, but where and when.'9' The simple an-
swer is by whatever regulation is reasonably designed to enhance the
goal of protecting the health, safety and well-being of the citizens. Per-
haps the most reasonable general rule is that individuals should have
the right to smoke only when and where the act does not endanger the
health and safety of others. Certainly this is exactly the standard used
in other types of legislation. For example, individuals may lawfully op-
erate motor vehicles, but only under clearly-defined conditions which
vary according to place and time and under the threat of penalties for
violations. The restrictions extend from the rationale that individuals
have the right to operate motor vehicles only to the extent they do so
without endangering the safety of others. The rationale of anti-smoking
laws should be commensurate with this. The rights of smokers to en-
danger their own bodies should end when their acts begin to endanger
187. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1890); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 154 (1973); see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (even one's hair
length may be regulated).
188. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (197Q) (discussing the
rational basis-legitimate interest standards).
189. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (discussing the higher
level of strict scrutiny applied to fundamental rights).
190. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) states: "Protection of health and safety of the public is a paramount govern-
mental interest. . . ." Id. at 300.
191. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-1,7,15 (West Supp. 1984) (emphasis
added).
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others. Some states have implemented this rationale by passing Clean
Indoor Air Acts; others, like Florida, have not.
B. The Inadequacy of Present Legislative Measures
Florida has two statutes designed to restrict smoking. One must
hesitate to describe them as anti-smoking statutes since neither affords
great protection from tobacco smoke.
1. Florida Statutes Section 823.12
Florida Statutes section 823.12192 makes smoking in elevators a
second degree misdemeanor. Of course, because there is rarely any pro-
hibition against smoking before getting on an elevator or after getting
off, the law is often ignored. At least one person, however, received a
$250 fine for blowing smoke in the face of another elevator occupant
who had requested that he extinguish his cigar.1 93 This is a good law,
but in the absence of other restrictions, it does little to promote public
health. People spend a small fraction of their time on elevators.
2. Florida Statutes Section 255.27
Florida Statutes section 255.27,9 enacted in 1977, represents
Florida's first real attempt at anti-smoking legislation. The statute's
preamble in very strong language recognizes: 1) the potential health
hazard of "even low levels of tobacco smoke. . ." 2) the "right to be
free of. . .tobacco smoke. . ." and 3) the potential loss of worker pro-
ductivity from exposure to tobacco smoke.195 The statute itself, how-
ever, falls far short of the preamble's stated aspirations. Under this
statute, "[t]he supervisor of each unit of government located in a gov-
ernment building shall establish rules governing smoking in that por-
tion of the building for which he is responsible." 196
Section 255.27 gives the government supervisor guidelines to fol-
low, but these guidelines appear more permissive of smoking than re-
strictive. For example, in conference rooms and auditoriums,
192. FLA. STAT. § 823.12 (1983).
193. Legal Conflict, supra note 178, at 458 (citing Good Housekeeping, Apr.
1979, at 118).
194. FLA. STAT. § 255.27 (1983).
195. 1977 Fla. Laws 73, ch. 77-52 (emphasis added).
196. FLA. STAT. § 255.27 (1983).
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"[s]eparate smoking and nonsmoking areas shall be set aside.' 1 97 This
means smoking is still permitted in these rooms, only not on certain
sides. Considering the physical qualities of tobacco smoke and how it
rapidly permeates a room, one realizes that dividing a room provides no
real protection.'98 Furthermore, "[t]here will be no limitation on smok-
ing in corridors, lobbies, and restrooms." 99 Common sense suggests
that these areas are often the smallest and least ventilated of a build-
ing. Unless nonsmokers who use or work in state buildings can miracu-
lously avoid these areas, they are assured of exposure to high levels of
tobacco smoke.
In fact, Florida Statutes section 255.27 does not guarantee that
individuals will be totally free from tobacco smoke in any area. In med-
ical care facilities smoking is "restricted to staff, lounges, private of-
fices, and specially designated areas.' 200 Apparently, this "specially
designated areas" language permits a supervisor to divide all open
rooms into smoking and nonsmoking sides, thereby creating the same
problem as discussed with conference rooms. In designating nonsmok-
ing areas, the supervisor is required to consider only "the individual
characteristics of the building or room such as size, ventilation, the
purposes for which it is utilized, and other criteria relating to public
health, safety and comfort." 0' The law does not guarantee that any
area will be absolutely void of tobacco smoke.
Florida Statutes section 255.27 suffers from two other even greater
deficiencies. First, the law does not provide penalties for violations. Sec-
ondly, whatever smoking restrictions do exist for the protection of pub-
lic health apply only in state government buildings or offices leased by
the state government. No other public places are affected.
In short, the Florida Legislature formally recognizes that tobacco
smoke is a serious public health hazard only when inhaled in certain
unspecified areas of state government buildings. However, it is doubtful
that the toxic effect of tobacco smoke discriminates in such a manner.
Florida should recognize, as other states have, that tobacco smoke is a
detriment to public health and welfare regardless of where or when
197. Id. § 255.27(1) (emphasis added).
198. Lefcoe, Ashley, Pederson & Keays, The Health Risks of Passive Smoking
and the Growing Case for Control Measurements in Enclosed Environments, 84
CHEST, July 1, 1983, at 93 (smoke permeates entire room.).
199. FLA. STAT. § 255.27(3) (1981).
200. Id. § 255.27(2) (emphasis added).
201. Id. § 255.27(4).
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inhaled. Florida needs to follow through to the logical conclusion of its
declarations stated in the preamble to Florida Statutes section 255.27
and enact a comprehensive Clean Indoor Air Act.
C. Elements to be Included in Florida's Comprehensive Legisla-
tive Response
Like any effective legislation, anti-smoking legislation must make
a clear statement of its intent and purpose, define terms, places, and
conditions under which smoking will be permitted, require adequate
posting of regulations, authorize individuals and agencies to enforce the
regulations, and provide adequate penalties for violations. 0a This sec-
tion discusses these elements and illustrates how some selected anti-
smoking laws have employed them. In addition, this section raises a
new issue concerning legislative protection of children from passive
smoking. The Florida Legislature should use the discussion as a guide
and should satisfy all elements in its Clean Indoor Air Act.
1. Intent and Purpose
Effective legislation should make clear the reasons and intent of
the restrictions. Such a statement is useful for interpretation and im-
plementation of restrictions. The best method is to incorporate the in-
tent as part of the statute. For example, Colorado Revised Statutes
section 24-14-101 states: "Legislative declaration. The general assem-
bly hereby declares that the smoking of tobacco. . .under certain con-
ditions is a matter of public concern and that in order to protect the
public health, safety and welfare it is necessary to control such smoking
in certain public places." 0 3
Perhaps the strongest statement of purpose of any anti-smoking
legislation appears in the newly-enacted city of San Francisco's Smok-
ing Pollution Control Ordinance.20 4 Section 1001 of this ordinance
states:
Because the smoking of tobacco. . . is a danger to health and is a
202. See PuBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, THE SMOKING DIGEST 83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SMOKING
DIGEST].
203. COLO. REV. STAT. § 245-14-101 (1982).
204. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE part II, ch. V, art. 19 §§ 1000-05
(1983).
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cause of material annoyance and discomfort . ., the purposes of
this article are (1) to protect the public health and welfare by regu-
lating smoking in the office workplace and (2) to minimize the
toxic effects of smoking. . .by requiring an employer to adopt a
policy that will accommodate, insofar as possible, the preferences
of nonsmokers and smokers and, if a satisfactory accommodation
cannot be reached, to prohibit smoking in the office workplace. 05
The section further emphasizes that the ordinance does not "create any
right to smoke . ,,,206 nor does it prevent an employer from banning
smoking altogether.20 7 The spirit of the ordinance merely allows an em-
ployer to attempt satisfying all employees, smokers, and nonsmokers.
However, this attempt at accommodating everyone does not imply
striking a balance or compromise. On the contrary, the ordinance
makes very clear that the right to be free from smoke is superior to the
right to smoke.208 Any smoking policy set by an employer must satisfy
all nonsmoking employees.207
2. Definitions and Restrictions
Most essential to any clean indoor air act are its definitions and
restrictions. Enforcement of any regulation requires knowing exactly
what is restricted and where it is restricted. For example, the term
smoking requires precise definition. Because the most harmful smoke
emanates from the burning ends of tobacco products and equipment,
the definition of "smoking" should include not only inhaling and exhal-
ing but also the burning or carrying of any lighted tobacco or other
smoking product. 10 Other important terms include public place, public
meeting, office, workplace, building, and enclosed area.2 ' It may even
be appropriate to define for purposes of protecting children, "private
home" and "automobile. '212
Of course, the actual regulations are the most critical. Many anti-
smoking regulations enumerate areas where smoking is prohibited.213
205. Id. at § 1001.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. § 1003(1)(b).
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-14-102(3) (1982).
211. Id.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 236-42.
213. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-14-103 (1982).
[Vol. 8
192
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss2/13
Nonsmokers' Rights
The most common areas listed include elevators, theaters, libraries,
buses, waiting rooms, government buildings, schools, etc.214 While these
lists have the benefit of making the restricted areas somewhat clear,
their exclusionary method unfortunately promulgates the traditional
presumption that smoking is permitted anywhere unless otherwise
provided.
The Minnesota Clear Indoor Air Act, 15 the leading comprehen-
sive state statute to date, takes a refreshing approach. Minnesota Stat-
utes section 144.414 states, "[n]o person shall smoke in a public place
or at a public meeting except in designated smoking areas." '216 The Act
defines a public place "as any enclosed, indoor area used by the general
public or serving as a place of work .... ,217 In effect, the Minnesota
Clean Indoor Air Act reverses the traditional presumption. Smoking is
prohibited in public unless an area has been set aside for smoking.
Nonsmokers are assured of clear indoor air in common, public areas,
but some areas may be set aside for smoking if certain precautions are
taken. This approach is the most reasonable, and one Florida should
follow.
The Minnesota Act exempts some areas. Private enclosed offices
are not subject to the restriction, and neither are "factories, warehouses
and similar places of work not usually frequented by the general public,
except that the [labor deparment and. . .health commis-
sioner]. . .shall establish rules to restrict or prohibit smoking. . .where
the close proximity of workers or inadequacy of ventilation causes
smoke pollution .... ,,218 Furthermore, the Minnesota section provid-
ing for designation of smoking areas requires the use of "physical bar-
riers and ventilation systems. . .to minimize the toxic effect of smoke
in adjacent non-smoking areas."2 19
The controversial San Francisco ordinance requires office employ-
ers operating businesses within the city to establish and enforce a writ-
ten smoking policy. 220 As discussed earlier, employers may attempt to
accommodate smokers, but if ventilation or separation is insufficient to
protect all nonsmokers, total abolition of smoking is required.
214. Id.
215. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.411 (West Supp. 1983).
216. Id. § 144.414.
217. Id. § 144.413.(2)
218. Id. § 144.414 (emphasis added).
219. Id. § 144.415.
220. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE part II, ch. V, art. 19 § 1003 (1983).
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3. Enforcement
A major problem with anti-smoking legislation is the lack of ade-
quate enforcement provisions. Of course, most people obey laws;
therefore, the mere enactment of an anti-smoking law coupled with
greater public awareness of the reasons and purposes of the law may
achieve substantial public compliance. But more is needed. While one
has difficulty imagining police officers using smoke detectors to catch
recalcitrant tobacco smokers as they use radar to catch speeding motor-
ists, effective anti-smoking laws do require adequate and enforceable
fines and penalties.
Enforcement provisions vary greatly, even among states with ex-
tensive anti-smoking laws.222 For example, although the Colorado stat-
ute gives a strong anti-smoking declaration, defines essential terms, lists
extensive restrictions for certain public places, creates optional prohibi-
tions, and makes clear that local governments may regulate even more
extensively than the state statute, it fails to provide a section for en-
forcement.223 Several states have made a violation a petty misde-
meanor.224 Alaska may fine an individual violator of its anti-smoking
act between $5 and $25,25 and managers of buildings or others respon-
sible for enforcing restrictions may be fined between $10 and $100.226
New Jersey fines individuals up to $100, and fines those responsible
with enforcement $25 for the first offense, $100 for the second, and
$200 for each offense thereafter.227
Sometimes statutes make clear who may enforce the restrictions
and by what methods. The California Clean Indoor Air Act,228 for ex-
ample, permits an individual to apply for a writ of mandate to comply
with the restrictions.229 If the plaintiff is successful, not only must the
entity enforce the restrictions, but the plaintiff will also receive reason-
221. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 202, at 84.
222. Id. at 84-86.
223. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-101 (1982).
224. See e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.417 (West Supp. 1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-5712 (1981) (Nebraska's Clean Indoor Air Act is almost identical to
Minnesota's.).
225. ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.340(a) (1982).
226. Id. § 18.35.340(b). Proprietors must also post conspicuous no smoking
signs. Id. § 18.35.330.
227. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:32D-4,12,20 (West Supp. 1984).
228. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25940 (Deering Supp. 1983).
229. Id. § 25945.
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able costs and attorney's fees.230 Other statutes provide that an "af-
fected party" may file suit to enjoin violators.3
The San Francisco ordinance appears to have the strictest enforce-
ment provisions. Employers who fail to institute and enforce a written
smoking policy which satisfies all nonsmokers may receive up to a $500
fine. 32 In addition, "[e]ach day such violation is committed or permit-
ted to continue shall constitute a separate offense and shall be punisha-
ble as such. ' 23 3 The enforcement provision also requires the Director of
Public Health to enforce the ordinance by serving notices to violators
and having the city attorney sue to enjoin violators.2 34
The San Francisco ordinance takes a serious approach to enforcing
an otherwise easy-to-ignore ordinance. Most nonsmokers find it difficult
to speak up about violations. Many would rather suffer the health con-
sequences and annoyance than risk alienation. Under this ordinance
suits are brought in the name of the city rather than an individual em-
ployee.23 5 The burden is on the employer to institute and enforce a pol-
icy on behalf of the nonsmokers. Knowledge of the potential for huge
fines for continued violations makes what is good for the nonsmoker
good for the employer.
4. Protection for Children
In her cover letter submitting the 1980 Surgeon General's report
to the House of Representatives, Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, stated: "Perhaps more disheartening
[than the harm tobacco smoke has on women] is the harm which
mothers' smoking causes to their unborn babies and infants. '2 36 A pos-
sible emerging issue is whether parental smoking should be restricted to
times when and places where children are not present. Arguably a rela-
tionship between parental smoking in the child's environment and the
negligent treatment of children exists. Florida's negligent treatment of
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.417(3) (West Supp. 1983).
232. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE part II, ch. V, art. 19 § 1005(2)
(1983).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 1005(1).
235. Id. § 1005(2).
236. Letter from Patricia Roberts Harris to Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
(printed inside front cover of PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING FOR
WOMEN (1980)).
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children statute provides in part: "Whoever permits a child to live in an
environment. . .[which] causes the child's physical or emotional health
to be. . .in danger of being significantly impaired shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree ... 23 Medical evidence demon-
strates that children who live in smoke-filled homes are in danger of
significant physical impairment.2 38
Although a government walks on thin ice when it attempts to reg-
ulate parental control and management of their children, the serious
detrimental effect parental smoking has on children arguably should
not be ignored. On the one hand is the traditional notion of the right of
parents to raise their children without state interference.23 9 On the
other hand, states are enacting legislation designed to protect non-
smokers, and yet no provisions exist to protect children, the group of
nonsmokers who may be in most need of protection. The Supreme
Court has stated: "we have recognized that a state is not without con-
stitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children
when their physical or mental health is jeopardized."240 In the same
opinion the Court stated, "[tihe statist notion that governmental power
should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents
abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition."241
The dilemma is not easily resolved. It would be unrealistic to ex-
pect Florida agencies to prosecute parents who smoke cigarettes in
their own homes, whether under the child neglect statute or otherwise.
It is realistic, however, to expect Florida to protect children by educat-
ing the public and focusing attention on the harm passive smoking has
237. FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1983).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 62-75 for a review of medical evidence
of harm to children from passive smoking.
Additionally, it could be argued that the dangers to children rise to the level of
child abuse. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1983) states: "Whoever . . .knowingly or by
culpable negligence, permits physical or mental injury to the child, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree. . . ." Also, FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1983) states:
"Whoever . . . knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits physical injury to the
child, and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent
disfigurement to such child, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree. . . ." Id.
239. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601-02 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944). In Prince, the Court spoke of "the parent's claim to authority
in her own household and in the rearing of her children." 321 U.S. at 165. "Against
these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interest of society to
protect the welfare of children ... " Id.
240. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
241. Id. (emphasis original).
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on children. One of the many ways this may be accomplished is to
include a provision in a Clean Indoor Air Act advising parents and
other adults not to smoke in enclosed areas when children are present,
for example, the home and automobile. Even without active enforce-
ment, such a provision may open "those pages of human experience
that teach that parents generally do act in the child's best interest. '242
5. Proposal
A Florida Clean Indoor Act should include a clear statement of
intent and the following minimum protections: 1) prohibit smoking in
all places open to the public, exempting only designated rooms where
nonsmokers realistically need not be present; 2) guarantee all non-
smokers a smoke-free workplace; 3) provide adequate enforcement and
penalty provisions; and 4) lead the nation in protecting the health of
infants by restricting parental smoking in areas when children are pre-
sent. The act should permit municipalities to place further restrictions
on smoking, but not permit them to create exemptions.
V. Conclusion
Twenty years ago the United States Surgeon General officially in-
formed the public of the dangers of tobacco smoke. Since that first
report, hundreds of medical studies have linked tobacco smoke to a
multitude of serious illnesses, and today tobacco smoking is recognized
as the number one cause of premature death and disability in
America. 43 Included in these findings is the discovery that secondary
tobacco smoke pollutes the air and is a significant health hazard to
nonsmokers. Using this as an underlying premise, nonsmokers have
sought legal remedies in their campaign for clean air. Nonsmokers do
not attack the privilege of smokers to assume the risks of tobacco
smoking. The issue nonsmokers present is whether an individual has
the right to take a risk which concomitantly involves an unavoidable
risk of harm to others near him. Nonsmokers argue that the privilege
to smoke, as with any other privilege, must end when its exercise en-
dangers the health and safety of others. Smokers should have the bur-
den to smoke only in areas where nonsmokers are not present. The free
242. Id. at 602.
243. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCUALR DISEASE 11 (lst
ed. 1983).
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choice of one should not take away the free choice and good health of
another.
Although no court has yet recognized a constitutional right to be
free from the dangers of tobacco smoke exposure, some nonsmokers
have achieved smoke-free workplaces under the employer's common-
law duty to provide each employee a safe place to work. While piece-
meal remedies through the courts applying this theory hold promise,
the better forum for granting relief is the legislature. In 1964 only half
of the population believed smoking should be restricted in certain
places, but in 1975 seventy percent favored controls.244 In all likelihood
that figure is even larger today. Responding to the medical evidence
and desire of the majority, half of the states have enacted comprehen-
sive legislation prohibiting smoking in public places. Regrettably, Flor-
ida has not. Pursuant to its power and duty to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens, the Florida Legislature should enact a Florida
Clean Indoor Air Act.
Curtis R. Cowan
244. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 202, at 8.
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The War Powers Resolution Of. 1973: An Attempt To
Regulate War Powers Proves Inadequate
I. Introduction
The executive and legislative branches of government have strug-
gled over control of the war powers since the adoption of the Constitu-
tion in 1789.1 However, the nation lacked any statutory procedure to
handle its "highly complex, confused use-of-force problems" until
1973.2 The War Powers Resolution of 1973,3 enacted by the Ninety-
Third Congress, was to provide a framework for the application of
shared powers.
The Ninety-Eighth Congress, in 1983, deviated from both the let-
ter and spirit of the War Powers Resolution by not requiring Presiden-
tial compliance with its provisions, and then by passing the Multina-
tional Force in Lebanon Resolution.' The alleged "compromise '5
between the executive and legislative branches, represented by the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, demonstrated that the
War Powers Resolution had failed to change the way the United States
engaged its military forces. The result of political maneuvering, the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution permitted the government
to escape all the safeguards built into the War Powers Resolution.
This note examines the War Powers Resolution, its text and back-
ground, and analyzes its application to the military situation in Leba-
1. See generally Reveley, The Power to Make War, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONDuCT OF FOREIGN PoLicY 83 (1976); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 80-125 (1972); 0. H. STEPHENS & G.J. RATHJEN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ALLOCATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 308-319
(1980); M. PUsEY, THE WAY WE Go TO WAR (1969); Note, Congress, the President,
and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1771 (1968).
2. Reveley, supra note 1, at 86.
3. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541-1548 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as War Powers Resolution].
4. The Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat.
805 (1983).
5. Arguably, it was not a compromise at all. See Statutory Authorization Under
the War Powers Resolution-Lebanon: Hearing and Markup on H.J. Res. 364 and H.
Res. 315 Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1983) (statement of Congressman George Crockett).
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non during 1982 and 1983. Since that application was the first compre-
hensive test of the War Powers Resolution, it offers a unique
opportunity to evaluate the Resolution's efficacy and conclude that, in
fact, neither the concept of shared powers or the procedural require-
ments of the Resolution have been implemented.
II. The Text of the War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 culminated several years of
national debate over the Vietnam war and the relative warmaking pow-
ers of Congress and the President. Underlying the Resolution was an
intent to harness executive powers and to ensure that future military
engagements would be endorsed through the democratic process and
gain public acceptance and support.6 In adopting the War Powers Reso-
lution, Congress set forth its intent to avail itself of its constitutional
role in war-making decisions. The "Purpose and Policy" section of the
Resolution states:
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that
the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.7
This language explicitly calls for a sharing of the power, between Con-
gress and the President, to make war. The act embraces a wide scope
of military operations and is not limited to situations of formally de-
clared war.
The war powers of the federal government are within the "zone of
6. If a majority does not acquiesce, at least, in national policy, the country
plunges into controversy, with a devastating impact on national effectiveness
at home and abroad. In this century Versailles and Vietnam are witness to the
dismal consequences of a failure to create and maintain consensus behind U.S.
initiatives abroad. The antidote for this affliction was termed bipartisanship
during the days when foreign affairs significantly divided Republicans from
Democrats. An end to the acrimony between the executive and Congress is the
more pressing concern today, followed by an articulation by both of a foreign
policy acceptable to the country at the large.
Reveley, supra note 1, at 92.
7. War Powers Resolution, at § 1541(a).
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twilight" as described by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company v. Sawyer.8 In the famous "Steel Seizure Case," Jus-
tice Jackson expounded the proposition that some constitutional powers
of the executive and legislative branches are meant to overlap, and that
the extent of independent authority that one branch may properly exer-
cise within this "zone of twilight" is dependent upon the degree to
which corresponding authority is exercised by the other branch.9 Jus-
tice Jackson concluded that when a President acts inconsistently with
the expressed will of Congress in an area of shared power, "[c]ourts
can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disa-
bling Congress from acting on the subject." 10
Congress expressed its claim of right to share war powers in sec-
tion 2(b) of the War Powers Resolution."1 That section bases the legiti-
macy of the Act on Congress' constitutional "necessary and proper"
powers. 2 Although not mentioned in the Resolution, the Constitution
also grants Congress the power to "declare war,"1 3 to "raise and sup-
port armies,"' 4 to "provide and maintain a navy,"1 5 to regulate the
"land and naval forces,""' and to have authority over the militia. 17 The
subject of war powers, therefore, is not one from which the courts could
"disable" Congress.' 8 The foundation established, the Resolution goes
on to construct a procedural mechanism for the exercise of shared pow-
ers. It mandates that the President "shall" consult with Congress prior
8. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 635.
10. Id. at 637.
11. War Powers Resolution, at § 1541(b) states:
Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided
that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers, but also all
other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or office thereof.
Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
13. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
14. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
17. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, 16.
18. The Constitution also vests the president with war powers, its "pertinent lan-
guage is rife with vague terms, frequent grants of competing authority, and outright
omissions." Reveley, supra note 1, at 90.
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to military actions, whenever possible.19 Further, it requires regular
consultation with Congress for the duration of any American military
engagement.20
The War Powers Resolution specifies a formal procedure for regu-
lar reports from the president to Congress. Absent a declaration of war,
these reports must begin within forty-eight hours of the introduction of
American forces into any one of three possible situations: into hostili-
ties or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances; into the territory, airspace or waters of
a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments
that relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such
forces; or when sending military forces in numbers which substantially
enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already lo-
cated in a foreign nation. 21 The presidential reports must set forth cer-
tain specific information designed to increase accountability, including:
19. War Powers Resolution, at § 1542 states:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with
the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in
hostilities or have been removed from such situations.
Id.
20. Id.
21. War Powers Resolution, at § 1543(a) states:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States
Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply,
replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; The Presi-
dent shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writ-
ing, setting forth -
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United
States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such in-
troduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.
Id.
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the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States
Armed Forces; the constitutional and legislative authority under which
such introduction took place; and the estimated scope and duration of
the hostilities or involvement.22
The War Powers Resolution, however, does not require a presiden-
tial report submitted pursuant to the Act to specify which of the three
situations is involved. Consequently, each President who has reported
under the Act 23 has avoided citing a particular section, thereby
sidestepping the force and effect of the most important safeguard in the
Act, section 5(b).24 This section sets a time limit on any presidential
deployment of armed forces unless Congress acts to declare war, specif-
ically authorizes a longer period for deployment, or finds itself unable
to meet due to war conditions. However, this safeguard applies only
when a President reports, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, on
one of the three types of situations dicussed above. Therefore, if the
22. Id.
23. On April 4, 1975, President Ford reported on United States participation in
efforts to transport refugees from Danang and other seaports to safer areas in Vietnam.
On April 12, 1975 President Ford reported on United States military actions to evacu-
ate Americans from Cambodia. On April 30, 1975, President Ford reported on United
States military forces' actions to evacuate Americans from Vietnam. On May 15, 1975,
President Ford reported on United States military action to recover the ship and crew
of the Mayaguez from Cambodian forces. On April 26, 1980, President Carter re-
ported on an attempt by the United States military to rescue American hostages being
held in Iran. On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported on the involvement of
United States Forces in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.
On August 12, 1982, President Reagan made his first report on the dispatch of United
States forces to Lebanon. Only President Ford's first report, on April 4, 1975 cited a
section of the War Powers Resolution.
24. War Powers Resolution, at § 1544(b) states:
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be
submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title, whichever is earlier,
the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with
respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted),
unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authori-
zation for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by
law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of
an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be
extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President deter-
mines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military
necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the
continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a
prompt removal of such forces.
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President either fails to specify a situation type and its corresponding
section or to make a report at all, and if Congress fails to require both
a report and a section cite, the section 5(b)2" time limit will not apply.
The War Powers Resolution contains a concurrent resolution pro-
vision.2 8 Congress intended this provision to enable it to direct the re-
moval of American forces from engagement at any time, regardless of
section 5(b) time frames. The concurrent resolution puports to carry
the force of law without presidential participation. In effect, the con-
current resolution provision of the War Powers Resolution gave Con-
gress a veto power over presidential decisions to commit American
armed forces.
In the recent case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,27 the United States Supreme Court held that the legislative
veto violates the constitutionally prescribed method for lawmaking; the
process must include presentment of a bill to the President.2 Although
the Chadha case involved a veto provision whereby one house of Con-
gress claimed a veto power over an executive decision, the subsequent
Supreme Court affirmance of a lower court ruling against a two-house
veto provision in United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission29
expanded the scope of Chadha to concurrent resolutions. Thus, it has
been suggested that Congress consider the War Powers Resolution's
concurrent resolution provision unconstitutional."0 Removal of that pro-
vision, section 5(c), would not cloud the entire Resolution; the Act con-
tains a severability clause that purports to protect remaining provisions
from any decision rendering a particular section invalid. A similar sev-
erability clause involved in the Chadha case was upheld and given ef-
fect by the Supreme Court.31
25. Id.
26. War Powers Resolution, at § 1544(c) states:
Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, at any time that United
States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the
United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war
or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the
President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
Id.
27. - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
28. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.
29. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
30. R. CELADA, EFFECT OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISION ON THE Two-
HOUSE DISAPPROVAL MECHANISM TO TERMINATE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES
PURSUANT TO UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL ACTION (August 24, 1983).
31. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. at 2775.
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Although the elimination of the concurrent resolution provision
weakens the potential for congressional action, it does not dispossess
Congress of the power to directly effectuate changes in military policy.
Congress is now relegated to expressing its will through a joint resolu-
tion which, unlike a concurrent resolution, must be presented to the
president. Should a president veto such a joint resolution, the veto
would be subject to a potential congressional override. Thus, it appears
that Congress could still have the last word in a dispute with the Presi-
dent over policy.
III. The Historical Context of the War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution is a historic piece of legislation. As
the Vietnam war was entering its final stages, Congress enacted the
Resolution to attempt to ensure against future catostrophic military
ventures. Congressional concern arose, in part, from an awareness that
the Vietnam experience was fueled by federal statutes providing Presi-
dents with both funds and broad discretion to carry out the war. 32 By
far the most important such statute was the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Reso-
lution3 3 which gave the President sweeping authority to conduct mili-
tary operations in Southeast Asia. The Tonkin Resolution provided
blanket Congressional consent for whatever actions the President might
take. As a practical matter, it afforded the cloak of a federal law for a
major escalation that Congress did not foresee. The Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution was repealed in 1970 when its usefulness, as an independent
source of authority for the President, had evaporated.34
Long before its repeal, the Tonkin Resolution had lost most of its
support in Congress as an appropriate federal policy. Growing numbers
of congressmen were demanding a greater role in foreign and military
affairs.35 The Senate passed the National Commitments Resolution 6 in
32. Congress supplied billions of dollars for the war effort through appropriations
bills. In addition, Congress passed legislation that provided for selective service and
sharply increased manpower limits for the armed forces. For example, the 1967 appro-
priations act proclaimed Congress' "firm intention to provide all necessary support for
members of the Armed Forces of the United States fighting in Vietnam ... " Pub. L.
No. 90-5, 81 Stat. 5 (1967).
33. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
34. The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2053
(1970) repealed the Tonkin Resolution.
35. "Vietnam undermined the simple confidence in each of the arguments that
had traditionally supported congressional deference to the President in the area of for-
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1969. This measure defined the nature of an American military com-
mitment as one which had to recieve the approval and endorsement of
both the President and Congress. First introduced in 1967 by Senator
William Fulbright,37 the Resolution expressed the "sense of the Sen-
ate" but had no binding effect on either the president or Congress.
The Senate intended the National Commitments Resolution to be
an expression of its desire to share war powers with the President. Had
that desire been satisfied, it is unlikely that any further legislation on
the subject would have been enacted. The desire proved to be a naive
one, however, as the executive branch made no change in its policies as
a result of the non-binding Resolution. In a 1972 Foreign Relations
Committee report,38 the Resolution's failure was noted: "Following the
adoption of the National Commitments Resolution it was hoped that
the newly installed Nixon administration would take a different view
from that of its predecessor. That hope has not been realized." 9 It
became obvious to the Committee that congressional expressions with-
out the force of law would not bring about a sharing of power.40
Congress began to search in earnest for a more effective tool. The
appropriations power,41 through which Congress could either fund mili-
tary operations or terminate them, was one alternative. However, inter-
est began to focus on legislation which would deal with war powers
generically, rather than ways to control particular events and policies.
In the summer of 1970, Senator Jacob Javits42 was one of the many
outspoken advocates who introduced generic war powers proposals in
Congress.43
During the early seventies, war raged on in Southeast Asia as
American invasions and bombings of Cambodia and Laos were re-
vealed. These revelations spurred a fear that the war was widening. At
home, a critical series of domestic issues relating to the Watergate
scandal-which eventually forced President Richard Nixon from of-
eign affairs; unity, secrecy, superior expertise, superior sources of information, decision,
and dispatch." Allison, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 96 (1976).
36. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., in 115 CONG. REC. 17,245.
37. Dem., Arkansas.
38. S. Res. 92-606, 2d Sess. (1972).
39. Id.
40. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98th CONG. 2d Sss.,
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION (Comm. Print 1982).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
42. Rep., New York.
43. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 40, at 48.
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fice-was becoming explosive in its own way. In this historical context,
the House of Representatives and the Senate each produced a war pow-
ers bill. The Senate, led by Senators Javits, Fulbright, and others
passed a version which adopted an "authority" test4 4 under which the
President's ability to commit forces without congressional authorization
was restricted to emergency situations. The key restraint in the Senate
bill was a thirty-day time limit which would begin to run upon deploy-
ment of the forces. Unless Congress authorized a longer deployment
within those thirty days, the forces would automatically be withdrawn.
The House favored a "performance" test4 5 under which the President
would be required to report to Congress within seventy-two hours of
deployment. The filing of the report, not the deployment, would trigger
a 120-day period for independent presidential action. The" House de-
leted any form of prior restraint upon the President; the Senate version
defined specific emergency situations and purported to limit indepen-
dent presidential power to them. A congressional conference committee
produced a compromise 4 --the War Powers Resolution of 1973 47 -that
consisted of the performance test and a maximum time period of ninety
44. Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or
Surrender? 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 832-33 (1974):
The most fundamental difference to be resolved concerned the triggering
of the 30- or 120-day period allowed for the President to obtain congres-
sional approval for his deployment of the armed forces. From the first war
powers legislation introduced by Senator Javitz, the Senate consistently
has specified the emergency situations which would permit Presidential
commitment of armed forces without particular cogressional authority.
Congressman Zablocki's brief flirtation with this so-called "authority" ap-
proach had received short shrift from his committee colleagues in the
House who favored a "performance" test. Under the House test the 120-
day period would begin to run when the President reported to Congress
within 72 hours after having deployed the armed forces, whereas under the
Senate's "authority" test the 30-day period would begin to run upon de-
ployment of the troops. The House conferees argued that an attempt to
delineate the President's warmaking powers specifically was "constitution-
ally questionable and from a practical standpoint unwise" and that lan-
guage in the Senate bill giving the President the right to forestall an attack
could license preemptive war.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
45. Id.
46. See generally Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,
H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 33,037
(1973).
47. War Powers Resolution, supra note 2.
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days for presidential action without Congressional concurrence.4 The
basis of the Senate's provision delineating presidential warmaking au-
thority survived, but only as an element of the bill's non-binding Pur-
pose and Policy section:
The Constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief
to introduce the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1)
a declaration of war, (2) a national emergency created by attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.4
9
The Senate overwhelmingly approved the compromise, 75-20, on Octo-
ber 10, 1973,50 and two days later, the House followed suit by a vote of
238-123.11 Senator Fulbright, expressing his satisfaction with the prod-
uct sent to President Nixon, said that the bill was a "historic recap-
ture" of Congressional powers and predicted that "[n]ever again will
the war making practices of this country be the same."52
By the time the War Powers Resolution reached President Nixon's
desk, the President's public support and credibility had nose-dived.
Only his constitutional veto power stood in the way of the bill's climb
to the status of law. Citing constitutional, institutional, and policy ob-
jections to the legislation, the President vetoed it.53 Efforts to override
the veto began immediately thereafter. The outcome was in doubt be-
cause the War Powers Resolution had not attained a two-thirds major-
ity when it was initially approved and sent to the President; additional
votes were needed for a successful override attempt. On seven previous
occasions, the President had been able to stave off an override of his
veto. 4 On this occasion, it was different. Congress was influenced by
public distress over the Vietnam war and the unfolding Watergate
48. If congressional authorization for further deployment was not forthcoming
within 60 days, the deployment had to be terminated; the president could extend the
period by another 30 days if he certified that the additional time was necessary for the
safety of American forces.
49. War Powers Resolution, at § 1541(c).
50. 119 CONG. REC. S19,006 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
51. 119 CONG. REC. H8963 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1973).
52. New York Times, Oct. 5, 1973, at 11.
53. Veto of War Powers Resolution, 1973 PUB. PAPERS of Richard Nixon 893
(1975).
54. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 40, at 159,160.
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scandal. The President was not able to garner the necessary support
from the House of Representatives, which had protected five of Presi-
dent Nixon's eight previous vetoes; the House voted to override, by four
votes. 5 The Senate also voted to override, 75-18.11 The War Powers
Resolution became law in the face of presidential opposition.5 7 "It was
an overwhelming demonstration of the interests of the people who had
been aroused.""8
IV. The Passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution
For ten years after passage of the War Powers Resolution there
were no major confrontations over war powers.5 9 Congress resorted to
statutes which expressed its will on particular issues without invocation
of War Powers Resolution procedures.60 However, ten years of dor-
mancy had not buried the Resolution. In 1983, President Ronald Rea-
gan and the Ninety-Eighth Congress gave the Resolution its first com-
prehensive test.
A. Background
Lebanon, for thousands of years the site of violence, terrorism, and
war, served as an arena for conflicting international interests in 1982.
By the summer of 1982, Israeli armed forces had pushed the Palestine
Liberation Organization's combatants from the Israeli-Lebanese border
to the Lebanese capital of Beirut."' Hesitant to carry the battle into the
55. 119 CONG. REC. H36221 (Nov. 7, 1973).
56. 119 CONG. REC. S36198 (Nov. 7, 1973).
57. For the President's reaction to the override vote, see White House Statement
Following Action by the Congress Overriding the President's Veto (Nov. 7, 1973), in 9
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1312 (Nov. 5, 1973). For an analysis of the override vote,
see 29 CONG. QUART., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 905 (1973).
58. 129 CONG. REC. S12,986 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1983) (Statement of Senator
John Stennis).
59. See generally T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS
71-76 (1979).
60. See, e.g., Boland Amendment to the 1983 Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-337, § 793 (1982), which prohibited certain military acvtivi-
ties in Central America.
61. Democratic Study Group, Lebanon and The War Powers Act, Special Re-
port No. 98-11 at 9 (Sept. 19, 1983).
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city, the Israelis entered into international negotiations.6 2
On July 6, 1982, President Reagan announced that he had ap-
proved a plan for United States participation in a multinational force
which would supervise the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization fighters from Beirut.63 According to press reports, the Presi-
dent approved the plan on July 2.64 However, he did not consult with
Congressional leaders until the day of his announcement."5 That same
day, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki 6
sent a letter to the President warning of "incalculable effects on execu-
tive-legislative relations" if Reagan failed to trigger the War Powers
Resolution.67 While the President acquiesced in reporting to Congress
concerning the deployment, he rebuffed Representative Zablocki's ad-
monition by failing to specify which of the several sections of the Reso-
lution applied. In so doing, he prevented the time limitations, after
which he could not act on his own authority, from beginning to run.
The Marines completed their evacuation mission on September 10,
1982, and withdrew from Lebanese territory.68 However, during the
next week three events occurred which precipitated a Presidential order
for the Marines to return: the assassination of Lebanese President
Bashir Gemayal, a massacre of civilians by the Christian Phalangist
Militia, and the entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut.69 On Septem-
ber 29, the Marines and their fellow "peace-keepers" landed in Leba-
non once again. President Reagan issued a second report to Congress,
again failing to cite a section of the War Powers Resolution.'
Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which triggers the
time limits for presidential action, applies to situations of "hostilities"
or "imminent involvement in hositlities."7 1 Had President Reagan clas-
sified the situation in Beirut in terms of this section, the sixty-day pe-
riod would have begun. The President's refusal to acknowledge the ap-
62. Id.
63. War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, CSR Issue Brief No.
IB81050 at 3 (updated Sept. 15, 1983).
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id.
66. Democrat, Wisconsin.
67. War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, supra note 63, at 4.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. War Powers Resolution, at § 1543(a).
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plicability of section 4(a)(1)2 continued even after Marines were killed
or wounded on September 30, 1982, March 15, 1983, and September 6,
1983. While the President steadfastly rejected a label of "hostilities"
for the Marine's predicament, he nevertheless coninued to increase the
might of American forces at the scene. By September 1983, the com-
bined naval and land battle group totalled over twelve thousand person-
nel and a large number of surface ships.7 On September 6, 1983, ele-
ments of the naval group fired on gun positions in the mountains
overlooking the Marine contingent. This episode marked the first use of
American naval artillery since the Vietnam war. 4
In Washington, concern over the course of events was brewing in
Congress. In early September, several leaders called on the President to
give Congress a greater role in the situation and to invoke section
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.7 5 However, the administration
responded that any Congressional action would hinder the executive
branch's strategy in the region, and took the position that the War
Powers Resolution was an unconstitutional interference with presiden-
tial authority.76 Despite the President's summary rejection of Congress'
contentions, representatives of the two branches met to work towards
agreement on policy. These negotiations collapsed on September 15,
1983, the President's representatives having refused to accept any
Congressionally-imposed time limit whatsoever. The administration ar-
gued that the Lebanon situation did not qualify as "hostilities" within
the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Secretary of State George
Shultz maintained that the Marines were not engaged in hostilities, but
rather were "in a situation where there is violence. '7 8 Such statements
drew heated retorts from members of Congress." A consensus within
72. Id.
73. Democratic Study Group, The Lebanon Resolution, Fact Sheet No. 98-17 at
I (Sept. 27, 1983).
74. Id.
75. Congress Wants Greater Role On U.S. Presence in Lebanon, CONG. QUART.
1876 (Sept. 3, 1983).
76. Democratic Study Group, supra note 73, at 1.
77. Id.
78. Congress Wants Greater Role On U.S. Presence in Lebanon, supra note 75.
79."We have people up in helicopters, we're shooting rockets and artillery-if that
isn't imminent hostilities, I don't know what is," remarked Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Charles Percy (Republican, Illinois) Id. "It makes a mockery
out of law to suggest that our forces are not engaged in hostilities," concluded Senator
Gary Hart (Democrat, Colorado). Letter from Senator Hart to author (October 6,
1983).
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Congress, that "hostilities" existed as of the first Marine death, began
to take shape.80
Despite its desire to produce bipartisan support for the deploy-
ment, the administration rejected a proposal from the Democrat-con-
trolled House Foreign Affairs Committee that called for invocation of
War Powers Resolution procedures and authorized a stay of up to eigh-
teen months for the Marines in Lebanon. Senate Democrats responded
to this rejection by formally introducing a bill to declare that section
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution and its accompanying time re-
straints applied to the situation in Lebanon. The White House immedi-
ately softened its position, re-opened negotiations with House leaders,
and reluctantly struck a "compromise" that was "virtually identical to
the resolution that was rejected by the administration a week earlier."'
The President accepted the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposal
as a bipartisan compromise. Despite his acceptance of the eighteen
month authorization, concept however, President Reagan did not re-
tract his opinion that the War Powers Resolution was unconstitutional.
In fact, he adhered to the position that neither the Lebanon Resolution
nor the War Powers Resolution could have any impact on his constitu-
tional powers as Commander-in-Chief.
B. Legislative Process
Titled the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, the com-
promise measure was introduced as a joint resolution into both houses
of Congress. From the outset, Congressional debate over the Multina-
tional Force in Lebanon Resolution was a compilation of expressions on
the Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, and current Presidential
policies in Lebanon. Within both houses of Congress there was an ap-
prehension that the proposed resolution was, as characterized on the
floor of the Senate, a "political compromise to [sic] the Leganon situa-
tion [which] instead compromises the very nature of the War Powers
Resolution. '8 2 There was a growing fear that the War Powers Resolu-
tion would be invoked in name only, without any actual limitations on
executive action: "[ilt is a compromise put together to help the admin-
80. Reid, Marines Could Spark Legal Crisis, Washington Post Sept. 20, 1983,
at A8.
81. Democratic Study Group, supra note 73.
82. 129 CONG. REC. S13,131 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983) (statement of Senator
Jim Sasser).
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istration avoid invoking the War Powers Resolution."8 3
The Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution was taken up by
the full Senate on September 27, 1983. One of the architects of the
War Powers Resolution, former Senator' Jacob Javits, submitted a
statement that expressed his view that the Multinational Force in Leb-
anon Resolution was a device beneficial to both the President and Con-
gress.8 4 Opponents of the bill were equally vocal, however.8 5 One Sena-
tor, seeing no benefit to Congress, described the measure as an
invitation for the President to "take 1,600 Marines and the Battleship
New Jersey, and call us in 1985."' 8 A number of attempts to amend
the authorization bill were made and rejected. Senator Robert Byrd 7
introduced an amendment"8 which would have invoked the War Powers
Resolution's time restraints. The Byrd amendment was tabled, 55-45.89
Senator Clairborne Pell ° presented an amendment which provided for
six months of authorization rather than eighteen.91 Senator Pell's
amendment was tabled, 62-38.92 Senator Christopher Dodd 3 and Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy" proposed an additional condition to the continu-
ation of American participation in the multinational force; their
amendment required an American withdrawal if all other contributing
nations withdrew. This amendment was accepted and incorporated into
the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution. 5 Senator Paul Tson-
gas sought to "codify the statements that ha[d] been made,"9 6 referring
83. 129 CONG. REC. S13,132 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983) (statement of Senator
Jim Sasser).
84. 129 CONG. REC. S12,991 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1983).
85. 129 CONG. REc. S13,126-13,132 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
86. 129 CONG. REC. S13,044 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) (statement of Senator
Edward Kennedy).
87. Democrat, West Virginia.
88. Amendment No. 2231, at 129 CONG. REC. S13,041 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1983).
89. 129 CONG. REC. S13,138 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
90. Democrat, Rhode Island.
91. Amendment No. 2228, at 129 CONG. REC. S13,139 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
1983).
92. 129 CONG. REC. S13,143 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
93. Democrat, Connecticut.
94. Democrat, Massachusetts.
95. 129 Cong. Rec. S13,145-46 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983). The Dodd-Kennedy
amendment was also incorporated into the House version of the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution.
96. 129 CONG. REC. S13,147 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
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to the administration's assertions that Marine operations were confined
to the geographic boundaries of Beirut. Tsongas' amendment was ta-
bled, 56-42.97 Senator Thomas Eagleton, 98 himself an important con-
tributor to war powers legislation,9" urged his collegues to "tighten-up"
the Resolution by replacing the word "protective" with the word "de-
fensive" within the context of limits on military activities. " 'Protective'
is a more ambiguous word and susceptible to somewhat broader inter-
pretation than 'defensive'."100 Senator Eagleton's amendment, which
would have changed those words, was tabled 66-34.101
Another amendment, introduced by Senators Carl Levin and Jen-
nings Randolph, attempted to ensure that later judicial review of exec-
utive acts under the War Powers Resolution could not be avoided by
the "political question" doctrine.0 2 The fact that a case challenging
American military activities in El Salvador, Crockett v. Reagan,10 3 was
dismissed as a non-justiciable case involving a "political question" con-
cerned many Senators. In Crockett, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that the issue of whether American
troops were engaged in hostilities in El Salvador required resolution by
the political branches, not by the judiciary.0 According to the district
court, which was subsequently upheld on appeal, the case was "non-
justiciable because of the nature of the fact finding that would be re-
quired."10 5 The text of the proposed amendment included stipulated
facts on which a future judicial decision could be based, including a
factual finding that hostilities existed as of the first Marine death. Such
a finding would be binding on a President that signed on to it. How-
ever, the Senate defeated the effort to "eliminate any escape clause,"
97. Id.
98. Democrat, Missouri.
99. Senator Eagleton contributed to the Senate version of the War Powers Reso-
lution, but did not support the Resolution as it emerged from Conference Committee in
1973. He believed that the Committee's product amounted to a loss of, rather than a
gain in, Congressional authority.
100. 129 CONG. REC. S13,149 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
101. Id.
102. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also Tigar, Judicial
Power, the 'Political Question Doctrine,' and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV.
1135 (1970).
103. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D. D.C. 1982), aff'd. 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D. D.C. 1983).
104. 558 F. Supp. at 888, 889.
105. 558 F. Supp. at 896.
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54-45.1°6 Rather than a finding of fact, the Multinational Force in Leb-
anon Resolution dealt with the "hostilities" issue as a Congresional
declaration, which could not bind the President.
Despite opposition on various grounds, including wide differences
of opinion on policy matters and the need for literal adherence to the
War Powers Resolution, proponents of the Multinational Force in Leb-
anon Resolution found the votes necessary to secure its passage. On
September 29, 1983, the Senate voted largely along party lines and
approved the so-called "bipartisan" measure, 54-46.1°7
In the House of Representatives, the debates did demonstrate a
higher degree of. bipartisanship than existed in the Senate. Still, many
of the arguments were the same. It was asserted that the Multinational
Force in Lebanon Resolution "maintain[ed] congressional responsibil-
ity but allow[ed] the President the latitude he must have." 10 8 The
House debates also revealed the entanglement of issues that existed in
the Senate. Expressing a preference for dealing with the policy ques-
tions, Representative Raymond McGrath 10 9 said that "[t]he issue to-
day is not really whether the President should or should not have in-
voked the War Powers Act in the first place. It is whether a majority of
the people in this House believe our commitment to Lebanon, via the
peace-keeping force, should continue or not."110
Under a semi-closed rule of procedure,' which restricted floor de-
bate, the House basically had only two alternatives to consider. The
first was the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution; the second
was a substitute offered by Representatives David Obey11 2 and Gillis
Long. 1 3 The Obey-Long substitute would have cut off funds for United
States forces in Lebanon after ninety days unless the President either
submitted to section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, or certified
that a cease-fire existed and reported on a monthly basis pursuant to
the War Powers Resolution. This alternative proposal was designed to
"provide a meaningful way for Congress to exercise a role in the deci-
106. 129 CONG. REC. S13,149 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
107. 129 CONG. REc. S13,167 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
108. 129 CONG. REC. H7568 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) (statement of Congress-
man Reid).
109. Republican, New York.
110. 129 CONG. REc. H7619 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
111. H.R. Res. 318 (129 CONG. REC. H7560, daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) limited
debate; Representative Levitas labeled the limitations a "gag rule" (at H7561).
112. Democrat, Wisconsin.
113. Democrat, Louisiana.
1984]
215
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
sion to leave Marines in Lebanon as events change ... . The Obey-
Long substitute was defeated, however, 272-158.115
With the substitute eliminated, the House turned its attention to a
block of amendments offered by Chairman Zablocki. 118 These amend-
ments, which were accepted by the House acting as a Committee of the
Whole and incorporated into the Multinational Force in Lebanon Reso-
lution, 17 changed the requirement for Presidential reports under the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution from at least once every six
months (which would have been consistent with War Powers Resolu-
tion reporting requirements) 1 8 to at least once every sixty days.119
These amendements also noted specific areas to be covered by such re-
ports, and expressed Congressional policy concerns over such matters
as a partition of Lebanon. 20
As Representative William Lehman121 had noted before the de-
bates had begun, "[w]hen the President and the House leadership get
together on something, they usually get what they want. 122 The only
order of business remaining was a vote on the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution as amended. As predicted, the joint resolution
passed, 270-161.123
The next day, September 29, the resolution passed by the Senate
was reported to the House. The significant difference between the Sen-
ate and House versions was the difference in reporting requirements;
the House bill required a report at least every sixty days, 24 whereas
the Senate bill required a report at least every ninety days.125 Chair-
man Zablocki told the House that the President had voluntarily agreed
to a sixty-day requirement, 126 and that there was "no further need for
114. 129 CONG. REc. H7582 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
115. 129 CONG. REc. H7617 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
116. Democrat, Wisconsin.
117. 129 CONG. REC. H7622 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
118. War Powers Resolution, at § 1543.
119. The Senate's version, as debated and passed, specified a 90 day reporting
requirement.
120. These items were eventually deleted from the bill; the House later adopted
the Senate version, which did not contain specified areas to be reported or on policy
opposition to a partition of Lebanon. See infra text accompanying notes 124-29.
121. Democrat, Florida.
122. Interview with Representative William Lehman, in Miami (Sept. 21, 1983).
123. 129 CONG. REC. H7623 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
124. H.R.J. REs. 159, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
125. S.J. REs. 364, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
126. 129 CONG. REc. H7725 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
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discussion or delay."12 The House promptly voted to accept the Senate
version, 253-156,128 to lay aside the previously approved House version,
and to send the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution to the Pres-
ident.1 29 The net effect of the bill's language was to provide statutory
authorization for continued deployment, pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution, without addressing the failure of both Congress and the
President to realize the aspirations of the Resolution.
President Reagan signed the statute into law on October 12, 1983,
and in an accompanying statement 3 emphasized the "bipartisan ba-
sis" upon which foreign policy should be conducted. 31 As expected, the
President expressed "reservations about some of the specific Congres-
sional expressions ' ' 132 in the Resolution. The President's statement
characterized the automatic termination provision of the War Powers
Resolution as an "arbitrary and inflexible"1 33 deadline that imporperly
restricts presidential authority. President Reagan argued that "isolated
and infrequent" 134 attacks upon American forces did not constitute
hostilities which would invoke the "unwise" 13 5 timetable of the War
Powers Resolution.
Most significantly, the statement expressed the President's convic-
tion that despite his signing the Multinational Force in Lebanon Reso-
lution into law, he could not be bound by it:
I believe it is, therefore, important for me to state in signing this
Resolution, that I do not and cannot cede any of the authority
vested in me under the Constitution as President and Commander-
in-Chief of United States Armed Forces. Nor should my signing be
viewed as any acknowledgement that the President's constitutional
authority can be impermissibly infringed by statute, that congres-
sional authorizations would be required if and when the period
specified in section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution might be
deemed to have been triggered and the period had expired, or that
section 6 of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution may be
127. Id.
128. 129 CONG. REC. H7726 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
129. Id.
130. Statement of the President, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. No. 41 (Oct.
12, 1983).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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interpreted to revise the President's constitutional authority to de-
ploy United States Armed Forces.138
The President signed the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolu-
tion to gain a minimum of eighteen months of congressional blessing
for his policies. It was the President's position that the statute in no
way put a maximum time limit on deployment because no statute could
diminish his independent authority over war powers.
V. Conclusion: The Continuing Need For Accountability
The saga of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution high-
lights a need for the nation to once again focus on the process by which
it becomes engaged militarily. Lives of American soldiers were at
stake, yet neither the legislative nor executive branch of the federal
government was willing to stand firm and abide by the provisions of the
War Powers Resolution. Just ten years after its passage, the purpose of
the War Powers Resolution has been substantially undermined. Al-
though just a few months have elapsed since the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution became law, it is not premature to conclude that
the effect of this measure was essentially to restore the pre-War Powers
Resolution status quo in the form of unchecked presidential discretion.
Have the wounds from the Vietnam experience healed so completely
that the nation has forgotten, and failed to learn from them?187 In the
days since the Lebanon Resolution's enactment, more than 240 Ameri-
cans have lost their lives in Lebanon, and hostilities continue.
Since the inception of American troop deployment in Lebanon,
President Reagan chose not to comply with the procedural regulations
and safeguards built into the War Powers Resolution. Before he acqui-
esced in the compromise which evolved into the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution, the President chose not to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the War Powers Resolution in court as a means of forestall-
ing and/or terminating Congressional demands for a role in military
136. Id.
137. See generally Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Preroga-
tive or Usurpation? 55 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1969); Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The
President versus the Constitution, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
711 (R. Falk ed. 1969); Buchan, Questions About Vietnam, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (R. Falk ed. 1969); Van Alstyne, Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1972).
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policy.138 That alternative had little political appeal and presented the
potential for an enormous erosion of executive power; a ruling adverse
to the President's position would inspire more frequent and more effec-
tive congressional action.
The course of action clearly anticipated by the War Powers Reso-
lution would have been for President Reagan to admit the existence of
hostilities in Lebanon as of September of 1982, and to seek congres-
sional authorization for continued deployment. Had the President taken
this step he would have abided by and upheld the law, and realized the
sharing of responsibility that was the intent behind the War Powers
Resolution; further, he would have been in a favorable position to build
truly bipartisan support for his policies both within Congress and
amongst the people. Instead, President Reagan apparently ignored the
letter and spirit of the War Powers Resolution for as long as he could.
When American casualties in Lebanon forced the issue to the forefront,
the President resorted to semantics and arguably attempted to sidestep
the law. In the process, he demonstrated that the United States can
still become involved in a military conflict without due regard for its
own law.
Perhaps Congress is culpable for permitting President Reagan to
evade the War Powers Resolution. For more than a year, Congress sat
idle as American soldiers dug in between warring factions. Congress
failed to require the President to submit to section 4(a)(1) of the War
Powers Resolution, and the sharing of responsibility did not take place.
Congressional abstinence from its lawful role revealed its ignorance of
the fact that "once our troops are committed to a hostile situation, it is
almost impossible to pull them out." 139 In September of 1983, deaths
138. "[The President] and his aides have produced no legal brief or other docu-
ment justifying their refusal to comply with the [War Powers Resolution]. And the
reason is simple: They have none. There is talk in the newspapers, for example, that the
Congress is demanding something that is 'unconstitutional'; but we have seen no Opin-
ion of the Attorney General reaching that conclusion." Lewis, _ N.Y. Times, Sept.
19, 1983 at A-19.
139. 129 CONG. REc. H7582 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) (statement of Represen-
tative Luken). Accord Henkin, A More Effective System for Foreign Relations: The
Constitutional Framework, 66 VA. L. REV. 751, 766 (1975):
[O]nce we are at war, Congressional control-which in my view Congress
continues to have-becomes largely hypothetical. In Indochina, Congress
had constitutional authority, by resolution or through the appropriation
process, to terminate, confine, or otherwise limit our participation. But a
large majority of Congress felt it could not break with the President with-
out jeopardizing the lives of American troops and other national interests.
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and injuries to American troops partially awoke Congress from its
hibernation. As Senator Lawton Chiles 140 remarked, "[f]ive of our
boys had already died by the time Congress got around to consider
invocation of the War Powers Act. '141
Under pressure of public concern for the Marines and the possib-
lity of war, Congress did pass legislation under the War Powers Reso-
lution. That legislation-the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolu-
tion--does little more than "rubber stamp"'142 the President's policies.
The objective of the War Powers Resolution, according to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, was to "allow the President and Congress
to work together in mutual respect towards their ultimate, shared goal
of maintaining the peace and security of the nation."' 43 Neither the
objective of the War Powers Resolution, nor the "ultimate goals" in-
volved were achieved by the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution.
The Lebanon experience sets a dangerous precedent for the future.
The President and Congress have failed to demonstrate an understand-
ing that "loophole-making is not in [their] own, nor in the country's
best interest.' 44 With the judiciary an unlikely participant in the reso-
lution of war powers issues,145 concurrent irresponsibility on the part of
the executive and legislative branches upsets the treasured American
notion that the United States is a "nation of laws, not men."' 146
The Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, and the national
policies that it represents, have rekindled public concern over "presi-
dential credibility and integrity, [over] congressional gullibility, and
[over] the effectiveness of our foreign policy system.' 1 47 The experi-
ence, and the possible renewal of attention to the process through
which war powers are implemented, may bring about refinements in
In a word, the constitutional restraints on the President existed but were
not effective.
Id.
140. Democrat, Florida.
141. Letter from U.S. Senator Lawton Chiles to author (Nov. 29, 1983).
142. Id.
143. H.R. REP. No. 93-287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
144. FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 56, at 75.
145. War powers are "so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of gov-
ernment as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
146. Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 292 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
147. Henkin, supra note 135, at 761.
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the process and an increased awareness both within the government
and the public. In the future, both the President and Congress must
overcome the tendency to confuse a military policy with the lawful pro-
cedure to implement that policy. The procedure, the War Powers Reso-
lution, requires democratic control over questions of war and peace.
"Democratic control involves decisions made by all the federal repre-
sentatives of the people-the president, the Senate, and the House--on
a timely and informed basis."1 48 Both the President and Congress must
abide by the War Powers Resolution, or change it through the legisla-
tive process. This note makes no suggestion for changes in the statute,
because absent a commitment to the principles of shared power and
responsibility, a change of language will not compel either the Presi-
dent or Congress to be faithful to the ideal. Only an informed public, a
citizenry that keeps watch over the process by which its country enters
into international hostilities, can require adherence to the law and to
democratic principles on the part of their elected representatives.
Paul D. Novack
148. Reveley, supra note 1, at 93.
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Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha: A
Legislative "House of Cards" Tumbles
I. Introduction
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,' decided
June 23, 1983, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional
an exercise by Congress of a legislative veto provision under section
244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 The ramifications
of the Court's decision, affirming the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit,3 are broad in scope, affecting both the theoretical implications
of the doctrine of separation of powers and its practical application to a
wide range of federal statutes." Consequently, the Court's ruling in
Chadha has received public attention usually afforded only to Supreme
Court decisions concerning first or fourteenth amendment rights. 5
The scope of this comment will be threefold. First, it will examine
generally the roots of the decision in Chadha by focusing on the doc-
trine of separation of powers. The philosophical basis for the doctrine
will be shown as it affected the Framers' vision finally set out in the
United States Constitution. The structure of the Constitution will be
investigated, to better glean specific instances, as well as general princi-
ples, of the doctrine. Case law prior to Chadha will also be discussed to
better understand the Supreme Court's past interpretation of the doc-
trine leading up to the Chadha case. Second, the Chadha case itself
will be treated, focusing separately on the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions and the relative merits of each position. Finally, the
1. - U.S.__, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (the decision was 7-2; Burger, C.J. writ-
ing for the majority, Powell, J. concurring, and White and Rehnquist, JJ. dissenting in
separate opinions).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976). See infra note 73.
3. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1980).
4. Justice White states "[tioday the Court... sounds the death knell for nearly
200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.'"
Chadha, - U.S. at .. , 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (White, J. dissenting). For an exhaustive
list of statutes so affected see id. at ., 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16 app. 1.
5. See N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, June 25, 1983,
§ 1, at 9, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, § 4, at 1, col. 5; Wash. Post, June 24,
1983, at A4, col. 1.
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"aftermath" of Chadha will be discussed: its effect on statutory law in
general, questions of severability, and the possible contours of a legisla-
tive response to the case.
II. Separation of Powers Doctrine
A. Philosophical Basis
Since the writings of Plato,6 the idea that coordinate branches of
government should be separate as to their essential functions and pow-
ers has been axiomatic to various theories of benign government. Aris-
totle first authored that which may be seen as a treatise on the doctrine
of separation of powers. 7 Yet, it was not until after the Enlightenment
that the doctrine gained force and proved a ground for heated debate.
Locke discussed the doctrine at length. He rested his arguments for
separation of powers on the need for a balance of powers, not only to
check the executive and legislative branches,' but also to provide a
buffer against monarchial tyranny." However, it was in 1748 when
Charles de Montesquieu published his treatise, The Spirit of the
Laws,10 that the doctrine of separation of powers was first articulated
in the form later adopted by the Framers of the United States
Constitution.
Montesquieu begins his treatment of separation of powers by iden-
tifying three types of power constituitive of government in general: the
legislative, the executive, in terms of matter of civil law.1' This tripar-
6. PLATO, LAWS in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 1360 passim (E. Hamilton ed.
and trans. 1961). Plato's ideas on the separation of powers are in no sense crystallized
in the Laws. Part of this confusion can be attributed to the constant repart6e between
the principals in the dialogue, true to the Socratic concepts of logos and dialektikon.
7. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 156-63 (H. Rackham trans. 1932). Along with this gen-
eral expos6, Aristotle further divides into three elements that which the good politician
must consider in framing a constitution: the deliberative element, the administrative
element, and the judicial element. Id. at 189. See also ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN
ETHICS 158-61 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962). For a broad overview of Aristotle's place in
the philosophical development of the doctrine of separation of powers see generally M.
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 21-22 (1967).
8. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 243-46, 356, 370, 382-84, 386,
392 (P. Laslett ed. 1970).
9. Id. at 382.
10. C. MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES LOIX (J. Gressaye ed. 1950).
11. 2 id. at 63 ("II y a dans chaque Etat trois sortees de pouvoirs: la puissance
legislative, la puissance executrice des choses qui dependent du droit des gens, et la
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tite scheme closely follows that proposed by Locke, a fact not the least
startling since Montesquieu models his utopian form of constitutional
government on the English constitution. 2 Indeed, the entire section of
The Spirit of the Laws dealing with the separation of powers is subti-
tled "On the English Constitution." 3 Montesquieu then elucidates his
notion of the third power of government and ascribes to it the power of
judgment,1 4 thus closely paralleling the modern notion of the judiciary.
He goes on the point out that these three powers should be exercised
separately by branches of government entrusted to each, lest tyranny
result.15 The political liberty of all subjects of government would be
compromised if one hand should wield two or more powers
concurrently.16
Interpretation of Montesquieu's theory led to two widely divergent
schools. The first school states that Montesquieu's exposition of the
doctrine of separation of powers can best be seen as an advocacy for a
"pure" doctrine of separation of powers:
[A] "pure doctrine" of the separation of powers might be formu-
lated in the following way: It is essential for the establishment and
maintenance of political liberty that the government be divided into
three branches or departments, the legislative, the executive, and
the judiciary. To each of these three branches there is a corre-
sponding indentifiable function of government. . .Each branch of
the government must be confined to the exercise of its own func-
tion and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other
branches.17
puissance executrice de celles qui dependent du droit civil.").
12. See M. VILE, supra note 7, at 86. The English judiciary had strong feelings
embracing the separation of powers. Blackstone states:
In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, or the right of
making and enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same
man .... But, where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct
hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a
power, as may tend to the subversion of it's own independence, and there-
with of the liberty of the subject.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *146. For a complete background on constitutional
law in England, see generally H. GREAVE, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION (1958).
13. C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, at 63.
14. Id. ("la puissance de juger..
15. Id. at 63-64.
16. Id. at 64.
17. M. VILE, supra note 7, at 13 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the 'pure' doctrine would opt for complete autonomy of the
separate branches of government. It would constitute "a thoroughgoing
separation of agencies, functions, and persons." 18 Indeed, it has been
argued that Montesquieu's treatment of separation of powers cannot,
by definition, be seen to admit of any mixing of function.1 9
A second school argues, however, that Montesquieu's theory can
be interpreted as allowing for a partial separation of powers. This
would result in a system of checks and balances between branches to
ensure the non-encroachment of one branch upon another's exercise of
its essential functions.2 0 The argument here is that without the strong
need for independence of branches, due to the fact that the representa-
tive branches would cease to be coordinate in nature:21 one branch,, if
subordinate to another, could not a priori check another's abuse of a
power vested to a third branch.
It is difficult to ascertain with exactitude Montesquieu's actual po-
sition relative to the two schools. 2 However, it is readily apparent
which school of thought was adopted by the Framers of the United
States Constitution.
B. The Framers' Vision
It is clear that there was a general consensus that Montesquieu's
ideas were to be interpreted, for the purpose of drafting the Constitu-
tion, as advocating a mixed form of partial separation of powers.2 3 This
18. Id. at 85.
19. See W. Struck, Montesquieu als Politiker, 298 HISTORISCHE STUDIEN 1, 68-
69 (1933). But see 2 C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, at 72-73, where it is stated that
there must be three exceptions to the non-unification of the legislative and the judicial
powers: "(1) In cases of trial of nobles, trial should not be held in a common court, but
rather by peers in the legislature. (2) In cases of impeachment. (3) For the purposes of
mitigating criminal sentences." Id.
20. See M. VILE, supra note 7, at 85-86.
21. Id. at 95.
22. See Hazo, Montisquieu and the Separation of Powers, 54 A.B.A. J. 665,
668 (1968).
23. This is not to say that there was no diversity at all on this issue. During the
"'newspaper debates" on the drafting of the Constitution there were dissenting voices
disfavoring the doctrine. See Centinel I, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, Oct. 5,
1787 reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION at 330-31 (M. Jensen ed. 1976). However, upon the taking of actual vote dur-
ing the structured debates on the adoption of the Constitution, the tripartite structure
was passed unanimously in the affirmative. See 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOP-
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uniformity of thought as to the horizontal aspect of separation of pow-
ers, concerning separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial
functions, traversed the political rift dividing the Federalists and the
non-Federalists concerning the vertical aspect of the doctrine, concern-
ing the sparation of federal as opposed to state powers. Even Jefferson,
firmly a non-Federalist, gave his stamp of approval to the separation of
branches of government.24
Of course, the incorporation of the separation of powers into the
Framers' vision of the Constitution must be set upon a backdrop of the
Articles of Confederation, a decidedly nonfederalist document. To
those living under the Articles "[the] union was merely a means to
their end, the independence of the several states. . .centralization was
to be opposed."'2 5 Indeed, the non-Federalist sentiments backing the
Articles were "antagonistic to any government with pretensions toward
widespread dominion."26 Thus, any federal structure superimposed on
the several states must be controlled. Although such control is afforded
by an adoption of the vertical doctrine of separation of powers alloting
to the states certain sovereign rights, such protection is also given
through implementation of the horizontal doctrine. Through the hori-
zontal doctrine, in its mixed form, each branch provides protection
aganist encroachment by coordinant branches. This translates into
greater protection of individual citizens when confronted with the fed-
eral system.27 Thus for example, the peoples' will, as represented in the
legislative branch, could not be foiled by an executive override which
would invade the essential function of the legislature.
James Madison wrote, concerning the idea of partial horizontal
separation of powers:
From these facts by which Montesquieu was guided it may clearly
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 183 (1836).
See generally Diamond, The Zenith of Separation of Powers Theory: The Federal
Convention of 1787, 8 PUBLIUS 45 (No. 3 1978) (issue analysis of the debates of 1787);
Carey, Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model. A Reply to the Critics, 72
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 151 (1978) (a rethinking of the Madisonian viewpoint as relates to
the Federalist and the Federal Convention).
24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) in T. JEF-
FERSON, SELECTED WRITINGS 68 (H. Mansfield ed. 1979).
25. M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 161 (1940). See also U.S.
ART. OF CONFED. art. II.
26. M. JENSEN, supra, at 161.
27. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 48-50 (1913).
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be inferred, that in saying 'there can be no liberty where the legis-
lative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body
of magistrates,' or 'if the power of judging be not separated from
the legislative and executive powers,' he did not mean that these
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over
the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and
still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, [the
English constitution], can amount to no more than this, that where
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department, the funda-
mental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.28
This view was reiterated by Madison in debate during the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787, where he emphasized the need for separa-
tion on a partial basis between the executive and judicial branches.2 9
The means by which this separation should be instituted "consists in
giving those who administer each department, the necessary constitu-
tional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others." 0 In this way the checks and balances of power will check am-
bition against ambition.31
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 245 (J. Madison) (G. Wills ed. 1982). See also
1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 393 (5th
ed. 1905):
But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of gov-
ernment, and maintain that the separation is indispensable to public lib-
erty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to
affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct,
and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the
other, in the slightest degree.
Id.
29. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 34-35 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911) (debate of Tuesday, July 17, 1787). Here Madison argues for the full collat-
eral nature of the judiciary in the scheme of government. There are suggestions that
this full treatment of the nature of the judiciary is the great American innvation on
Montesquieu's initial theory. See W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 125 (Tulane Studies in Political Science No. 9, 1965). The judiciary had a
special place in the separation of power since "[tihe aid of the judges as council of
revision would double the advantages and diminish the dangers of his [the executive's
position." 1 F. THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 343
(1901). See also THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE
AMERICAN STATES lxxxiv (W. Solberg ed. 1958) (introduction by W. Solberg).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 262 (J. Madison) (G. Wills ed. 1982).
31. Id.
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C. The Constitutional Text and pre-Chadha Interpretation
Cases concerning the separation of powers are few in relation to
other areas of constitutional interpretation. The cases deal with a wide
variety of governmental powers. Additionally, cases concerning separa-
tion of powers arise in a decidedly intense political setting, due to the
primordial nature of the doctrine in the constitutional scheme. Factu-
ally, the cases concern seizure by the executive of steel production,3 2
claims of executive privilege in the Senate "Watergate" investigation,3
the nature of the executive's position as Commander in Chief of the
armed forces,3 and, of course, the propriety of the legislative veto.3 5
Therefore, the constitutional principles of separation of powers are at
times best described as obscure.
The Supreme Court has, since its inception, maintained Madison's
view of partial horizontal separation of powers. Justice Brandeis explic-
itly stated in Myers v. United States:
The separation of the powers of government did not make each
branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure, de-
pendent upon the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in
some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and
judicial.3 6
Justice Brandeis also pointed out that the "[c]hecks and balances
were established in order that this should be 'a government of laws and
not men.' "37 This language finds further support in Buckley v. Valeo
where the Court states, "a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of
Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively." 88 This, however, is ex-
actly the problematic aspect of adjudications on separation of powers;
namely, how much encroachment is constitutional? To state this query
conversely: what is an essential function of a given branch for purposes
of determining the constitutionality of the acts of a coordinate branch?
In general, there are two ways to violate the separation of powers.
32. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
33. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
34. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
35. Chadha, - U.S. .. , 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
36. 272 U.S. at 291 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
37. Id. at 292.
38. 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
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First, one branch may interfere with another branch's assigned func-
tion. Second, one branch may assume a function entrusted to another
branch. 9 When a constitutional violation takes place in the first in-
stance, it is usually due to an unconstitutional claim of privilege, in an
attempt to exclude a member of one branch from a process associated
with an essential function of another branch. Thus, the Court held as
unconstitutional, as violation of separation of powers, a claim by Presi-
dent Nixon to "an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presiden-
tial communications. ' 40 The failure to produce documents upon the is-
suance of a subpoena duces tecum for judicial consideration interfered
with the judicial branch's primary function: "to say what the law is. '
The Court stated that since "the legitimate needs of the judicial pro-
cess may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those
competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions
of each branch. 42 It is interesting to note that the claim of Presidential
privilege itself was based on an absolute view of separation of powers.43
However, the need for partial separation was again reaffirmed.44 The
Court revisited this problem in Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices.45 After his resignation from the Presidency, Nixon had executed
an agreement with the Administrator of General Services which lim-
ited access to certain documents accumulated during his term of office.
After five years of limited access, the agreement stipulated that the
documents could be destroyed at Nixon's behest. Congress passed a bill
signed into law by President Ford which directed the Administrator to
take custody of the documents. On appeal, Nixon argued that the act
was unconstitutional as violation of separation of powers. 46 The Court
rejected this contention stating that "the proper inquiry focuses on the
39. See Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371,
384-85 (1976). Justice Powell also points out this distinction in Chadha, - U.S.
103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J. concurring). See infra note 130.
40. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703.
41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
42. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
43. Id. at 706.
44. The judiciary, early in its history, had held that a subpoena may issue to the
President to both compel his attendance as a witness to trial and to produce any paper
which a party to the suite has a right to avail himself or for purposes of testimony. See
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (Marshall, C.
J., presiding).
45. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
46. Id. at 441.
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extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned function,' thereby rejecting any pure
doctrine of separation of powers.
Separation of powers may also be constitutionally violated when
one branch assumes a function constitutionally entrusted to a coordi-
nate branch. Early in its history the Court addressed legislative en-
croachment in uncertain terms:
It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general
rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to
individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other depart-
ments. How far the power of giving the law may involve every
other power, in cases where the constitution is silent, never has
been, and perhaps never can be, definitely stated.' 8
However, in latter cases the degree of constitutionally permissible
infringement by the legislature upon other branches was further re-
fined. In J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,'49 the Court held
constitutional a delegation of quasi-legislative power to the President,
which allowed the President to increase or decrease import and export
duties.50 The Court distinguished between an unconstitutional delega-
tion of law making ability to the executive and a constitutional confer-
ence of discretion to the executive as to the execution of the law.51 It
further held:
Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the
Executive Branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect
intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such of-
ficers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and di-
recting the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing
for penalizing a breach of regulations. 2
47. Id. at 443.
48. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
49. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
50. Id. at 411.
51. Id. at 407. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 315-19 (1936) where the Court upheld a delegation of legislative power to the
President. The Court stated that the contention of invalid delegation was irrelevant in
the area of foreign affairs where the executive has full plenary authority.
52. J.W. Hampton, Jr. and Co., 276 U.S. at 406.
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In Springer v. Government of the Phillippine Islands,53 decided
the same year as Hampton, it was held that the legislature had uncon-
stitutionally assumed an executive function when it appointed corporate
directors of the government held National Coal Company. The Court
stated that the legislature had exercised an appointment power wholly
within the province of the executive branch.14 Thus, "[t]he appoint-
ment of managers. . .of property or a business is essentially an execu-
tive act which the legislature is without capacity to perform. .. .
Legislative usurpation of a judicial function was the issue in
United States v. Brown.56 The respondent was convicted under an act
of Congress which made it a crime for a member of the American
Communist Party to hold a position on the executive board of a labor
organization. The Court first stated that the bill of attainder clause"
was intended to implement the doctrine of separation of powers by
prohibiting a legislative exercise of judicial power. 58 The clause should
be liberally construed in order to prevent legislative punishment 59 and a
denial of an individual's constitutional rights.60
Executive incursions into coordinate branches' constitutionally pre-
scribed functions have met with less equivocation on the part of the
Supreme Court. In Little v. Barreme (the "Flying Fish" Case)" the
President's seizure of ships on the open seas, without legislative author-
ity, was seen to be an unconstitutional fashioning of law by the execu-
tive.6 2 It is difficult to say with precision why intrusions by the execu-
tive were initially dealt with on more firm ground than the legislative
instrusions. Perhaps acts by the executive were sui generis more sus-
pect by the Court due to the spectre of the British monarchy still pre-
sent in the minds of many. Another explanation might also be that the
President, by virtue of his singular position in the infant executive de-
partment, brought close scrutiny of his every act to bear upon his office.
53. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
54. Id. at 202. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
55. Springer, 277 U.S. at 203.
56. 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (per curiam).
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
58. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442-46.
59. Id. at 447-49. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 491-99
(1978).
60. The individual rights of freedom of speech and belief and the right to due
process under the laws were at issue in Brown.
61. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
62. Id. at 177.
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Clearly, the most representative case of the executive overreaching is
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the "Steel Seizure"
case).6 3 President Truman had commandeered the nations' steel mills
without statutory authority, to avert a national strike of steelworkers.
The President claimed authority for his actions from the aggregate
powers vested in the executive branch under Article II of the Constitu-
tion and particularly under the President's powers as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces.6 ' Both of these arguments were rejected by
the Supreme Court.65 It was clear that the "military powers of the
Commander in Chief were not to supersede representative government
of internal affairs." 66
It is very rare indeed for the court to call the judiciary into ques-
tion on a violation of separation of powers. This may be due to the
unique position the judiciary enjoys vis-i-vis the doctrine. Although a
third branch of government, set out separately in article III of the Con-
stitution, and thus subject to the same constraints under the doctrine as
the executive and the legislature, the judiciary is the branch which en-
forces the constitutional mandates of the doctrine. It thus is preeminent
among the branches as arbiter of the doctrine. Indeed, the judiciary,
for the purposes of separation of powers, must determine the limits of
63. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For an informative study of the political climate and
inside story of the Steel Seizure Case, see generally A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE: YOUNGSTOWN STEEL AND TUBE CO. v. SAWYER (1958).
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
65. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 587-89; cf United States v.
Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1872) (where the Court upheld a seizure of private
vessels in order to transport military supplies, during the time of war. This was justified
due to the direct emergency at hand, even though there was no statute in force). Id. at
629.
In dicta in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., Justice Jackson proposes that there is
substantial dimunition in the "war powers" of the executive where there is merely a
conflict and not a de jure war:
But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more
sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign af-
fairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly en-
large his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own com-
mitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.
343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J. concurring).
66. Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme
Court, 51 MicH. L. REV. 141, 167 (1952). But cf. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A
Judicial Brick Without a Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 61-62 (1953) which argues
that the President's power under the suspect executive order is the same kind of power
that de facto exists in exigent national circumstances.
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its own power. The very equilibrium of the doctrine depends on the
courts. 67 One case where the Court called the judiciary into question
was In re Debs. 8 There, the Court upheld a lower court of equity's
issuance of an injunction without express statutory authority. Although
the injunction was upheld and did not encroach upon the legislative
lawmaking function, modern commentary points out that Debs "might
be viewed as a case in which both the Court and the executive usurped
the legislative function of Congress."6
Thus it may be said, as an overview of Supreme Court decisions
treating separation of powers, that there exist no clear lines of demar-
cation concerning that which constitutes a violation of the doctrine.
This is a field of constitutional decisionmaking where very broad, yet
primordial, principles are applied on a case-by-case basis, each subse-
quent case further elucidating the meaning of separation of powers. In
Chadha, the Supreme Court once again faced the task of interpreting
this difficult doctrine.
III. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
A. The Facts of Chadha
Jagdish Rai Chadha was admitted to the United States on a non-
immigrant student visa in 1966. He is an East Indian, born in Kenya
and the possessor of a British passport. His student visa expired on
June 30, 1972. The District Director of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be
deported. This occurred on October 11, 1973. Pursuant to statute70 a
deportation hearing was held on January 11,1974 before an immigra-
tion judge. Chadha admitted his deportable status, but the hearing was
adjourned in order to allow him to file an application for suspension of
deportation under statute.71
67. See Fellman, The Separation of Powers and the Judiciary, 12 REv. OF POL.
357, 376 (1976).
68. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
69. Levi, supra note 39, at 382.
70. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976).
71. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) pro-
vides in relevant part:
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may,
in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien
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The deportation hearing was continued after Chadha had submit-
ted his application for suspension. On June 25, 1974, on the basis of a
character investigation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and supporting afidavits, the immigration judge ordered Chadha's de-
portation suspended and submitted a report of suspension to Con-
gress.7 2 Congress had the power by statute to veto such a suspension.7
Congress did not exercise this veto power until the first session of the
Ninety-Fourth Congress. On December 12, 1975 a resolution was in-
troduced into the House of Representatives opposing the suspension of
deportation of Chadha and five other aliens.7 4 The resolution was
who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation
and-(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the pro-
visions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that
during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character
and is a person whose deportation would in the opinion of the Attorney
General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence.
72. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1) pro-
vides in relevant part:
Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to
meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney Gen-
eral may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deporta-
tion of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a
complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of
law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such
suspension.
73. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) pro-
vides in relevant part:
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a)
of this subsection-if during the session of the Congress at which a case is
reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following
the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or House of Rep-
resentatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor
the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon
deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own
expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law.
74. H.R. Rep. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 40247 (1975). The
resolution was passed onto the House Committee on the Judiciary for consideration. It
is fairly clear that the Committee's consideration was perfunctory at best, as is attested
to by Representative's Eilberg's simplistic rationale for the revocation of Chadha's sus-
pension of deportation:
It was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the
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passed without debate or a recorded vote. It was neither presented to
the Senate nor to the President, as is constitutionally mandated for
legislation.
In the wake of this resolution, deportation proceedings were re-
opened. The immigration judge held that he had no authority to rule on
the constitutionality of the House's actions. On November 8, 1976,
Chadha was ordered deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals which summarily affirmed the lower administrative
court. Chadha then sought judicial review, under statute, of the admin-
istrative appeal court's decision. He filed a petition for review in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service agreed with Chadha's position and
joined with him in arguing for the unconstitutionality of the House's
actions. The court of appeals invited both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to file briefs amicus curiae.
The court of appeals held that the House was in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers in its exercise of the legislative veto. 5
The House and Senate then filed motions to intervene and petitions for
rehearing. The court of appeals granted the motions to intervene but
denied rehearing. Later motions for rehearing en bane were also de-
nied. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court as to
the appeal taken by the House of Representatives. 8 Oral arguments
were had on February 22, 1982. The case was reargued October 7,
1982. The Court filed its final decision June 23, 1983. 7
aliens contained in the resolution did not meet these statutory require-
ments, particularly as it relates to hardship; and that it is the opinion of
the committee that their deportation should not be suspended. I should
emphasize that this is a disapproval resolution and unless it is adopted in
this session of Congress permanent residence will be granted to those
aliens named in the resolution.
121 CONG. REc. 40800 (1975) (statement of Rep. Eilberg).
75. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 436. The case was originally argued before and submit-
ted to a panel consisting of circuit judges Ely, Carter and Kennedy on April 10, 1978.
It was then reassigned to a panel consisting of circuit judges Ely, Kennedy and Hug on
August 13, 1980.
76. 454 U.S. 821 (1981). Judgment as to jurisdiction over the Immigration and
Naturalization Service was postponed until the merits.
77. Counsel present in the case were as follows: Alan B. Morrison for Chadha,
the Solicitor General Rex Lee for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Eugene
Greesman for the House of Representatives, and Michael Davidson for the Senate.
Briefs amicus curiae were filed by the American Bar Association and the Counsel on
Administrative Law of the Federal Bar Association.
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B. The Majority Opinion
1. Threshold Issues
Before embarking upon the constitutional inquiry concerning the
legislative veto provision in the Act, the Court addressed several thresh-
old issues challenging the justiciability and the jurisdiction of the case.
First, the Court considered a challenge to its appellate jurisdic-
tion.78 The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court was a proper forum
for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1252, that the proceeding below was a
civil suit pursuant to the statute, and that the appellant in this case was
aggrieved by the proceeding below within the meaning of section
1252.79 Even though the Immigration and Naturalization Service to-
gether with Chadha sought the invalidation of the House's action, the
Service was aggrieved because it was bound by statute to execute an
order of Congress which might be held unconstitutional.8" Thus, appel-
late jurisdiction was found to have been properly taken.
The Court next turned to the issue of severability. The Court
soundly rejected the contention that section 244(c)(2) was not severa-
ble from the remainder of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The
Court noted that if the subsection was not severable, the entire statute
would be unconstitutional. Chadha would, therefore, be deported since
the Attorney General would have no power to suspend deportation.81.
However, the Court took notice that the Act employs a self-executing
severability clause82 which renders any portion of the Act held uncon-
stitutional void and severed from the remainder of the Act. s Further-
more, the legislative history of the Act demonstrated that it was in-
tended by its drafters to facilitate severability." Finally, it was stated
that, as a general rule, a provision is presumed severable if the remain-
der of the statute after severability would be operative as law. 5 Thus
"section 244(c)(2) survives as a workable administrative mechanism
78. The Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252
(1976). See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
79. Chadha, - U.S. at .. , 103 S. Ct. at 2773. See supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. Id. at ., 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
82. Id.
83. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 406, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
84. Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2775.
85. Id.
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without the one-House veto." 86 Chadha also had standing to appeal.
The Court rejected the position that Chadha lacked injury in fact and
merely represented the interests of the executive branch. The injury
was possible deportation; an injury which would be redressed if the leg-
islative veto were to be held unconstitutional. 7
Likewise, the Court rejected the argument that it should avoid the
constitutional issue in the case on the grounds that Chadha had alter-
native statutory relief available to redress his injuries. Although
Chadha married a citizen of the United States during the pending ap-
peal and might have been accorded resident status as an immediate
relative,88 such classification was speculative at best.89 Equally specula-
tive was the possibility that Chadha may have been granted asylum by
the Attorney General if he was unable to return to his homeland for
fear of persecution. Thus, Chadha had no substantive alternative re-
lief available to him which might have precluded the Court from con-
sideration of the constitutional aspects of the case.
The Court also refuted a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court
of appeals under the Act.91 It was claimed by the House of Representa-
tives that 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) could not sustain jurisdiction since
Chadha was not challenging the deportation determination but rather
the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision. Nevertheless, it
was held that since Chadha's status as deportable was de facto depen-
dent upon the constitutionality of the Act, he was challenging the de-
portation determination itself. 92 The relief he sought was directly in-
consistent with the deportation order.93 Therefore, jurisdiction was
properly taken in the court of appeals.
Next the Court focused on the contention that the case did not
constitute a genuine controversy under the "case or controversy" clause
86. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2776.
87. Id.
88. Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 201(b), 204, 245, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b),
1154, 1255 (1976).
89. Chadha, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2777.
90. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2776. The Court here refers to the Refugee Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
91. The court of appeals took jurisdiction under section 106(a) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § lI05a(a) (1976). See Chadha, 634 F.2d at 411-
12; see also Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
92. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2778.
93. Id.
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of the Constitution.94 It was argued that this question was moot since
the House and the Senate intervened in the action.95 However, the
Court continued to point out that even "prior to Congress' intervention,
there was adequate article III adverseness even though the only parties
were the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Chadha."9
Resting on the same rationale employed to dispell the challenge to its
appellate jurisdiction, the Court held that, notwithstanding the fact
that Chadha and the Immigration and Naturalization Service both saw
the legislative veto as unconstitutional, Chadha would still have been
deported by the Service. This provided the requisite adverseness.
2. Political Question Doctrine
The justiciability of the case was also brought into question under
the political question doctrine. The gravamen of the contention was
that the "naturalization"97 and the "necessary and proper"98 clauses
conferred upon Congress unbridled power over the disposition of aliens.
Thus any adjudication in the case would amount to a decision of a
nonjusticiable political question.
The Court rebutted this argument by indicating that "[t]he ple-
nary authority of Congress over aliens. . .is not open to question, but
what is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitution-
ally permissible means of implementing that power."99 Baker v. Carr
states that a political question may arise when there is "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to coordinate po-
litical department. . ... "00 If it were to be held that means of imple-
menting a plenary authoriity was beyond judicial scrutiny under the
political question doctrine, then it would follow that "virtually every
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be a political ques-
tion."10' This conclusion is untenable since it would wrest constitutional
decisionmaking from the judiciary, impeding, if not totally disrupting,
its primary article III function.10 2
94. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
95. Chadha, - U.S. at - 103 S. Ct. at 2778.
96. Id.
97. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cI. 4.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
99. Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2779.
100. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
101. Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2779.
102. Id.
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3. The Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto 03
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, began with the pre-
103. The topic of the constitutionality of the legislative veto had received much
attention prior to the Supreme Court's decision on the case. For an in-depth analysis of
the court of appeals' decision in Chadha see Comment, Limiting the Legislative Veto:
Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1721 (1981).
Most scholarly opinion before the determination of the case argued for the uncon-
stitutionality of the legislative veto. See, e.g., Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Sep-
aration of Powers: The Executive on a Leash? 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978); Martin,
The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L.
REV. 253 (1982); Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 593 (1976); Kahn, In Perpetual Tension: Executive-Legislative Relations and
the Case of the Legislative Veto, 11 PRES. STUD. Q. 271 (1981); Committee on Federal
Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Legislative
Veto Symposium, 28 AD. L. REV. 575 (1976); accord Keefe, Can a Legislative Veto
Be a Bill of Attainder, 68 A.B.A. J. 103 (1982); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and
Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agen-
cies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064 (1981); Cooper and Hurley, The Legislative Veto: A
Policy Analysis, 10 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 1 (1983); But see Javits and Klein,
Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52
N.Y.U.L. REV. 455 (1977); Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Re-
sponse to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REV. 323
(1977); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978); Bruff and Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Ad-
ministrative Regulations: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 13§9
(1977); cf. Fisher, A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes, 93 POL. Scl. Q. 241
(1978) (viewing the legislative veto as a useful prudential device). See generally S.
BERBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
(1975) (demonstrating the general pros and cons of the legislative veto as it concerns
delegation of Congressional powers).
Many "general" periodicals also noted the prospective battle on the horizon. Uni-
formly, they view the legislative veto as constitutionally improper. See Witter, The
Legislative Veto: A Fight on the Horizon, BUREAUCRAT, Summer 1980, at 31; Miller,
The Legislative Veto, PROGRESSIVE, May 1978, at 12; Shapiro, Legislative Veto: Lat-
est Power Fight, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1982, at 88; Green and Zwenig,
The Legislative Veto Is Bad Law, 227 NATION 434 (1978).
It is also interesting to note that prior to Chadha, Presidential disapproval of the
legislative veto process transgressed party lines. President Carter voiced strong disap-
proval of the veto. President's Message to Congress Transmitting His Views on the Use
of the "Legislative Veto," H.R. Doc. No. 357, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). President
Reagan also criticized the veto as unconstitutional concerning various bills before him
for consideration. Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981,
1981 PUB. PAPERS 1207 (1981); Amendments to the Tribally Controlled Community
Colleges Assistance Act of 1978, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 7 (1983); Amend-
ments to the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 19 WEEKLY
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sumption of validity of the challenged legislative veto provision. The
only inquiry which the Court was concerned with was the constitutional
basis of the statute, not its wisdom.10 The Chief Justice, however, off-
set this token bow to judicial restraint with the statement that mere
utilitarian virtues will not shield the statute from constitutional scru-
tiny. Indeed, "[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objec-
tives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government .. ."05 This state-'
ment serves two functions. First, it posits a constitutional truism.
Second, it anticipates and undermines Justice White's characterization
of the legislative veto as a useful mechanism.106
The Chief Justice then turned to a discussion of the "presentment"
clauses 07 of the Constitution. It was the Framers' intent that the pre-
sentment clauses provide the necessary safeguards to protect the sepa-
ration of powers. Both the presentment to the President and the Presi-
dential veto were considered integral to the entire fabric of the
Constitution."0 8 The powers given to Congress were "to be most care-
fully circumscribed."109 This was to protect the public from any oppres-
sive legislation which might be passed under the guise of a "private
bill." This danger is one of contemporary concern, given the various
political sentiments which might prompt self-interest legislation not
calculated to evince the will of the people in general. The Chief Justice
also pointed out that the presentment clauses insure a national view-
COMP. PREs. Doc. 38 (1983).
104. Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
105. Id. at 2781.
106. Id. at 2785 (White, J. dissenting). This, as is seen later, is a vast oversimpli-
fication of Justice White's position in his dissent, amounting to the commission of a
"straw man" fallacy.
107. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3 provide in relevant part:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the
United States. . . . Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Con-
currence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President
of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be ap-
proved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules
and Limitations presented in the Case of a Bill.
Id.
108. Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2782.
109. Id.
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point in the legislative process. 110 Although the legislature is the elected
body representative of the aggregate of the people, so too is the Presi-
dent elected. There may be some situations in which the people's will is
better represented by him. It is in this capacity as the executive repre-
sentative of the people that his veto has full significance. It manifests a
check for the people on improvident legislative measures, just as the
two thirds veto override of Congress operates as a cross-check for the
people against ill-advised executive denials of the legislative will.
Having dealt with the presentment clauses, Chief Justice Burger
turned to the issue of bicameralism.""' He stated that a primary pur-
pose of bicameralism is to protect against hatily considered legislation.
The requirement of passage by both Houses of the legislature makes
mandatory careful and full consideration of any proposed law before it
cvould take effect.11 2 Nonadherence to the bicameralism principle could
erupt into a legislative tyranny. At first blush, this view seems plausi-
ble. However, upon perusal of the Chief Justice's bicameral argument,
it becomes apparent that his conclusion rests upon an ill reasoned inter-
pretation of the purposes of bicameralism. Certainly the primary pur-
pose of the bicameral requirement was to assuage the lesser populated
states as to their representation in the legislature. By providing for the
Senate, the Framers called for equal representation by state, regardless
of the relative population of the states. This was not the case with the
representation of the House of Representatives, allotted solely on the
basis of population. This protected individual state identity-if not, in a
sense state sovereignty-in the congress. Thus, any legislation to be put
into effect must both pass a vote by the representatives of the numbers
of people and by the representatives, irrespective of the numbers, of the
several states. This is not to say that the Chief Justice's reasoning is
without merit. Close scrutiny of proposed laws is an important incident
to bicameralism. However, it is misleading to place this rationale upon
the Framers as an exclusive one.
The majority then turned to the analysis of the constitutionality of
110. Id. at 2782-83.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides that "[a]ll legislative powers herein
agranted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 also insures bi-
cameralism. See supra note 107.
112. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2783. See also Brief for Appellee at
57, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983); Brief for Appellant at 29, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
- U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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section 244(c)(2) under the presentment causes, bicameralism, and the
separation of powers. Chief Justice Burger stated that "[a]lthough not
'hermetically" sealed from one another, . . .the powers delegated to
the three branches are functionally indentifiable."113 When a branch
acts, there is a presumption that it acts constitutionally within its
sphere of delegated powers. 114 However, in order that the acts of the
House may be held to the letter of the presentment clauses and bicam-
eralism, it must be established that the House acted in a legislative
manner. The Chief Justice held that there can be no doubt that the
House of Representatives acts were legislative in nature. The House
sought to alter the legal rights of Chadha, the Attorney General, and
administrative officials in general. This alteration could only have been
achieved by legislation, since there is no plenary authority under the
Constitution for such acts by the House.11 5 The intent of Congress in
authorizing the one-house legislative veto also demonstrates its legisla-
tive veto also demonstrates its legislative nature:
After long experience with the clumsy, time consuming private bill
procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the
Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the au-
thority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in cer-
tain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to
delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be im-
plemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in
Art. I."16
Thus, given the legislative character of its acts, the House has in-
vaded the executive's constitutionally delegated powers by circum-
venting the presentment clauses and bicameralism. There are four situ-
ations in which one house may act without presentment and these
situations are expressly set out in the Constitution: 1) the House of
Representatives may initiate impeachment proceedings, 2) the Sen-
ate may conduct trials of impeachment and convict pursuant to those
113. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2784-85.
116. Id. at 2786. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-15, Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (argued
Feb. 22, 1982) where Mr. Gressman, counsel for the House of Representatives, is ques-
tioned in hypothetical form about such a delegation and its legislative character.
117. Chadha, - U.S. at-, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl.
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proceedings,"1 3) the Senate has final approvement power over presi-
dential appointments,119 and 4) the Senate may ratify presidentially-
negotiated treaties. 20 In the face of these express exceptions to present-
ment and bicameralism, it is apparent that the Framers intended that
these be special instances and that no implied powers along these lines
should be recognized.121 The constitutional tapestry is woven with the
inviolable thread of separation of powers which was "intended to erect
enduring checks on each Branch."' 2
The House of Representatives argued, however, that the affirm-
ance of the court of appeals would have the effect of sanctioning law-
making by the Attorney General, which in turn would amount to a
circumvention of the bicameral process.1 23 The Chief Justice cogently
pointed out that even though agency activity may be viewed as quasi-
legislative, bicameral checks on this activity are not constitutionally
mandated since executive acts within the administrative activity are
limited in scope by statutory enactments of Congress, pursuant to arti-
cle I, sections 1 and 7. Therefore, the Attorney General acts presump-
tively in an executive capacity, although delegated by Congress certain
quasi-legislative responsibilities; a capacity which does not receive con-
stitutional scrutiny under bicameralism or under the presentment
clauses.' 24
Thus, the majority in Chadha held section 244(c)(2) unconstitu-
tional in violation of separation of powers os set forth in the present-
ment clauses and the mandate for bicameralism, affirming the judg-
ment below in the court of appeals. 25
C. Justice Powell's Concurrence
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment of the majority, would
118. Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 3, cl.
5.
119. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2.
120. Chadha, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2.
121. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
122. Id.
123. Brief for Petitioner, U.S. House of Representatives at 40, Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
124. Chadha, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
125. Id. at 2788.
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hold the legislative veto as applied in this case unconstitutional as a
violation of separation of powers on different grounds from the major-
ity. Justice Powell rightly noted the breadth of the majority's holding;
it "will invalidate every use of the legislative veto."12 In a plea for
judicial restraint, Justice Powell stated that the holding of the Court
"should be no more extensive than necessary to decide this case." 117
Congress evidently viewed the legislative veto as an essential check on
its delegation of power to the executive in the form of administrative
agencies. Due to the nature of the legislature as a coordinate branch of
government, due respect should be accorded its judgments, inasmuch as
the constitution .will countenance such respect. Thus, Justice Powell
would hold that Congress has assumed a judicial posture in violation of
separation of powers in its use of the legislative veto in this case. He
would not reach the overly broad questions of validity under the pre-
sentment clauses and bicameralism.' 28 However, Justice Powell's opin-
ion must not be easily dismissed as a limited holding, merely deferen-
tial to a coordinate branch of government. The opinion is tightly
reasoned, and provides a more secure rationale for Chadha than the
majority furnishes.
Justice Powell begins his analysis by establishing the Framers' at-
tention to the necessity of the separation of the legislative and judicial
branches. Such intent may be seen in the text of the Constitution in the
bill of attainder clause, which must be read as an implementation of
the separation of powers doctrine.129 The doctrine may be violated in
two ways. First, a branch may interfere with another branch's constitu-
tionally delegated function. Second, a branch may actually assume a
function delegated to a coordinate branch unconstitutionally. This case
is of the second genre.130
That the House usurped a judicial function in Chadha is clear.
First, they had not enacted a general rule, rather they had specifically
determined the status of Chadha's individual rights. 31 Second, even if
the House's actions were not to be seen as providing a de novo adjudi-
126. Id. (Powell, J. concurring).
127. Id. at 2789.
128. Id. at 2792.
129. Id. at 2789-90. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Although Justice Powell
does not assert that the legislative veto is a bill of attainder per se, such a position has
been advanced. See Keefe, supra note 103, at 103.
130. Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J. concurring). See
supra note 39.
131. Id. at _., 103 S. Ct. at 2791.
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cation, they have taken on the color of an appellate tribunal.3 2 This
has dangerous implications for Chadha's rights. Congress, unlike the
courts, is not bound constitutionally by substantive rules of due process,
nor "procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing
before an impartial tribunal .. ."" This danger was further com-
pounded in this case where the House abandoned even its own normal
procedures for considering resolutions due to time constraints.134 In-
deed, "[t]he only effective constraint on congress' power is political. 13 5
This hardly provides a procedural safeguard against an abuse of a per-
son's individual rights. Further, although Congress "is most accounta-
ble politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability,"136 here
it prescribed a special rule determinative of Chadha's individual rights.
Thus, there is no shred of political accountability here. 37
Justice Powell also successfully rebutted the majority's criticism of
his position that Congress had assumed a judicial function. Chief Jus-
tice Burger states that Justice Powell's position cannot be maintained
because the determination of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice presented an nonjusticiable issue, unreviewable by a court on ap-
peal.138 Justice Powell aptly reasoned in retort that "reviewability" is
not coextensive with "adjudication." Although procedurally a court of
appeals may not review a substantive decision by the Attorney General
in such a case, this does not diminish the judicial character of Con-
gress' acts.139
The strength of Justice Powell's opinion can best be seen in the
light of Consumer Energy Comm'n of America v. FERC,1 40 summarily
affirmed by the Court subsequent to Chadha. In FERC, a legislative
veto in a natural gas pricing rule promulgated by the Federal Regula-
tory Commission was held unconstitutional. However, in FERC the
132. Id.
133. Id. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2792.
134. Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 2791 n.6. Congress had the Attorney General's
report on the suspension of Chadha's deportation for a year and a half. However, there
was no action taken until three days prior to the running of the statute of limitations
period. Thus, the resolution was neither circulated nor effectively debated.
135. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2792.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2787 n.21 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2791 n.8 (Powell, J. concurring).
140. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). The lower court's opinion may be
found at 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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veto was a two-House veto. This vitiates the force and applicability of
one prong of the majority's holding in Chadha.
Thus, Justice Powell was not willing to declare, as the majority
did, the unconstitutionality of every legislative veto provision. These
provisions are extant in numerous enactments of Congress and may
present differing degrees of intrusiveness, some of which may be uncon-
stitutional, others which may not.14
D. Justice White's Dissent
Justice White strenuously dissented from the majority's holding.
He joined Justice Powell in a plea for judicial restraint, although Jus-
tice White would not hold the legislative veto in this case unconstitu-
tional. Initially, Justice White recognized the utility of the legislative
veto as evidenced by its historical application.142 In his view Congress
faces a dilemma in the absence of the legislative veto. Either the legis-
lature must refrain from delegating authority to the executive or it
must allow the adminstrative agencies unbridled lawmaking power.14 3
He then attacked the majority's heavy reliance on the Framers' intent
in deciding the constitutional question. The complexities of modern
government are well beyond those which confronted the Framers.14 4
However, not willing to rely solely upon this utilitarian argument, Jus-
tice White proceeded to the conclusion that the legislative veto in
Chadha does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
Justice White argued that only bills and equivalent enactments of
Congress should be required to pass muster under the presentment
clauses and the requirement of bicameralism. The legislative veto does
not rise to the dignity of a bill because "[t]he power to exercise a legis-
lative veto is not the power to write new law without bicameral ap-
proval or presidential consideration."" 45 The legislative veto no more
gives Congress lawmaking ability through one house than the presiden-
tial veto gives such power to the executive. 46 The presentment clauses
only apply to actions for which concurrence of the two houses is "nec-
141. See Chadha, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. 2792-2816 passim (White, J.
dissenting).
142. Id. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2793-96.
143. Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 2793.
144. Id. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2798.
145. Id. at .__, 103 S. Ct. at 2799.
146. Id.
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essary."1 47 It is not clear that this mandate covers the legislative veto in
this instance. Legislative authority is delegated to agencies as a matter
of course. Justice White argued that the Congress must have an effec-
tive means to check the power of such agencies which is thus dele-
gated. 14 8 Paradoxically, the majority held that the independent agen-
cies may indulge in making "rules" with the force of law, whereas the
legislature, the branch constitutionally entrusted with lawmaking au-
thority, may not check such power in the agencies.149
Justice White also urged that there is a de facto concurrence of
opinion on the part of both houses and the President. The Attorney
General manifests the President's approval in submitting a report to
Congress recommending suspension of deportation. The House and
Senate may tacitly approve this recommendation by their silence. If
either the Senate, the President, or the House of Representatives dis-
agrees, then Chadha's status is maintained deportable. 150 The suspen-
sion order does not in and of itself maintain Chadha as nondeportable,
it merely defers deportation. 151 Thus, there has been a concurrence of
the three interested entities before a change of Chadha's status.
Justice White's argument is suspect on three points. First, there
has not been a concurrence of the House and Senate in this case. The
House of Representatives acted on its own in its veto. Second, the con-
cept of tacit approval by either the Senate of the House's action or by
both houses of the Attorney General's suspension of deportation is
highly debatable. It is more likely that silence on the part of either
house manifests nescience or apathy rather than considered approval.
Third, the contention that Chadha's status is not altered from that of a
deportable alien to that of a nondeportable alien by the Attorney Gen-
eral's suspension of deportation begs the question. Concurrence of opin-
ion on the part of the two houses and the executive are necessary to
establish the status of Chadha.
Justice White's arguments against the necessity of presentment
and bicameralism for the validity of the legislative veto further draw
light upon the insufficiencies in the majority's opinion, lending transi-
tively more force to Justice Powell's concurrence. Justice White at-
tempts to draw Justice Powell's opinion into question by asserting that
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
148. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2802 (White, J. dissenting).
149. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2804.
150. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2806.
151. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2807.
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Congress has not exercised a judicial function, since a refusal of sus-
pension by the Attorney General is judicially reviewable.' 52 However,
this argument is ill-founded. In Chadha, it is the reviewability of grant-
ing of suspension of deportation that is the question. The problem is
that Congress has put itself into that reviewing posture.
Therefore, even though Justice White would not hold that all leg-
islative vetoes are constitutional, he would hold that in Chadha the veto
did not violate the separation of powers. Indeed, the veto provides "a
necessary check on the unavoidably expanding power of the agen-
cies. . .as they engage in exercising authority delegated by
"1153Congress.
E. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Rehnquist declined to reach the merits of the case. He
opined that section 244(c)(2) was not severable from the remainder of
the statute. Stating that a severability clause was not dispositive on the
issue of severability in general, he argued that the intention of Con-
gress discloses the section's inherent unseverability. Congress never in-
tended that a class of persons in Chadha's position would be able to
take advantage of a suspension of deportation.15 Thus the statute is
only severable if Congress would have intended that the Attorney Gen-
eral be able to suspend deportations without the section in question. To
hold otherwise would be to expand the statute beyond its own
bounds . 55 However, the majority's tripartite test for severability en-
tirely undercuts this offering. 58 Justice White joined in the dissent.
IV. After the Fall: What May Congress Do?
It is evident from the Court's decisions subsequent to Chadha that
the breadth of the majority's holding will reach all legislative veto pro-
visions in other statutes. 57 The central issue now is: how may Congress
constitutionally implement alternative schemes for checking powers
delegated to the administrative agencies?
152. Id. at . 103 S. Ct. at 2810.
153. Id.
154. Id. at . 103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist and White, JJ. dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at ... _, 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76 (majority opinion). See supra p. 22.
157. See FERC, - U.S. , 103 S. Ct, 3556; Consumers Union v. FTC, -
U.S. ... , 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) affig 691 F.2d 575 (1982) (en banc).
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One issue left open by Chadha is severability. Although the legis-
lative veto provision in Chadha was deemed severable, such may not be
the case in all statutes, depending on explicit statutory language and
legislative history. A constitutional attack on a non-severable legislative
veto provision would result in the unconstitutionality of the otherwise
valid remainder of the statute in question. Thus Congress may step
back and allow the judiciary to invalidate legislative veto provisions on
constitutional grounds, on a case-by-case basis. The main drawback
with this "wait and see" scheme is that the courts will have to deter-
mine in each case the severable or non-severable nature of each veto
provision, hardly an efficient or uniform method of settling the dispute
at hand. It seems clear that the first step in a resolution of Congress'
dilemma must be to excise all legislative veto provisions from statutory
law. Having done this, Congress has numerous options at its disposal to
replace the checks on the administrative agencies previously afforded
by the legislative veto.
Although some doomsayers have proposed that all rulemaking ca-
pacities of agencies should be eliminated or that there be a constitu-
tional amendment to validate the legislative veto, 58 there exist more
prudent measures available to Congress. Congress may choose to dele-
gate with greater specificity to the agencies. 1 With greater restrictions
accompanying delegation to the agencies, Congress would retain a
check on agency overstepping without putting itself in the unconstitu-
tional role of an appellate body. This would result in extremely compli-
cated statutory law making in many ways resembling code enact-
ment.160 It would require a virtual overhaul of well over one hundred
statutory provisions. A more expeditious alternative along these same
lines simply would be to revoke much of the authority already residing
in the agencies. More than likely, a combination of these two ap-
proaches would prove most effective.
Congress may also opt for a more formal scheme to check agency
power. One such scheme might be a "delayed effectiveness" provision
allowing Congress a period of time to enact legislation to annul or oth-
158. See Smith and Struve, Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69
A.B.A. J. 1258, 1261, 1262 (1983).
159. Congress has already taken steps in this direction by imposing new restric-
tions on the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See H.R. 2668, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H4759 (daily ed. June 29, 1983).
160. How Congress May Replace the Legislative Veto, Bus. WK., July 11, 1983,
at 29.
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erwise affect a newly enacted regulatory rule161 The problem with this
approach is that such a provision would seem to be subject to bicamer-
alism and presentment criteria, as was the case with the legislative
veto.1 6
2
Congress may also resort to a more coercive measure. It may cur-
tail agency power by declining to authorize funds for activities it deems
undesirable.1 1 3 This approach may be lacking since it would foster
"special interest" lobbying concerning funds allotted to specific agen-
cies. It may be argued that this is already a common practice regarding
agency funding; however, it is clear that this common practice would
be escalated if such withholding of funds became "formalized" as a
Congressional check against the executive agencies.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling in Chadha has vast implications on
the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. It de-
nudes as unconstitutional a longstanding legislative mechanism for
checking agency abuse of delegated rulemaking power, making it nec-
essary for Congress to adopt alternative schemes to accomplish this
goal. The range of statutes so affected is broad; so broad that the Court
invalidated more legislation in Chadha than was invalidated cumula-
tively in the entire history of the court.'
There are reservations concerning the breadth and logic of the ma-
jority's holding. Justice Powell's well reasoned concurring opinion pro-
vides a better rationale for the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto
and demonstrates a properly narrow holding on facts of the case, a
holding which would not unadvisedly call to task all legislative veto
provisions.
Regardless of the wisdom of the majority's holding, Chadha stands
as the most recent pronouncement on the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers, a doctrine which commands a central position in the development
of constitutional interpretation. From its inception in Greek philosophy,
through its crucial formulation by Montesquieu and ultimately to its
uneven treatment in the Supreme court, the doctrine has remained at
161. Smith and Struve, supra note 158, at 1261.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1262.
164. Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2810-11 (White, J. dissenting).
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the vortex of political controversy. Chadha is no exception to this
observation.
Fred L. Rush, Jr.
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